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1
Introduction?
Few economic decisions are ever made in a social vacuum. Many of us look
constantly to others for guidance or for comparison. Our actions might benefit
or hurt others, so we use said actions strategically to reward or to punish. We
are appalled if our sense of distributional justice gets wronged and refuse to
cooperate with those who offended it. Over the past decades the emergence of
behavioral economics has put these social aspects of decision making into sharp
focus. Behavioral economics has advanced our collective understanding of so-
cial preferences and comparisons by incorporating insights from neighboring
disciplines such as psychology or political science. A key ingredient for this evo-
lution lies in the controlled examination of human behavior – frequently using
laboratory or field experiments – to uncover its underlying mechanisms. The
causal identification of these hidden motives in turn gave rise to new theoreti-
cal models that include reciprocity or preferences for status and fair outcomes.
This thesis consists of five essays that each contribute to different facets of the
literature on the behavioral impact of social comparisons and social preferences.
All of them employ laboratory or field experiments and combine them with the-
oretical frameworks that incorporate different kinds of social motives.
In Chapter 2 (joint work with Sebastian Kube, Hannah Schildberg-Hörisch
and Elina Khachatryan), I study how social preferences can hamper the adoption
of efficient legislation. Institutions and their endogenous adaption are increas-
ingly thought to facilitate cooperation and to mitigate the free-rider problem
inherent in the provision of public goods. In this paper, we test within a unified
framework how the process of institution formation is affected by three key as-
pects of natural environments: i) heterogeneity among players in the benefits of
cooperation, ii) (a)symmetry in players’ institutional obligations, and iii) poten-
tial trade-offs between efficiency and equality in payoff allocations. We observe
social preferences to be limiting the scope for institution formation. Inequality-
? I would like to thank Holger Gerhardt for outstanding TeXnical assistance and numerous
helpful comments.
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averse players frequently object to institutions that fail to address differences
in players’ benefits from cooperation – even if rejecting the institution causes
monetary losses to all players.
Building on these results, Chapter 3 (joint work with Sebastian Kube) in-
vestigates the interplay between cooperation and redistribution if individuals
profit heterogenously from public goods. We analyze such situations, both from
a theoretical and empirical perspective, to explore to what extent formal redis-
tribution can alleviate the implementation problem. We find that the answer to
this question depends on whether redistribution and governance i) form two dis-
tinct institutions to be decided upon separately or ii) are “bundled” into a single
institution. Implementation and cooperation rates are higher in the latter case,
where parties decide over the joint implementation of the combined institution.
By contrast, coordination problems arise if redistribution is available separately
from, rather than being an integral component of, the governing institution; re-
sulting in significantly lower cooperation rates compared to the bundled case.
In Chapter 4 I study how social preferences can be leveraged to obtain valu-
able information about employees. Peer evaluations are frequently used if an
employee’s performance is hard or even impossible to observe by a principal. If,
however, the evaluating peer is in direct competition with the evaluated peer
for bonuses or promotions, incentives for truthful reporting might be reduced. I
explore to what extent team-incentives – in contrast to fixed wages – can encour-
age truthful evaluations. I use a laboratory experiment that combines a real ef-
fort task and a rank-order tournament, where the prizes are distributed on basis
of themutual evaluations of the tournament participants. I find that the outcome
depends on whether the participants i) can evaluate their peers individually or
ii) have to rank them. Team-incentives have significant positive impact on the
sincerity of peer evaluations only in the latter case. Without team-incentives and
forced rankings the evaluation behavior carries little to no meaning.
In Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 (joint work with Lukas Kießling and Jonas Rad-
bruch) I investigate whom individuals choose as peer and how these self-selected
peers impact individual performance. While the influence of peers on our con-
sumption behavior, general well-being, and individual performance on the job
or in school is widely accepted, we know relatively little about how these peers
arise in the first place. Frequently they are not randomly selected, but might be
carefully chosen. We conduct a field experiment in physical education classes
at secondary schools. Students participate in a running task twice: first, the stu-
dents run alone, thenwith a peer. Before the second run, we elicit preferences for
peers. We experimentally vary the matching in the second run and form pairs ei-
ther randomly or based on elicited preferences. We find that students on average
prefer peers of higher ability, but these preferences vary with their personality
traits. Higher competitiveness, lower extraversion, and an internal locus of con-
trol are associated with preferences for superior peers. Taking social network
| 3
information into account, we find homophily in agreeableness and attitudes for
social comparisons even conditional on friendship ties. These self-selected peers
improve individual performance by .14-.15 SD relative to randomly assigned
peers. While self-selection leads to more social ties and lower performance differ-
ences within pairs, this altered peer composition does not explain performance
improvements. Rather, we provide evidence that self-selection has a direct ef-
fect on performance and provide several markers that the social interaction has
changed. Regarding the design of peer assignment mechanisms, our results also
highlight the importance of accounting for the multidimensionality of peer pref-
erences. In summary, this thesis documents effects on individual behavior that
are not predicted by standard economic theory, but underscore the relevance
of social preferences for our understanding of economic decision making and
behavior, and the design of efficient institutions.

2
Institution Formation and
Cooperation with Heterogeneous
Agents ?
2.1 Introduction
“[...] a set of rules used in one physical environment may have vastly different
consequences if used in a different physical environment.”
(Ostrom, 1990, p.22)1
Cooperation problems are ubiquitous in many areas in economics, ranging
from teamwork or hold-up problems in managerial economics, over community
governance or property rights security in development economics, natural re-
source management or climate protection in environmental economics, trade
obstacles or treaty formation in international economics, to tax compliance and
the provision of public goods in public economics. Each example certainly has its
own distinctive issues, but when it comes to mitigating the underlying coopera-
tion problems, there is usually a common approach: the modification of individ-
uals’ incentive-compatibility constraints, such that “free-riding” is no longer the
dominant strategy (e.g., Shavell and Polinsky, 2000). These modifications (im-
plicitly or explicitly) impose restrictions on individuals’ choice sets, which raises
the question whether they will be implemented in the first place (e.g., Gürerk
et al., 2006; Tyran and Feld, 2006; Kosfeld et al., 2009; Bierbrauer and Hell-
wig, 2011; Markussen et al., 2014). In the present paper, we will shed light on
this central question – asking in particular to which extent i) the heterogeneity
? Financial support from the German Research Foundation (DfG) through SFB-TR 15 is grate-
fully acknowledged.
1 Reported, inter alia, in Decker et al. (2003).
6 | 2 Institution Formation and Cooperation with Heterogeneous Agents
of the involved players and ii) the (a)symmetry of the restrictions affects their
implementation.
Consider the following example that we use throughout the paper, namely
the provision of a public good. If members of a society are perfectly identical
and all benefit equally from overcoming this social dilemma, one might expect
them to mutually agree on establishing an institution that eliminates the so-
cial dilemma.2 However, controversies might arise when members are heteroge-
neous and have different stakes in overcoming the social dilemma. In particular
when equality considerations are taken into account, the exact content of the
institution is key to successful implementation. Symmetric institutions, in which
all members have the same obligations, might be rejected in favor of asymmet-
ric institutions with member-specific obligations – even if this implies monetary
losses for all members.
To causally identify how institution formation is affected by selected aspects
of natural environments, we conducted a series of laboratory experiments. The
basic underlying game, a public-good game, is a prominent workhorse for study-
ing cooperation problems. Each player receives an endowment and has to de-
cide on its allocation between private consumption and contributions to a public
good. Provision of the public good creates benefits for all group members and is
socially efficient in terms of the sum of monetary payoffs.3 However, the individ-
ual marginal return from the public good is below the marginal return from pri-
vate consumption, such that free-riding incentives exist which jeopardize public
good provision. To offer players the opportunity to endogenously mitigate the
cooperation problem, we add an additional stage that is played prior to the pub-
lic good game. At this first stage, players decide on implementing an institution
using unanimity voting. If all players in the group vote in favor of the institu-
tion, they are committed to certain efficiency-enhancing contribution levels in
the subsequent public good game.4 If at least one player votes against the imple-
mentation of the institution, the regular public good game is played and each
player can freely decide how much to contribute in the second stage.
Players in our setup thus start in the absence of institutions and subsequently
decide on the implementation of a joint institution to foster cooperation. In such
2Of course, expected benefits must exceed the costs of implementing the institution. Through-
out the paper, we take this for granted by assuming the institution to be costless – notwithstanding
that the case of positive costs would be interesting to study (e.g., Kamei et al., 2015).
3 Throughout the paper, efficiency refers to monetary payoffs.
4One could also think of the institution as consisting of two elements: i) It states a certain
obligation for each player, i.e., the exact amount that he is required to contribute in the second
stage, and ii) it installs a deterrent sanctioning technology, i.e., players’ contributions are mon-
itored and a player receives harsh punishment when deviating from the required contribution.
For reasons of simplicity, the second component is not an explicit part of the experiment. Instead,
it is implicitly modeled by restricting a player’s choice set in the second stage to the required
contribution (see Kosfeld et al., 2009; Gerber et al., 2013, for similar approaches).
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an initial, lawless state of nature that is characterized by sovereign players fac-
ing a social dilemma, it seems natural to use unanimity voting for deciding
on the implementation of institutions.5 In fact, unanimous decision-making is
the easiest possible, if not the only, voting procedure that players do not have
to explicitly agree upon prior to voting. It does not require players to give up
sovereignty, since each player can veto any decision. This is different for non-
unanimous voting rules, such as majority voting, where players need to forfeit
part of their sovereignty and which therefore typically only emerges after a joint
history of cooperation.6
Since our focus is on how institution formation is affected i) by heterogene-
ity in players’ benefits from cooperation, and ii) by the (a)symmetry of obliga-
tions, we vary these factors in a controlled manner while fixing the decision rule
to unanimity voting in all treatments. First, in some treatment conditions (Ho-
mogeneous types), all players are of the same type and, thus, receive the same
benefits from the public good, while in other conditions (Heterogeneous), there
are two types that differ in their marginal benefits. Second, we vary the content
of the institution. All players are either obliged to contribute their entire endow-
ment to the public good (Symmetric Institution), or obligations differ between
the two player types (Asymmetric). While the symmetric institution implies effi-
cient public good provision, but inequality in payoffs for heterogeneous players,
obligations in the asymmetric case are chosen such that final payoffs are equal-
ized. This setup allows us to clearly identify the roles of inequality aversion and
efficiency concerns in the process of institution formation.
We find that inequality considerations can hamper the formation of efficient
institutions meant to foster cooperation. With heterogeneous player types, those
with low marginal benefits frequently object to the symmetric institution (about
40% reject it). The same is observed for homogeneous player types with asym-
metric institutions (about 45% reject it). On the other hand, support is high
when the institution implements equal payoff allocations: the asymmetric insti-
tution seems perfectly acceptable for heterogeneous player types, as does the
symmetric institution for homogeneous types. In both cases, more than 90% of
all votes are in favor of the implementation.
With respect to the sum of monetary payoffs, we observe that efficiency is
always lower when institution formation failed than when the institution was im-
plemented. The symmetric institution for homogeneous player types performs
5 The idea of an initial state of nature that is characterized by sovereign agents in a lawless
environment goes back to Rousseau (1762) and Hobbes (1651).
6 Cooperation in past periods may foster trust and reciprocal behavior among players, which
may make them willing to forfeit part of their sovereignty. To give just one example, international
organizations, most notably the League of Nations as the precursor of what is now the United
Nations, used to apply the unanimity voting rule for voting on matters of substance before World
War II. It was only during the post-war growth in international coordination through permanent
organizations that non-unanimous voting rules were increasingly applied.
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best (average efficiency is above 90% of the maximally obtainable sum of pay-
offs). Compared to this, under heterogeneity both the symmetric and the asym-
metric institution lead to lower rates of efficiency, albeit for different reasons. In
the former case, average efficiency is lower because the symmetric institution
is frequently rejected. In the latter case, heterogeneous player types frequently
implement the asymmetric institution, but average efficiency is lower since to-
tal obligations and the level of public good provided are lower. The asymmetric
institution for homogeneous players performs worst.
The striking differences in average efficiency and implementation rates be-
tween treatments underline at least three important issues. First, our results
stress that inequality aversion can have a strong impact on the process of institu-
tion formation. In most of the existing studies on institution formation, introduc-
ing social preferences to the theoretical models usually leads to stronger support
for the institution; be it because more players want to be part of a coalition than
is predicted under standard preferences (e.g., Kosfeld et al., 2009; McEvoy et al.,
2015), or because the institution to be implemented allows them to reduce free-
riders’ payoffs (e.g., Markussen et al., 2014). By contrast, in those cases where
inequality-aversion makes a difference in our setup, inequality-averse players
are predicted to be less inclined to support the formation of the institution – a
phenomenon that has not been discussed so far in the corresponding literature.
As can be seen in our data, this easily leads to situations where players forego
monetary payoffs by objecting to efficient institutions; in particular given the
requirement of unanimous decisions.
However, and this is the second point we would like to stress, the use of
unanimity voting for implementing institutions must not always be detrimental
to efficiency. On the contrary, it can even help to foster cooperation.7 Already
Wicksell (1964) discusses that institutions based on unanimity or consensus
voting can be ideally suited to overcome the canonical problem of free-riding.
Unanimity makes individual activism implicitly conditional on the activism of
all other parties involved. This mitigates the dilemma of institution formation:
those who agree on implementing an institution do not face the subsequent risk
of free-riding by non-supporting, and thus non-participating, players (see also
Maggi and Morelli, 2006). Consequently, there is no drawback in supporting
institutions that are based on unanimous decisions; either all players partici-
pate and the institution is formed, or the institution is not created at all. This
can be clearly seen when comparing our data to related studies that implic-
7 Apart from this, there is also another desirable feature of unanimity. It is easy to agree on a
principle of unanimity, since every party has veto power and freedom of choice is thus granted (at
least ex ante, before an institution is implemented). Moreover, recent evidence implicitly suggests
that many people value unanimous decisions, and that they have a strong preference for involving
all players in the decision-making process (see Decker et al., 2003; Sutter et al., 2010; Linardi
and McConnell, 2011, and the references therein).
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itly allow players to “opt out” of institutions (Kosfeld et al., 2009; Gerber et al.,
2013). While efficient and equitable institutions are frequently not implemented
in those other studies, we observe that such institutions receive strong support
and are implemented most of the times when unanimity is required.
Of course, this is not to say that unanimity will lead to stronger cooperation
all the time. The unanimity voting rule grants de facto veto rights to every party
involved. Therefore, it is crucial that the institution to be voted on addresses
idiosyncratic interests amongst the involved parties. We see this in our study,
since homogeneous players frequently reject asymmetric institutions, and het-
erogeneous players regularly reject symmetric institutions. Support for the lat-
ter is also found in lab experiments by Banks et al. (1988), and Kesternich et al.
(2014), as well as in the survey evidence reported in Reuben and Riedl (2013).
The importance of fixing appropriate institutional obligations beforehand is also
reflected in the literature that studies homogeneous players’ acceptance thresh-
olds on minimum contribution requirements in public good games (Birnberg et
al., 1970; Dannenberg et al., 2014; Rauchdobler et al., 2010). Taken together,
the evidence strongly suggests that prior to the ultimate voting about the imple-
mentation of an institution, great care has to be taken ex ante in designing the
institution.
The institution at hand is implicitly built around a centralized authority
with a deterrent sanctioning technology, but also other institutional mecha-
nisms could be implemented to foster cooperation (e.g., Apesteguia et al., 2013;
Falkinger et al., 2000; Andreoni and Gee, 2012). One could even think about im-
plementing decentralized sanctioning regimes. Of course, the seminal papers by
Ostrom et al. (1992), Gächter and Fehr (2000), and Fehr and Gächter (2002)
started with the basic idea of mutual monitoring and punishment among the
members of a group; focusing in particular on the question whether certain be-
havioral norms can emerge, even in the absence of formal institutions with a
centralized structure. Still, there are some studies where players do vote over
the implementation of decentralized sanction regimes (Putterman et al., 2011;
Markussen et al., 2014; Kamei et al., 2015). Those studies exclusively focus on
majority voting and homogeneous agents. It might be interesting to reconsider
their results in our setup with heterogeneous players, or to see how behavior
would change when using unanimity voting procedures.
Finally, in particular the results of our two benchmark treatments, where ho-
mogenous or heterogeneous players face only a regular public goods game and
are not given the option to implement an institution, directly add to a broad
strand of literature on “asymmetric” public goods. This literature has different
approaches to studying the impact of asymmetries on cooperation; most com-
monly by varying the ratio of costs to benefits between players of the same
group (see, e.g., the seminal paper by Fisher et al. (1995), and the recent work
byMcGinty andMilam (2013)), or by introducing inequalities in players’ endow-
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ments, be it explicitly, (e.g., Cherry et al., 2005), or implicitly by using different
action sets for different agents, (e.g., Khadjavi et al., 2014). Just like in our data,
where contributions are lower with heterogeneous agents but the difference falls
short of being significant, the existing empirical evidence is mixed: with some
studies reporting lower contributions in the presence of an asymmetry, some re-
porting higher contributions, and others finding no effect at all on cooperation
levels (see, for example, Anderson et al. (2008), p.1014f, for a detailed review of
the findings). Maybe most notable for our context are the findings from Riedel
and Schildberg-Hörisch (2013). In their setup, asymmetry is implemented by
exogenously imposing requirements on minimum contribution levels that differ
between the two (otherwise symmetric) players that form a group. These obliga-
tions are non-binding and are backed up by non-deterrent sanctions only. Still,
the authors observe that non-binding obligations shape contribution behavior,
but in contrast to our findings, the effect is only temporary and vanishes over
time.
The outline of the paper is as follows. Section 2.2 describes the experiment
design. In Section 2.3, behavioral predictions for subjects’ behavior will be de-
rived, using both standard and social preferences (inequality aversion). Sec-
tion 2.4 presents and discusses the empirical results. Section 2.5 concludes.
2.2 Experiment
In natural environments, the complexity of the process of institution formation
makes it particularly difficult to draw causal conclusions about the conditions
under which institutions come into being. As a starting point, we therefore use
the controlled environment of laboratory experiments to study central aspects of
the endogenous formation of institutions. In this section, we present the design
of our experiment and describe the implemented procedures.
2.2.1 Experimental Design
Our design builds on a standard public goods game (VCM game), a frequently
used workhorse to study elements of social dilemmas in the lab (e.g., Isaac and
Walker, 1988). Each player has a private endowment E = 20. Players simulta-
neously decide on the amount ci that they contribute to a public good, with
0≤ ci ≤ E, i = 1, ...,n. The benefits from the public good are enjoyed by all play-
ers, independent of their individual contribution ci . In some treatments, players
are heterogeneous, i.e., not all players benefit from the public good to the same
extent. To model heterogeneity, we allow the marginal per capita return (MPCR)
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γi from the public good to vary across players.8 Given the contributions of all
players (c1, ..., cn), player i’s material payoff pii is thus given by
pii = E − ci + γi∑ni=1 ci .
In all treatments, parameters for γi are chosen such that players face a social
dilemma. Efficiency, defined as the sum of payoffs of all players, is maximized
if all players contribute their entire endowment. Yet, from an individual per-
spective, each player’s material payoff is maximized by not contributing to the
public good, regardless of the other players’ contributions. Formally, this implies∑n
i=1 γi > 1 and γi < 1 ∀i.
We form groups of three players (n= 3). Between treatments, we vary two
components. First, we vary the composition of players’ types γi . In some treat-
ments (HOM), players are homogeneous, i.e., all players are of the same type
and thus receive the same benefits from the public good (γi = 2/3). In other
treatments (HET), players are heterogeneous: two players have a high return
from the public good (γi = 3/4) and one player has a low return (γi = 1/2).9
The different marginal per capita returns are chosen as to keep total efficiency
gains constant between treatments (2 · 3/4+ 1 · 1/2= 3 · 2/3).
Second, we vary availability and content of the institution. In the benchmark
treatments (VCM), there is no institution formation stage and players play a reg-
ular public goods game. In the main treatments, there is an institution formation
stage first, followed by a contribution stage. In the institution formation stage, a
single institution is available and can be implemented via unanimity voting, i.e.,
the institution is implemented if and only if all players vote in favor of adopt-
ing the institution. If the institution is rejected, the regular public goods game
without any restrictions on contributions is played. The institution states each
player’s obligation c¯i , the amount that each player has to contribute to the public
good in the second stage if the institution has been implemented. Voting and
the implementation of the institution are costless.10
The main treatments vary in the type of institution that is available. In gen-
eral, treatments are designed to reflect a tradeoff between efficiency and equal-
ity of payoffs. In treatments with the symmetric institution (SYM), all players
are obliged to contribute their entire endowment to the public good if the insti-
tution has been implemented. The symmetric institution maximizes the sum of
8 To give just two among many possible examples, nation states differ in their benefit from
climate protection or researchers at different stages of their career benefit from joint publications
to a different extent.
9We choose a single player with a lower return because this setup is sufficient to illustrate
the potential weakness of unanimity voting, i.e., already a single player can prevent successful
institution formation by vetoing.
10 These are simplifying assumptions. Qualitatively, the theoretical predictions do not change
as long as the gains in individual material payoffs due to implementing the institution outweigh
the individual implementation costs.
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Table 2.1. Treatments
Vcm Sym Asym
Hom γ= 2/3 γ= 2/3 γ= 2/3
no obligations c¯ = 20 c(c¯ = 20)= 20, c(c¯ = 8)= 8
Π = 40 Π(c¯ = 20)= 32, Π(c¯ = 8)= 44
Het γh = 3/4, γl = 1/2 γh = 3/4, γl = 1/2 γh = 3/4, γl = 1/2
no obligations c¯ = 20 c¯h = 20 , c¯l = 8
Πh = 45, Πl = 30 Πh =Πl = 36
payoffs of all players and, thus, induces the efficient outcome. In treatments with
the asymmetric institution (ASYM), one player is required to contribute 8 units,
while the two others are obliged to contribute all 20 units to the public good. In
treatments with heterogeneous players, the obligation is 20 for the high types,
and 8 for the low types. Obligations are chosen such that the asymmetric insti-
tution implies equal payoffs for both types of players (36 each), which comes at
an efficiency cost. In contrast, with heterogeneous players, the symmetric insti-
tution implies inequality in final payoffs (45 for the high types and 30 for the
low type). If the asymmetric institution is combined with homogeneous players,
one randomly chosen player has to contribute 8 units, while the other two play-
ers are obliged to contribute 20 units. The design results in the 2× 3-treatment
matrix shown in Table 2.1.
2.2.2 Procedures
The computerized experiments (using z-Tree; Fischbacher (2007)) were run at
the BonnEconLab of the University of Bonn, Germany in 2012. Student sub-
jects were recruited randomly from all majors (using Orsee; Greiner (2015))
and were randomly assigned to one of the six treatments (between-subject de-
sign). For each treatment, we ran two sessions with 24 subjects each. In each
session, subjects first received written instructions (see Appendix 2.C). To cre-
ate common knowledge, instructions were read out aloud to the subjects. After-
wards, subjects answered a set of control questions and could pose clarifying
questions to ensure understanding of the game’s structure and payoffs. Subjects
then played the game repeatedly for 20 periods. Interaction took place within
the same group of three subjects (partner matching protocol), it was anonymous
and decisions were taken in private at the computer. After each voting stage, sub-
jects received feedback on the voting result and the voting behavior of the other
two subjects in their matching group. After each contribution stage, subjects
were informed about their own payoff and the payoffs and contributions of the
other two subjects in their group. After all 20 periods, subjects answered a ques-
tionnaire covering socio-demographic characteristics. Each session lasted about
80 minutes. Accumulated earnings were converted at a rate of 40 tokens = 1
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Table 2.2. Behavioral Predictions Based on Standard Preferences
Vcm Sym Asym
Hom voting - implement institution implement institution
contribution c = 0 c = 20 c(c¯ = 20)= 20, c(c¯ = 8)= 8
Het voting - implement institution implement institution
contribution ch = cl = 0 ch = cl = 20 ch = 20, cl = 8
Euro. Total earnings per subject ranged between 10 Euro and 22.5 Euro, with
an average of about 16.4 Euro.
Altogether, we had 282 subjects, and observations on 5640 individual deci-
sions. Given the allocation of subjects to the six treatments, repeated interaction
in 20 periods and matching groups of 3, we have 16 independent observations
per treatment.11 39% of our subjects are male, their age ranges from 16 to 42,
with an average age of 22 years.
2.3 Behavioral Predictions
For each treatment, we characterize players’ equilibrium behavior under two
alternative assumptions concerning the shape of the utility function. First, we
assume that each player’s utility function coincides with the monetary payoff
of the game, pii , i.e., that players have standard preferences. Second, we as-
sume that (at least some) players have social preferences. From the large set of
available approaches to social preferences, e.g., including, among many others,
Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) or Charness and Rabin (2002), we use the spec-
ification from Fehr and Schmidt (1999): in addition to valuing own monetary
payoff, a player suffers from inequality in monetary payoffs, i.e., from others
being worse or better off than himself. In our treatment with heterogeneous
benefits from the public good, players might vote against implementing an insti-
tution that obliges all players to contribute equally to the public good in order to
avoid inequality in payoffs. In the remainder of this section, we will provide an
intuition for the behavioral predictions for each treatment under the two alterna-
tive assumptions on the shape of players’ utility functions using the parameters
of our design. More general proofs are provided in Appendix 2.A.
Table 2.2 summarizes the behavioral predictions for players with standard
preferences. In basic VCM games, they are predicted not to contribute to the pub-
lic good at all. Whenever γi < 1, contributing does not pay off from an individ-
ual perspective. Condition γi < 1 is met for all players in treatments HOM-VCM
(γ= 2/3) and HET-VCM (γl = 1/2 and γh = 3/4).
11 Exceptions are treatments HET-VCM and HOM-ASYM, for which we have 15 independent
observations since some subjects did not show up.
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In all two-stage treatments, predictions are derived using backward induc-
tion. Let U INST denote utility when the institution has been implemented, with
INST=SYM for the symmetric and INST=ASYM for the asymmetric institution.
In the contribution stage, players will compare the utility they receive with the
respective institution being in place, U INST , to the utility of the VCM game that
is played if the institution has not received unanimous support in the voting
stage, UVCM . Unanimity voting ensures that, whenever U INST ≥ UVCM , it is a
best response to the voting behavior of the other players to vote in favor of the
institution. If all other players also vote in favor of implementing the institu-
tion, the institution will be implemented and the player’s preferred outcome is
achieved. If, in contrast, at least one other player votes against implementing the
institution, the institution will not be implemented and the VCM game will be
played. However, the approving player is still equally well off as if he had voted
against implementing the institution. Whenever U INST < UVCM , a player will
vote against installing the institution. In our design, U INST > UVCM = E = 20
for all player types in treatments HOM-SYM, HOM-ASYM, HET-SYM and HET-
ASYM (see payoffs in Table 2.1). Consequently, for all treatments, players with
standard preferences are predicted to vote in favor of the respective institution.
The institution will be implemented and players will contribute according to
their individual obligation. To summarize, if players have standard preferences,
unanimity voting on the formation of institutions is predicted to help to over-
come the social dilemma of public good provision. This result holds irrespective
of whether players are homogeneous or heterogeneous and whether a symmet-
ric or an asymmetric institution is voted on.
Table 2.3 displays the behavioral predictions for players with social prefer-
ences in terms of inequality aversion (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999). If players have
social preferences, there are multiple equilibria in treatment HOM-VCM.12 The
intuition is as follows: If all players are sufficiently averse to advantageous in-
equality (β sufficiently high)13, they will exactly match the contribution level
c ∈ [0, E] of the other players to equalize payoffs. If players are not or onlymildly
averse to advantageous inequality (β low), the only equilibrium that remains
is the one with zero contributions of all players. In treatment HET-VCM, the ba-
sic mechanism driving the existence of equilibria with positive contributions is
the same. If all players are sufficiently averse towards earning more than others,
they contribute positive amounts as soon as the other players contribute positive
amounts to prevent an unequal payoff distribution. However, to achieve equal
payoffs for all three players, the low type contributes less than the two high
types.
12 The proof is provided in Fehr and Schmidt (1999).
13 In the model of Fehr and Schmidt (1999), the parameter β captures the intensity of aversion
to advantageous inequality, while the parameter α measures the degree of aversion to disadvan-
tageous inequality.
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In treatments HOM-SYM and HET-ASYM, assuming social instead of stan-
dard preferences does not change the predictions. In both cases, the proposed
institution guarantees equality of payoffs while simultaneously maximizing util-
ity of players who are sufficiently averse to unequal payoffs. Hence again, all
players are predicted to vote in favor of the respective institution, it will be
implemented, and players will contribute according to their obligation. In treat-
ments HET-SYM and HOM-ASYM, however, predictions based on standard pref-
erences and social preferences differ. In both treatments, players with standard
preferences always support the formation of the institution as it offers a higher
monetary payoff than the VCM and they do not suffer from unequal payoffs that
arise from implementing the institution. In contrast, in treatment HET-SYM, low
type players with social preferences who suffer sufficiently from being worse off
than the high types (α sufficiently high), object to institution formation. They
prefer a lower monetary payoff, but equal payoffs across players in the VCM, to
a higher monetary payoff, but disutility from inequality due to the symmetric
institution being in place. Consequently, low type players drive rejections of the
proposed symmetric institution. Similarly, in treatment HOM-ASYM, all players
potentially have a motive for voting against the asymmetric institution that in-
troduces inequality in payoffs: Players with an obligation of 8 tokens, if they are
sufficiently averse to advantageous inequality, and players with an obligation of
20 tokens if they are sufficiently averse to disadvantageous inequality.14
2.4 Results
This section is structured along five sets of results concerning differences in vot-
ing and contribution behavior across treatments. All results are qualitatively in
line with the behavioral predictions presented in Section 2.3 and Appendix 2.A,
when assuming that at least some players are inequality averse to an extent that
induces their behavior to deviate from the predictions based on standard prefer-
ences. We report detailed predictions in Appendix 2.A.4 and the corresponding
results in the text below.
14 Preferences for efficiency, see, e.g., Charness and Rabin (2002), are an alternative expla-
nation for rejecting an asymmetric institution. Efficiency seekers should reject institutions that
do not induce full contributions in order to contribute more than they were obliged to with the
institution being in place (expecting others to contribute more after rejection provides a reason
for selfish agents to reject institutions, too). Charness-Rabin preferences predict that rejections
of institutions are possible in all treatments. However, all predicted rejections require fairly large
amounts of contributions in the subsequently played VCM to be justified. Yet, our data (see sec-
tion 2.4.4) do not indicate higher levels of contributions after an institution is rejected than under
the institution, suggesting that efficiency seeking is not a predominant motive for rejections. Be-
havioral predictions based on Charness-Rabin preferences (with no reciprocity, see Appendix I in
Charness and Rabin (2002)) are available from the authors upon request.
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First, we will briefly present results in treatments HOM-VCM and HET-VCM
that provide baseline scenarios for comparing whether unanimity voting on in-
stitutions increases efficiency. We proceed by discussing under which circum-
stances unanimity voting on symmetric or asymmetric institutions helps to in-
crease public good provision. We thereby focus on treatment comparisons in
which changes in behavior can be attributed to a single change in setup. That
means, we either compare treatments with different institutions, while keeping
constant the composition of player types (HOM or HET) or we compare treat-
ments with a different composition of player types, while keeping constant the
nature of the institution to be voted on (SYM or ASYM).
Table 2.4 and Table 2.5 contain first descriptive results. Table 2.4 displays
contributions averaged over all periods by treatment. Table 2.5 shows the share
of affirmative votes and implementation rates averaged over all periods by treat-
ment. Moreover, Figures 2.1 and 2.2 display the treatment-specific development
of contributions and share of affirmative votes over time.
Table 2.4. Average Contributions by Treatment
Vcm Sym Asym
Hom
overall 10.72 18.18 11.44
(7.83) (5.27) (8.35)
types c¯ = 20 – – 12.12
– – (8.79)
types c¯ = 8 – – 10.09
– – (7.23)
Het
overall 8.05 14.21 13.85
(6.58) (7.79) (7.20)
high types 9.42 14.77 17.18
(7.07) (7.42) (6.36)
low types 5.33 13.08 7.21
(4.33) (8.38) (2.90)
Notes: Contributions are in tokens. Standard deviations are presented in parentheses.
2.4.1 Baseline Treatments: Homogeneous versus Heterogeneous
Players in the VCM
On average, contributions in the standard VCM tend to be lower with heteroge-
neous than with homogeneous agents. Subjects contribute 10.7 out of 20 units
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Table 2.5. Share of Armative Votes and Implementation Rate by Treatment
Hom Het
Sym Asym Sym Asym
Affirmative votes
overall .95 .54 .84 .91
types c¯ = 20 – .48 .96 .90
types c¯ = 8 – .68 .60 .94
Implementation Rates
.87 .27 .56 .77
Notes: The share of affirmative votes as well as the implementation rate is significantly higher in
treatment HOM-SYM than in HET-SYM (MWU, p = 0.01 for both), in HOM-SYM than in HOM-
ASYM (MWU, p < 0.01 for both), lower in HET-SYM than in HET-ASYM (MWU, p = 0.16 for the
share of affirmative votes and p = 0.08 for the implementation rate), and significantly higher in
HET-ASYM than in HOM-ASYM (MWU, p < 0.01 for both). The share of low types’ affirmative
votes in HET-ASYM is significantly higher than in HOM-ASYM (MWU, p < 0.01). The share of
high types’ affirmative votes in HET-ASYM is significantly lower than in HOM-ASYM (MWU, p =
0.04).
in treatment HOM-VCM and 8.1 units in treatment HET-VCM (Mann-Whitney
ranksum test (MWU), p = 0.11).15
Result 1:
Average contributions in treatment HET-VCM are slightly, but not signifi-
cantly lower than in treatment HOM-VCM.
Moreover, we observe that average contributions of low and high types differ
in HET-VCM: while low type players contribute only 5.3 units, high type players
contribute 9.4 units on average. As a consequence, average payoffs for the two
player types are similar, 26.8 and 28.7 units, respectively. Players of both types
seem to intuitively strive for equal payoffs.
2.4.2 Unanimity Voting on the Symmetric Institution: Homogeneous
versus Heterogeneous Players
We first consider the voting behavior of homogeneous players who are con-
fronted with the decision whether to install the symmetric institution that
obliges each player to contribute the efficient amount, 20 units. Overall, 95.2%
of votes (914 out of 960 votes) are in favor of implementing the symmetric insti-
tution. As a result, in 86.6% of all cases, all three players of a group unanimously
agree to implement the symmetric institution and it is indeed implemented.
15 Throughout the paper, we report two-sided p-values. Each matching group’s average contri-
bution is one independent observation.
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Figure 2.1. Development of Average Contributions over Time
Notes: In treatments HOM − VCM and HET − VCM , average contributions decrease over time
(HOM − VCM : Spearman‘s Rho r = −0.27, p < 0.01 and HET − VCM : r = −0.47, p < 0.01). In
treatments HOM − SYM and HET − ASYM , average contributions increase over time (HOM −
SYM : r = +0.27, p < 0.01, HET − ASYM : r = +0.21, p < 0.01). In treatments HET − SYM
and HOM − ASYM , time trends in contributions are not significant (HET − SYM : r = +0.08,
p = 0.16, HOM − ASYM : r = −0.03, p = 0.64).
Result 2:
In treatment HOM-SYM, average contributions are significantly higher
than in treatment HOM-VCM.
On average, subjects contribute 18.2 units in treatment HOM-SYM instead
of 10.7 units in treatment HOM-VCM (MWU, p < 0.01). After some periods of
initial learning efficiency is close to 100% (see also Figure 2.1). To summarize,
in our setup with homogeneous players, unanimity voting on the symmetric
institution increases efficiency substantially.
Does unanimity voting on the efficient institution also yield high support
if players are heterogeneous, i.e., if the efficient institution introduces unequal
payoffs? Again, we start by analyzing behavior in the voting stage. In treatment
HET-SYM, the overall share of affirmative votes is lower than in treatment HOM-
SYM, 83.9% instead of 95.2% (MWU, p = 0.01). Heterogeneous players object
the implementation of the efficient symmetric institution more often than homo-
geneous players. The difference in affirmative votes between treatment HOM-
SYM and HET-SYM persists over time (see Figure 2.2). Similarly, the overall
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Figure 2.2. Share of Armative Votes over Time
Notes: In all four two-stage treatments, the share of affirmative votes increases over time (HOM −
SYM : Spearman‘s Rho r = +0.29, HET − SYM : r = +0.18, HOM − ASYM : r = +0.18, HET −
ASYM : r = +0.26, all p < 0.01).
implementation rate in treatment HET-SYM is 56.3%, substantially lower than
in treatment HOM-SYM, 86.6% (MWU, p = 0.01). Rejections of the institution
are largely due to the voting behavior of low types. In our data, 95.9% of high
types vote in favor of implementing the institution in treatment HET-SYM, but
only 59.7% of low types do.
As a consequence of the lower implementation rate, average contributions
are significantly lower in treatment HET-SYM than HOM-SYM: 14.2 instead of
18.2 (MWU, p = 0.01). However, average contributions in treatment HET-SYM
are significantly higher than in the VCM with heterogeneous players (MWU,
p < 0.01). Result 3 summarizes our results for treatment HET-SYM.
Result 3:
a) In treatment HET-SYM, average contributions are significantly higher
than in treatment HET-VCM.
b) In treatment HET-SYM, both implementation rate and average contri-
butions are significantly lower than in treatment HOM-SYM.
Overall, if players are heterogeneous rather than homogeneous in their
marginal returns from the public good, unanimity voting on the efficient insti-
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tution does not always result in its successful implementation. Still, compared
to the standard public good game in which no institution is available, unanim-
ity voting on the efficient institution increases efficiency substantially – even if
players are heterogeneous.16
2.4.3 Unanimity Voting on the Asymmetric Institution: Homogeneous
versus Heterogeneous Players
A potential remedy to the frequent rejections of the symmetric institution by low
type players is to design an asymmetric institution that ensures the maximum
possible payoffs among the set of all equitable payoff allocations. Obviously, un-
der the asymmetric institution, the low type players’ obligation must be lower
than under the symmetric institution. As a drawback, the implementation of the
asymmetric institution results in a lower level of public good provision than the
implementation of the symmetric institution.
Concerning results in treatment HET-ASYM, 91.0% of players vote in favor
of implementing the asymmetric institution which results in 77.2% successful
implementations. Thus, with heterogeneous players, the asymmetric institution
that guarantees equal payoffs for both player types is more than 20% points
more likely to be implemented than the symmetric one that induces the effi-
cient outcome, but unequal payoffs across player types (MWU, p = 0.08 for the
implementation rate and p = 0.16 for the share of affirmative votes). The higher
implementation rate is due to the substantially higher likelihood of low types
to vote in favor of the asymmetric institution than the symmetric one: 94.1%
instead of 59.7% (MWU, p < 0.01). With 89.5%, the high types’ share of affir-
mative votes for the asymmetric institution is only slightly lower than the 95.9%
affirmative votes for the symmetric institution (MWU, p = 0.04).
While implementation rates differ markedly for treatment HET-SYM and
HET-ASYM, average contributions do not: 13.9 units in HET-ASYM compared
to 14.2 units in HET-SYM (MWU, p = 0.97).17 There are two opposing effects
16 Although the focus of our paper is on distributive fairness, subjects’ behavior could be driven
by procedural fairness concerns, too. While economists have started studying the latter approach
only lately (the first economic experiments are reported in Bolton et al. (2005); see also Krawczyk
(2011), for a theoretical model), the idea of procedural fairness has been prominent in psychol-
ogy for some decades already (see, for example, Tyler and Lind (2000) for a summary). Barrett-
Howard and Tyler (1986) report that procedural fairness is equal in importance to distributive
fairness for subjects who are confronted with allocation decisions. This could provide a potential
explanation for the 84% approval rate in HET-SYM, namely if subjects think that equal obliga-
tions are procedurally fair in general and/or randomly assigning heterogeneity in the MPCRs to
subjects is procedurally fair. Interestingly, if this line of reasoning indeed applies it seems to be
done in a self-serving manner, because the support for the institution is much stronger among
high types than among low types. We thank an anonymous referee for pointing this out.
17 In line with the theoretical predictions, we observe that in HET-ASYM low and high types
are equally well off on average. High types’ average payoff is 34.0, low types’ average payoff is
33.6. In contrast, in treatment HET-SYM, average payoffs of low types are substantially lower
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that cancel each other out: while the higher implementation rate in HET-ASYM
increases contributions, implementing the asymmetric institution instead of the
symmetric one reduces contributions of the low types from 20 to 8 units. Com-
pared to the benchmark VCM game with heterogeneous players, average contri-
bution levels are significantly higher in treatment HET-ASYM than in treatment
HET-VCM (MWU, p < 0.01). We summarize results for treatment HET-ASYM
below.
Result 4:
a) In treatment HET-ASYM, the implementation rate is higher than in
treatment HET-SYM. In contrast, average contributions in treatments HET-
ASYM and HET-SYM are very similar.
b) In treatment HET-ASYM, average contributions are significantly higher
than in treatment HET-VCM.
Overall, designing institutions that address players’ demand for equal bene-
fits from institution formation seems to be very successful in raising the imple-
mentation rate. In many contexts, a higher rate of institution formation could
be considered beneficial per se, e.g., due to raising reliability of public good pro-
vision or by potentially triggering future institutionalized cooperation. However,
increasing the implementation rate by voting on an asymmetric institution will
always come at the cost of institutionalizing less than efficient levels of public
good provision.
To rule out that the high implementation rate in HET-ASYM is due the asym-
metry in contributions per se, we now turn to treatment HOM-ASYM. Here, we
can explore how the asymmetric institution performs if players are homoge-
neous, i.e., when it introduces binding rules concerning contributions to poten-
tially increase efficiency, but those rules induce unequal payoffs across players.
Proposing an asymmetric institution to homogeneous players receives rela-
tively low levels of support. The average share of affirmative votes ranges be-
tween 40% and 70% over time, resulting in an average implementation rate of
only 26.7%. For players with an obligation of 8 units, the share of affirmative
votes is 67.7%, while it is 20 percentage points lower for those with an obliga-
tion of 20. This might be because both types of players possibly have a motive
to vote against the institution, namely aversion to advantageous inequality (for
players with an obligation of 8 units) and aversion to disadvantageous inequal-
ity (for players with an obligation of 20 units). The share of affirmative votes as
well as the implementation rate is significantly higher in treatment HET-ASYM
than in HOM-ASYM (MWU, p < 0.01 for both).
than those of high types: 28.2 instead of 37.2. Again, this finding is in line with the theoretical
predictions.
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We have already shown that, with homogeneous players, proposing a sym-
metric institution helps to overcome the social dilemma of public good provision.
This is not the case with an asymmetric institution. The average contributions
in treatment HOM-ASYM are not significantly different from average contribu-
tions in treatment HOM-VCM (MWU, p = 0.75) and significantly lower than in
treatment HOM-SYM (MWU, p < 0.01).
Finally, the asymmetric institution performs worse for homogeneous than for
heterogeneous players, i.e., when it introduces inequality instead of addressing
it. With homogeneous players, both the share of affirmative votes and the aver-
age contributions are lower (MWU, p < 0.01 for affirmative votes and p = 0.04
for contributions). This strongly suggests that the success of the asymmetric insti-
tution for heterogeneous agents is indeed due to addressing payoff inequalities
between agents. Below, we summarize results for treatment HOM-ASYM.
Result 5:
a) Average contributions in treatment HOM-ASYM and HOM-VCM do not
differ significantly.
b) In treatment HOM-ASYM, implementation rate and average contribu-
tions are significantly lower than in treatment HOM-SYM.
c) In treatment HOM-ASYM, implementation rate and average contribu-
tions are significantly lower than in treatment HET-ASYM.
2.4.4 Contributions by Institution Formation Status
So far, we have analyzed average contributions in a given treatment, averag-
ing over cases of successful institution formation and those of failure to form
an institution. We have not studied yet how failure to implement the proposed
institution affects contribution levels. If motives for objecting to institution for-
mation differ across treatments, contribution levels in case of failed institution
formation could also differ across treatments. For example, inequality aversion
could be a plausible motive for voting against institution formation in treatments
HET-SYM and HOM-ASYM in which institutions induce unequal payoffs. In treat-
ments HOM-ASYM and HET-ASYM, a preference for efficient levels of public
good provision could drive rejections (compare footnote 14). Rejections of the
institution are harder to rationalize in treatment HOM-SYM because implemen-
tation of the institution results in maximal and equal payoffs. Consequently, re-
jections could be due to, e.g., mistakes or pleasure from exerting (destructive)
power. These motives could induce negative reciprocity, resulting in contribu-
tion levels well below the corresponding VCM. In contrast, efficiency seekers
could reject an asymmetric institution aiming at contribution levels that exceed
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institutional obligations. Players who reject an institution due to inequality aver-
sion have motives to contribute as in the baseline VCM whose equilibria ensure
equality of payoffs across players.
While we did not elicit subjects’ individual beliefs about the preferences of
players which rejected the institution, presenting results on average contribu-
tions in case of failed institution formation is still informative. Table 2.6 and
Figure 2.B.1 in the Appendix show that, in the relatively rare case of institution
failure (13%), average contribution levels in treatment HOM-SYM are substan-
tially below those of the corresponding VCM (6.4 instead of 10.7 units). In treat-
ments HET-SYM, HET-ASYM, and HOM-ASYM, average contributions are much
closer to those of the corresponding baseline VCM. Taken together, our results
do not point at a large, “hidden cost” of failed institution formation, namely
substantially and frequently reduced contributions in case of failed institution
implementation (except for treatment HOM-SYM).
Table 2.6. Average contributions after failed institution formation
Vcm Sym Asym
HOM 10.72 6.43 9.78
(7.83) (6.90) (8.56)
HET 8.05 6.76 6.59
(6.58) (6.33) (7.12)
Notes: Contributions are in tokens. Standard deviations are presented in parentheses.
2.5 Conclusion
The paper at hand studied the process of institution formation in social dilem-
mas, in particular the role of heterogeneity among players i) in their benefits
from cooperation and ii) in their institutional obligations. We found that the po-
tential tension between efficiency and equality in payoffs, originating from these
heterogeneities, strongly affected implementation rates of institutions. With het-
erogeneous players, aggregate implementation rates were significantly lower for
institutions featuring equal rather than unequal obligations; and vice versa for
homogeneous players – even though failed implementation usually implied se-
vere cutbacks in monetary payoffs. Both with homogeneous and heterogeneous
players, failed implementations arose primarily, but not exclusively, from rejec-
tions by the disadvantaged players that profited to a lesser degree from the im-
plemented institution. Consequently, institutions which tailored obligations to
players’ specific heterogeneities were able to gather higher degrees of support. In
fact, if benefits from institution formation were evenly distributed across players,
we observed strikingly higher implementation and cooperation rates than what
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has typically been found in related studies that only require non-unanimous
support for institutions to be implemented for all members (e.g., Kosfeld et al.,
2009).
A potential reason for the latter finding is that, in contrast to other decision
rules, unanimity voting entails a very strong notion of conditional cooperation.
The veto right inherent in unanimity voting makes each player’s cooperation
decision contingent on the decision of all other players involved. Consequently,
the supporting players do not face the risk of being exploited by non-supporting
players.18 On a similar note, no player will ever be governed by an institution
that he did not support himself. Both, the notion of conditional cooperation and
the retained sovereignty, make unanimity voting an attractive rule to settle on
in the first place.
On the other hand, these advantages come at the cost of an increased like-
lihood of rejecting efficient institutions as well as potentially low levels of coop-
eration after a rejection has occurred. Already with three players, we saw that
these problems exist. With larger groups, one might expect successful institu-
tion formation to be even more difficult, in particular if benefits from institution
formation are not equally distributed across players. Moreover, our data sug-
gest that voting against the institution is sometimes connected with the implicit
costs of making subsequent cooperation more difficult. One might even imagine
that rejecting players become the target of retaliation in other, seemingly unre-
lated, domains. Both threats might be bigger in large groups, simply because
there are more players who might potentially opt against the institution and/or
who might retaliate rejections. Yet, for groups deciding on the implementation
of an institution that takes care of players’ idiosyncrasies, these threats might
instead strengthen the power of an unanimity rule. Furthermore, under institu-
tions that lead to inequalities in payoffs, payoff differences might be less salient
in large groups because they are harder to recognize – in particular if players
do not compare themselves with everyone else in a large population, but rather
choose a small reference group consisting of similar others. It would therefore
be interesting to check in future studies whether the positive or negative effects
dominate when group size is increased.
Follow-up studies might also investigate if aggregate behavioral patterns are
affected by changes in other parameters of our design, like the marginal per
capita return from cooperation or the exact content of the institution. We ob-
served in our data on heterogeneous agents that, overall, the symmetric and
asymmetric institution lead to similar average cooperation rates. This was due
to two opposing effects that cancel each other out: while the higher implemen-
18 Parts of this reasoning rely on the strong enforcement mechanism underlying our institutions.
It would be interesting to study setups that allow to discriminate between i) support and ii)
adherence to an institution, and how these factors are affected by the voting mechanism in place.
We thank an anonymous referee for pointing this out.
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tation rate for the asymmetric institution generally increases cooperation, total
obligations (and thus cooperation rates) are lower than when the efficient sym-
metric institution is implemented. Although this qualitative finding is not at
the heart of our paper, it is still intriguing. Given the quantitative behavioral
effects that we observe, one could imagine that average outcomes between sym-
metric and asymmetric institutions start diverging as the most efficient payoff-
equalizing mechanism becomes more inferior to the efficient mechanism.
Along similar lines, natural next steps for future extensions also includemore
complex institutional arrangements. For example, redistribution might allay dis-
advantaged member’s doubts about the implementation of efficient institutions
for heterogeneous agents. The implementation of institutions with hierarchi-
cal structures, from simple leader-follower arrangements to multi-layered struc-
tures, yield the potential to increase implementation rates and cooperation, too
(e.g., Gächter et al., 2010; Hamman et al., 2011; Falk and Kosfeld, 2012). Com-
plementing these variations, one could also shed more light on the performance
of different voting rules for implementing given institutions (e.g., Young, 1995;
Gillet et al., 2009; Austen-Smith and Feddersen, 2006). More generally, allow-
ing for richer environments with competing institutions and voting rules opens
up the possibility to learn even more about the type of institutions that endoge-
nously arise within a group. Of course, in contrast to our approach, self-selection
would make proper causal interpretation more difficult. Still, it would be a nice
complement to the current research agenda: understanding what kind of insti-
tutions are created by groups, which voting rules are adopted for implementing
these institutions, and how these institutions perform under a variety of circum-
stances.
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Appendix 2.A Model and Theoretical Predictions
2.A.1 Model
We study the following two-stage game in which players have perfect informa-
tion on other players’ preferences:
Voting stage: First, all players simultaneously and independently vote either in
favor of or against adopting an institution. The institution specifies a contribu-
tion level that each player is obliged to contribute to the public good and intro-
duces sanctions for deviant contribution levels. Sanctions are sufficiently severe
to ensure that the prescribed contribution levels are indeed implemented.
Contribution stage: Second, all players simultaneously and independently
choose their contribution level to the public good. If the institution has been
implemented, players will contribute the amount specified by the institution. If
the institution has not been implemented, there is no sanctioning mechanism
and players play a standard public goods game (VCM).
In the contribution stage, players know how other players in their group
voted in the voting stage. In the following, we demonstrate that rejecting the
institution can increase utility in some treatments, while not in others. A multi-
tude of equilibria exists. In order to keep the subsequent analysis tractable and
short, when analyzing equilibria in which at least one player rejects, we focus on
those equilibria in which rejecting the institution strictly increases the rejecting
player’s utility.19 For each treatment, we will first characterize equilibria if play-
19 There also exist equilibria, in which players reject the institution although the resulting
utilities are lower than in the state of successful institution formation: As soon as one player
rejects, the decision of the other players does not affect institution formation under unanimity
voting. Consequently, further equilibria exist in which at least two players reject the institution.
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ers’ utility functions coincide with the monetary payoff of the game, pii , i.e., if
players have standard preferences. We will then proceed by analyzing equilibria
of the game if (some) players have social preferences, i.e., suffer from inequality
in monetary payoffs (compare, among others, Fehr and Schmidt (1999)). Fehr
and Schmidt (1999) assume that players compare their own monetary payoff
with the monetary payoff of all other players. They introduce the following util-
ity function:
Ui = pii −αi 1n−1
∑n
j=1max{pi j −pii; 0}− βi 1n−1
∑n
j=1max{pii −pi j; 0}
The first term represents the monetary payoff obtained in the game. The second
term captures utility losses due to being worse off than other players. αi mea-
sures the degree of individual envy. The last term denotes utility losses that play-
ers receive from being better off than other players. βi is typically interpreted as
a measure for the degree of compassion. Additionally, two important properties
are assumed. First, αi ≥ βi or, in words, envy is at least as strong as compas-
sion. Second, βi < 1, which prevents agents from “burning their own money” to
achieve a more equal outcome. In our setup with heterogeneous benefits from
the public good, players might vote against implementing an institution that
obliges all players to contribute equally to the public good in order to avoid in-
equality. Hence, we consider the model of Fehr and Schmidt (1999) as a natural
choice to derive predictions for our setup.
In the following, subscript l (h) stands for low (high) type, i.e., players with a
low (high) MPCR. Given the focus of this paper, (only) the analysis of the treat-
ments featuring heterogeneous players with social preferences focuses on the
case of three players: one low type with low MPCR γl , two high types with high
MPCR γh, and ∆γ= γh − γl < 1/2. Additionally, the propositions presented in
the text further specify results by setting γl = 1/2 and γh = 3/4, the parame-
ters we have used in the experiment implementation.
2.A.2 Treatments HOM − VCM and HET − VCM
The standard Voluntary Contribution Mechanism (VCM) is a one-stage game
without voting on implementing an institution and without any sanctioning
mechanism for low contributions.
Proposition 1. If players are money-maximizers, they contribute ci = 0,∀i in
treatments HOM − VCM and HET − VCM .
Whenever ∂ pii∂ ci = −1+ γi < 0, the marginal individual cost of contributing to
the public good exceeds the marginal individual benefit. Consequently, in any
standard VCM game, a money-maximizing player will not contribute to the
public good for all γi < 1. Condition γi < 1 is met by definition of the public
goods game for all players in treatments HOM − VCM (γ= 2/3) and HET −
VCM (γl = 1/2 and γh = 3/4).
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Proposition 2. Let us assume that players have social preferences.
In treatment HOM − VCM , if γi + βi < 1 for at least one player, there is a
unique equilibrium in which all players contribute ci = 0. If all players have
γi + βi > 1, other equilibria with ci > 0 exist, in which all players contribute
ci = c j ∈ [0, E],∀ j 6= i.
In treatment HET − VCM , if βh > 2/7 for both high types and βl > 2/5 for
the low type, equilibria with positive contributions exist in which ch ∈ [0, E] and
cl = 2/5ch. All players earn equal payoffs. Otherwise, there exists a unique equi-
librium in which all players contribute ci = 0.
The proof of HOM − VCM is provided in Fehr and Schmidt (1999). The in-
tuition is as follows: If players are sufficiently averse to advantageous inequality
(β sufficiently high), they are willing to exactly match the contribution levels of
the other players to equalize payoffs. Using the parameters of our experiment,
the proposition boils down to the result that equilibria with positive contribution
levels only exist if β > 1/3 for all players. In treatment HET − VCM , the basic
mechanism that drives the existence of equilibria with positive contributions is
the same as in the VCM with homogeneous players. If players are sufficiently
averse towards earning more than others, they contribute positive amounts to
prevent an unequal payoff distribution as soon as other players contribute a pos-
itive amount. To achieve an equal payoff distribution, the low type contributes
less than the high types. In the following, we provide a formal analysis of the
behavior of players with social preferences in treatment HET − VCM .
We start by analyzing the behavior of the low type.
Case 1: pil ≤ pi1 and pil ≤ pi2
Let us assume that the low type contributes such that his monetary payoff is
not larger than the payoff of both high types (that are labeled by indices 1 and
2). Then, the utility function of the low type that is relevant for the marginal
analysis is denoted by: Ul = E − cl + γl(cl + c1 + c2)− αl2 (cl − c1 +∆γ(cl + c1 +
c2))− αl2 (cl − c2 +∆γ(cl + c1 + c2)). The derivative with respect to cl is given by
∂ Ul
∂ cl
= −1+ γl −αl(1+∆γ) and will always be negative as γl < 1 and ∆γ≥ 0.
Hence the low type will never increase his contribution, but at least decrease
his contribution until pil = pi1 ≤ pi2 or pil = pi2 ≤ pi1. In sum, the low type will
never contribute such that his payoff will be lower than the payoffs of both high
types.
Case 2: pi1 < pil < pi2 or pi2 < pil < pi1
If the low type’s payoff is larger than the payoff of one high type, but still smaller
than the other high type’s payoff, the derivative of the utility function is given
by ∂ Ul∂ cl = −1+ γl − 1/2(αl − βl)(1+∆γ). This derivative is strictly negative, as
disadvantageous inequality is assumed to affect utility at least as strong as ad-
vantageous inequality (αi ≥ βi), γl < 1, and∆γ≥ 0. The low type will decrease
his contribution until his payoff equals the payoff of the better off high type. Intu-
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itively, by reducing his contribution the low type will increase his own monetary
payoff and simultaneously decrease disutility from disadvantageous inequality
at a faster rate than increasing disutility from advantageous inequality.
Case 3: pil > pi1 and pil > pi2
Let us now assume that the payoff of the low type is strictly larger than the pay-
offs of both high types. The utility function that is relevant for the marginal anal-
ysis is now denoted by Ul = E − cl + γl(cl + c1 + c2)− βl2 (c1 − cl −∆γ(cl + c1 +
c2))− βl2 (c2 − cl −∆γ(cl + c1 + c2)). Thus, ∂ Ul∂ cl = −1+ γl + βl(1+∆γ), which
is positive if βl >
1−γl
1+∆γ . If this condition is fulfilled, the low type will contribute
in such a way that his payoff will equal the payoff of the high type with the lower
contribution to the public good. If βl <
1−γl
1+∆γ , the low type does not contribute
to the public good at all since he does not suffer sufficiently from advantageous
inequality.
The next section analyzes behavior of one high type, player 1, given the
actions of the other high type, player 2, and the low type l. Without loss of gen-
erality, we will only analyze the decisions of high type 1 who is representative
for behavior of both high types.
Case 1: pi1 < pil and pi1 < pi2
If player 1 obtains the lowest monetary payoff, U1 = E − c1 + γh(cl + c1 +
c2)− α12 (c1 − cl −∆γ(cl + c1 + c2))− αl2 (c1 − c2). The derivative ∂ U1∂ c1 = −1+
γh −α1(1− ∆γ2 ) is always negative as γh < 1 and∆γ≤ 1/2. Thus, player 1 will
never increase his contribution, but, in contrast, decrease it until his payoff at
least equals the payoff of one other player. By reducing his contribution, player
1 can increase his monetary payoff and simultaneously decrease inequality.
Case 2: pil ≤ pi1 < pi2
Player 1 is worse off than the other high type, but weakly better off than the low
type. As the analysis of the low type’s behavior has shown, this case can never
arise in equilibrium.
Case 3: pi2 < pi1 < pil
Player 1 is better off than the other high type, but worse off than the low
type. The utility function that is relevant for the marginal analysis is given by
U1 = E − c1 + γh(cl + c1 + c2)− α12 (c1 − cl −∆γ(cl + c1 + c2))− β12 (c2 − c1). Set-
ting the derivative ∂ U1∂ c1 = −1+ γh − α12 (1−∆γ)+ β12 larger than zero, results in
the condition β1 > 2(1− γh)+α1(1−∆γ). If this condition is met, player 1 will
match the contribution of the other high type no matter what the low type does.
The low type may either choose his contribution to equalize payoffs of all three
players or not contribute to the public good at all. In the following, equilibria
that result in unequal payoffs will be called asymmetric.
With the parameters chosen in our experiment the condition for asymmetric
equilibria is reduced to β1 >
1
2 +
3
4α1. This condition can never be satisfied. Con-
sider the limiting case of α1 ≥ β1: α1 = β1. This results in β14 > 12 , which cannot
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hold as βi < 1 is another assumption of the Fehr-Schmidt model.
If β1 < 2(1− γh)+α1(1−∆γ), player 1 will at least reduce his contribution un-
til pi2 < pi1 = pil .
Case 4: pi1 > pil and pi1 > pi2
If the payoff of player 1 is larger than the payoffs of the two other players,
his utility function is now denoted by: U1 = E − c1 + γh(cl + c1 + c2)− β12 (cl −
c1 +∆γ(cl + c1 + c2))− β12 (c2 − c1). The derivative ∂ U1∂ c1 = −1+ γh + β1(1− ∆γ2 )
turns positive for β1 >
1−γh
1− 12∆γ . This implies that for sufficiently large values of
β1, player 1 will increase his contribution to the public good until at least one
other player obtains the same payoff as he does. Intuitively, a player 1 who is
sufficiently averse to advantageous inequality will contribute in order to reduce
inequality towards both other players. If β1 <
1−γh
1− 12∆γ , player 1will not contribute
at all.
In the following, we summarize the resulting equilibria:
In treatment HET − VCM , if βh < 1−γh1− 12∆γ for at least one high type player, there
exists a unique equilibrium in which all players contribute ci = 0.
If βh >
1−γh
1− 12∆γ for both high types and βl >
1−γl
1+∆γ for the low type, equilibria
with positive contributions exist with ch ∈ [0, E] and cl = ch 1−2(γh−γl)1+(γh−γl) (symmet-
ric equilibria).
If βl <
1−γl
1+∆γ for the low type and βh > 2(1− γh)+αh(1−∆γ) for both high
types, another class of equilibria with ci ≥ 0 exists, in which both high types con-
tribute the same amount ch ∈ [0, E] and the low type contributes cl = 0 (asym-
metric equilibria). Proposition 2 summarizes the results using the parametriza-
tion of our experiment.
2.A.3 Two-stage treatments with voting stage and contribution stage
In all two-stage treatments, players are assumed to apply backward induction.
Let U INST denote utility when the institution has received unanimous sup-
port and has been implemented, with INST = SYM for the symmetric and
INST = ASYM for the asymmetric institution. In the contribution stage, play-
ers will compare the utility they receive with the respective institution being in
place, U INST , to UVCM , the utility of the VCM that is played if the institution has
not received unanimous support in the voting stage. Whenever U INST ≥ UVCM ,
a player will vote in favor of implementing the institution. With unanimity vot-
ing, if all other players also vote in favor of implementing the proposed institu-
tion, the institution will be implemented and the player’s preferred outcome is
achieved. If, in contrast, at least one other player votes against implementing
the institution, the institution will not be implemented and the VCM will be
played. However, the approving player is still equally well off as if he had voted
against implementing the institution. Thus, unanimity voting ensures that it is
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always a best response to the voting behavior of the other players to vote in
favor of the institution if U INST ≥ UVCM . A player will never be hurt from vot-
ing for his preferred outcome no matter how the other players vote. Whenever
U INST < UVCM , a player will vote against installing the institution.
2.A.3.1 Treatment HOM − SYM
In treatment HOM − SYM , homogeneous players vote on implementing the
symmetric institution.
Proposition 3. The following statements hold both for money-maximizing players
and for players with social preferences. In treatment HOM − SYM , all players
vote in favor of implementing the institution. The symmetric institution is always
implemented and all players contribute according to the institutional rules, i.e.,
ci = E∀i.
If players are homogeneous (γi = γ) andmoney-maximizing, they compare
USYM = γnE to UVCM = E to decide on voting in favor of or against the symmet-
ric institution that requires each player to contribute the efficient contribution
level E. γnE > E if γ > 1/n, a condition that is always met by definition in a
VCM game with homogeneous players. Consequently, with unanimity voting,
all players will vote in favor of the symmetric institution.
In treatment HOM − SYM , assuming social preferences instead of pure
money-maximizing does not change predictions. With homogeneous players,
the symmetric institution guarantees equality of payoffs while simultaneously
maximizing them. Hence again, all players are predicted to vote in favor of the
symmetric institution. Formally, USYM = γnE ≥ UVCM = E − cˆ + γncˆ, where cˆ
denotes contributions in equilibrium with cˆ ∈ [0, E]. As UVCM is strictly increas-
ing in cˆ due to nγ > 1, the utility after successful implementation of the sym-
metric institution is always at least as large as the utility from the VCM. This
analysis is equivalent to the one done by Gerber et al. (2013) for the 4 player
case.
2.A.3.2 Treatment HET − SYM
In treatment HET − SYM , heterogeneous players vote on implementing the
symmetric institution.
Proposition 4. In treatment HET − SYM , money-maximizing players vote in fa-
vor of implementing the symmetric institution. The symmetric institution is always
implemented and all players contribute according to the institutional rules, i.e.,
ci = E, i ∈ {h, l}.
If players are heterogeneous and money-maximizing, they compare
USYM = γinE with γi ∈ γl ,γh to UVCM = E to decide on voting in favor of or
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against the symmetric institution that requires each player to contribute the
efficient contribution level E. USYM > UVCM whenever γi > 1/n. Given the
parametrization of our experiment (γl = 1/2, γh = 3/4, n= 3), this condition
is met for both high and low type players. Consequently, all players vote in favor
of the symmetric institution.
In treatment HET − SYM , predictions based on standard preferences and
social preferences differ markedly. Players with standard preferences always
support the formation of the symmetric institution as it offers a higher monetary
payoff than the VCM and they do not suffer from inequality that arises from
symmetric contributions of players with different MPCRs. In contrast, low type
players with social preferences who suffer sufficiently from being worse off than
the high types if the symmetric institution is implemented object to institution
formation. They prefer a possibly lower payoff, but equal payoffs across players
in the VCM to a higher monetary payoff, but disutility from inequality with the
symmetric institution being in place.
Proposition 5. High type players with social preferences will always vote in favor
of installing the symmetric institution. In contrast, low type players with social pref-
erences will reject the installation of the symmetric institution if they are sufficiently
averse to disadvantageous inequality, more precisely, if αl >
2
3 − 475 cˆh, where cˆh is
the equilibrium contribution of high types in the VCM. If players have social pref-
erences, the symmetric institution will not always be implemented.
The proof of proposition 5 is provided below. We first analyze the behavior
of the low type. If the symmetric institution is implemented, the low type’s
utility is USYMl = 3E(γl −αl∆γ). As has been shown in the previous analysis of
treatment HET − VCM , if players have social preferences and heterogeneous
MPCRs the VCM has both symmetric and asymmetric equilibria. Hence, UVCMl
depends on the kind of equilibrium that is played in the VCM. If a symmetric
equilibrium is played, the utility of the low type is UVCMl,s ym = E + ch(
2γh+γl−1
1+∆γ ),
where ch denotes the contribution level of the high types in the VCM. The low
type will reject the symmetric institution, if UVCMl,s ym > U
SYM
l , i.e., if αl >
3γl−1
3∆γ −
ch
3E∆γ(
2γh+γl−1
1+∆γ ). If an asymmetric equilibrium is played in the VCM, utility in the
VCM is UVCMl,as ym = E + γl2ch − βl(1− 2∆γ). The critical threshold for rejecting
the symmetric institution is given by αl >
3γl−1
3∆γ − ch3E∆γ(2γl − βl(1− 2∆γ)).
Next, we will analyze the voting behavior of the high types. Again, we
must distinguish between symmetric and asymmetric equilibria being played in
the VCM. If a symmetric equilibrium is played in the VCM, all players’ payoffs
are equal: UVCMh,s ym = U
VCM
l,s ym = E + ch(
2γh+γl−1
1+∆γ ). If U
VCM
h,s ym > U
SYM
h , the symmetric
institution will be rejected. Setting UVCMh,s ym > U
SYM
h = 3E(γh − β12 ∆γ), leads to
the condition βh >
2
3
3γh−1
∆γ − 2ch3E∆γ(2γh+γl−11+∆γ ). This can be interpreted as follows:
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if the high types’ sensitivity towards advantageous inequality and the contri-
butions in the VCM are large enough, high types will vote against the sym-
metric institution to achieve an outcome with equal payoffs, rather than po-
tentially higher, but unequal payoffs. If an asymmetric equilibrium is played in
the VCM, the utility of the high types is given by UVCMh,as ym = E + ch(2γh − 1−
αh
2 (1− 2∆γ)). Rearranging UVCMh,as ym > USYMh leads to βh > 23 3γh−1∆γ − chE (2γh −
1− α12 (1− 2∆γ)).
Let us summarize behavior of players with social preferences in treatment
HET − SYM : If symmetric equilibria are played in the VCM, the low type votes
against implementing the symmetric institution if αl >
3γl−1
3∆γ − ch3E∆γ(2γh+γl−11+∆γ ).
The high types vote against implementing the symmetric institution if βh >
2
3
3γh−1
∆γ − 2ch3E∆γ(2γh+γl−11+∆γ ). If an asymmetric equilibrium is played in the VCM, the
low type rejects the institution if αl >
3γl−1
3∆γ − ch3E∆γ(2γl − βl(1− 2∆γ)), while
the high types reject it for βh >
2
3
3γh−1
∆γ − chE (2γh − 1− αh2 (1− 2∆γ)). If the in-
stitution is not implemented, contribution levels are identical to those in the
treatment HET − VCM . If the symmetric institution is implemented, all play-
ers contribute ci = E, i ∈ {h, l}.
Using the parametrization of the experiment simplifies results drastically.
Equilibria with asymmetric payoffs cannot arise. Low types will reject the sym-
metric institution if αl >
2
3 − 475 ch. High types will reject the institution for
βh >
10
3 − 875 ch. Since β < 1 by assumption of the Fehr-Schmidt model and
ch ∈ [0,20], this condition is never met and high types will never reject the
institution.
2.A.3.3 Treatment HET − ASYM
In treatment HET − ASYM , heterogeneous agents vote on implementing the
asymmetric institution.
Proposition 6. The following statements hold both for money-maximizing players
and for players with social preferences. In treatment HET − ASYM , all players
vote in favor of implementing the asymmetric institution. The institution is always
implemented and all players contribute according to the institutional rules, i.e.,
high types contribute ch = E and low types contribute cl .
If the asymmetric institution has been implemented the utility of money-
maximizing low types is denoted by UASYMl = E − cl + γl(n1E + n2cl), the util-
ity of money-maximizing high types by UASYMh = γh(n1E + n2cl). Contribution
levels in the asymmetric institution are designed to equalize payoffs across het-
erogeneous player types, i.e., the contribution level of the low types, cl , is de-
termined by UASYMl = U
ASYM
h . Solving for cl and restricting contributions to
be non-negative results in cl =max{E
1−n1∆γ
1+n2∆γ
; 0}. Whenever UASYMl = U
ASYM
h >
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UVCM = E, players vote in favor of the asymmetric institution. Inserting cl and
rearranging UASYMl = U
ASYM
h > E leads to γhn1 + γln2 > 1, which is the neces-
sary condition for public good provision to be efficient, a condition that is met
by definition of the public goods game.
Both high and low type players with social preferences will vote in favor
of implementing the asymmetric institution. Implementing the asymmetric in-
stitution guarantees both player types the highest attainable payoff among all
equilibrium payoffs of the VCM and does not induce payoff inequalities. This
intuitive line of reasoning summarizes the part of the formal analysis provided
below that is relevant for the parameters used in the experiment. In sum, in treat-
ment HET − ASYM , we will show that the low type with social preferences will
only reject the asymmetric institution if an asymmetric equilibrium is played in
the VCM. Otherwise, the utility level with the asymmetric institution in place
represents the highest attainable equilibrium utility level and the implementa-
tion of the asymmetric institution will always be supported.
If a symmetric equilibrium is played in the VCM, the low type will com-
pare the utility obtained under the asymmetric institution, UASYMl = U
ASYM
h =
γhE(
3
1+∆γ), to the utility level in a symmetric equilibrium of the VCM, U
VCM
l,s ym =
E + ch(
2γh+γl−1
1+∆γ ). Simplifying U
ASYM
l ≥ UVCMl,s ym results in the condition E ≥ ch that
is always met. Consequently, the low type will support the implementation of the
asymmetric institution. If an asymmetric equilibrium is played in the VCM, the
low type will compare UASYMl to U
VCM
l,as ym = E + γl2ch − βl ch(1− 2∆γ). Setting
UVCMl,as ym > U
ASYM
l and rearranging results in
ch
E >
2γh+γl−1
(1+∆γ)(2γl−βl)(1−2∆γ) , i.e., the
low type will only reject the asymmetric institution if the amount contributed
to the public good in the asymmetric equilibrium of the VCM is relatively large
compared to the total endowment and if the conditions for the existence of an
asymmetric equilibrium in the VCM are met, i.e., if βl <
1−γl
1+∆γ for the low type
and βh > 2(1− γh)+αh(1−∆γ) for both high types.
High types will always support the implementation of the asymmet-
ric institution. First, the asymmetric institution guarantees them the high-
est attainable utility level in the VCM among all possible symmetric equi-
libria of the VCM. Second, also if an asymmetric equilibrium is played in
the VCM, the high types’ utility obtained under the asymmetric institution
must at least be as large as the utility in every possible asymmetric equilib-
rium of the VCM, since the low type additionally contributes a non-negative
amount to the public good and equal payoffs are ensured. Technically, let
us compare the high types’ utility from the asymmetric equilibrium in the
VCM, UVCMh,as ym = E + ch(2γh − 1− α12 (1− 2∆γ)) to the utility from the asym-
metric institution UASYMh = Eγh(
3
1+∆γ)= Eγh(2+
1−2∆γ
1+∆γ ). Setting U
VCM
h,as ym >
UASYMh results in ch(2γh − 1− α12 (1− 2∆γ))> E(γh(2+ 1−2∆γ1+∆γ )− 1). Since E ≥
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ch, −α12 (1− 2∆γ)> γh(1−2∆γ1+∆γ ) which can be simplified to −α12 > γh1+∆γ must
hold for UVCMh,as ym > U
ASYM
h to be true. However, −α12 > γh1+∆γ can never be true,
since the left side of the inequality is negative, while the right one is positive.
Consequently, high types will always vote in favor of implementing the asym-
metric institution.
For the parameters used in the laboratory experiment asymmetric equilibria
in the VCM do not exist. The only source of rejecting the asymmetric institution
is eliminated and all players are predicted to vote in favor of implementing the
asymmetric institution.
2.A.3.4 Treatment HOM − ASYM
In treatment HOM − ASYM , homogeneous players vote on implementing the
asymmetric institution.
Proposition 7. For money-maximizing players, it is a weakly dominant strat-
egy to vote in favor of implementing the asymmetric institution in treatment
HOM − ASYM . The asymmetric institution is always implemented and all play-
ers contribute according to the institutional rules.
The asymmetric institution obliges n1 players to contribute their whole ini-
tial endowment E, while the other n2 players are obliged to contribute only
c¯ < E with n1 + n2 = n. Money-maximizing players who are obliged to only
contribute c¯ will vote in favor of the asymmetric institution because it will in-
crease their earnings: UASYMc¯ = E − c¯ + γ(n1E + n2 c¯)> E, the payoff in the VCM,
since c¯ < E and γ(n1 + n2)> 1. However, for players who are obliged to con-
tribute E, the formation of the asymmetric institution does not pay off when
the share of players with low contributions gets too large or these players’ con-
tribution level c¯ gets too small. Their payoff from the asymmetric institution
is denoted by UASYME = γ(n1E + n2 c¯). Only if γ(n1E + n2 c¯)> E, it is a weakly
dominant strategy for all players to support the installment of the asymmetric
institution. For the parametrization of our experiment (γ= 2/3, n1 = 2, n2 = 1,
E = 20, and c¯ = 8), this is indeed the case.
Players with social preferences will reject the asymmetric institution if
the inequality introduced by the asymmetric institution outweighs its mone-
tary gains. The utility of the two players who contribute fully is denoted by
UASYME = γ(n1E + n2 c¯)− αi2 (E − c¯), the utility of the player who contributes c¯
is given by UASYMc¯ = E − c¯ + γ(n1E + n2 c¯)− βi(E − c¯). For three players with
social preferences, UVCM = E − cˆ + γ(n1 + n2)cˆ, where cˆ denotes the equilib-
rium contribution to the public good in the VCM. Comparing UASYME to U
VCM
shows that the players contributing fully will reject the asymmetric institution
if αE > 2
(cˆ−E)+γ(n1E+n2 c¯−(n1+n2)cˆ)
E−c¯ , while the player contributing c¯ will reject it
if βc¯ >
(cˆ−c¯)+γ(n1E+n2 c¯−(n1+n2)cˆ)
E−c¯ . Inserting the experimental parameters, the two
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conditions simplify to αE > 2− cˆ6 and βc¯ > 2− cˆ12 . These inequalities also show
that the asymmetric institution is more attractive if equilibrium contributions in
the VCM cˆ are low.
Proposition 8. Players with social preferences who are obliged to contribute fully
will vote against the asymmetric institution if αc¯ > 2− cˆ6 , while players who are
obliged to contribute c¯ will vote against the asymmetric institution if βE > 2− cˆ12 .
Hence, if homogeneous players have social preferences, the asymmetric institution
will not always be implemented.
2.A.4 Behavioral predictions
The results section is structured along five sets of predictions and corresponding
results concerning differences in voting and contribution behavior across
treatments. The predictions are listed below. They build on the theoretical
predictions for the different treatments. We focus on predictions that are based
on treatment comparisons in which changes in behavior can be attributed to
a single change in setup (either a change in the institution or a change in the
composition of player types). Moreover, the predictions are based on three
assumptions. First, we assume that at least some players are inequality averse
to an extent that induces their behavior to deviate from the predictions based
on standard preferences. Second, when comparing two-stage treatments to
the corresponding baseline VCMs, we assume that whenever an institution
is rejected in the voting stage of a two-stage treatment, subjects play the
equilibrium in the VCM of the contribution stage that the same group of
subjects would play in the baseline VCM. Finally, for each of the two treatments
HOM-VCM and HET-VCM, all possible equilibria can be ranked according to
efficiency on a continuous scale from 0 to 1. When comparing the two baseline
VCMs in treatments HOM-VCM and HET-VCM, we assume that the same group
of subjects would play the equilibrium of the same efficiency rank in treatment
HOM-VCM and HET-VCM, e.g., a given group of subjects that chooses the
most efficient equilibrium in treatment HOM-VCM, would also choose the
most efficient equilibrium in treatment HET-VCM. This results in the following
predictions concerning treatment comparisons:
Prediction 1:
Average contributions in treatment HET-VCM are lower than in treatment
HOM-VCM.
Prediction 2:
In treatment HOM-SYM, average contributions are (weakly) higher than
in treatment HOM-VCM.
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Prediction 3:
a) In treatment HET-SYM, average contributions are (weakly) higher than
in treatment HET-VCM.
b) In treatment HET-SYM, both implementation rate and average contri-
butions are lower than in treatment HOM-SYM.
Prediction 4:
a) In treatment HET-ASYM, the implementation rate is higher than in
treatment HET-SYM. There is no unambiguous prediction whether aver-
age contributions are higher in treatment HET-ASYM or in treatment HET-
SYM.
b) In treatment HET-ASYM, average contributions are (weakly) higher
than in treatment HET-VCM.
Prediction 5:
a) There is no unambiguous prediction whether average contributions are
higher in treatment HOM-ASYM or in treatment HOM-VCM.
b) In treatment HOM-ASYM, the implementation rate is lower and average
contributions are (weakly) lower than in treatment HOM-SYM.
c) In treatment HOM-ASYM, the implementation rate is lower than in
treatment HET-ASYM. There is no unambiguous prediction whether av-
erage contributions are higher in treatment HOM-ASYM or in treatment
HET-ASYM.
2.B Contributions Without Institutions | 41
Appendix 2.B Contributions Without Institutions
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Figure 2.B.1. Contributions in Case of No Institution over Time
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Appendix 2.C Instructions
The instructions below are translations of the German instruc-
tions for the experiment. The instruction are for treatment
HET − ASYM . Instructions for the other treatments were as simi-
lar as possible except for the necessary adjustments concerning
the composition of types (in treatments with homogeneous play-
ers), the level of obligations (in treatments with the symmetric
institution), and the omittance of the first stage in the baseline
VCM treatments.
General instructions for the participants
You are now participating in an economic experiment. If you read the following
explanations carefully, you will be able to earn a considerable amount of money
– depending on your decisions and those of the other participants. Thus it is very
important to read these instructions carefully and to understand them.
During the experiment, it is absolutely prohibited to communicate with the
other participants. If you have any questions, please ask us: please raise your
hand and we will come to your seat. If you violate this rule, you will be dismissed
from the experiment and forfeit all payments.
How much money you will receive after the experiment depends on your deci-
sions and those of the other participants. During the experiment, payoffs will
be calculated in Taler instead of Euro. Your total income will be calculated in
Taler first. The total amount of Taler that you have accumulated during the ex-
periment will be converted into Euro and paid to you in cash at the end of the
experiment. The exchange rate from Taler to Euro is as follows:
40 Taler = 1 Euro
The experiment consists of exactly one part. This part is divided into 20 periods.
At the beginning of the experiment you are randomly assigned to a group of
three. Thus, there are two other participants in your group. In each group of
three, there are two participants of type A and one participant of type B
(the difference between type A and type B will be explained in detail shortly).
Whether you are of type A or of type B is determined randomly. In all periods
your type remains the same, just as the types of the other participants
in your group remain the same. You will be interacting with the same two
participants in all periods. Neither during, nor after the experiment will you
receive any information about the identities of the other participants in your
group.
2.C Instructions | 43
Detailed Information about the Course of each Period
Each period is divided into three stages:
1. In the second stage you have to decide on howmany Taler you contribute
to a project and how many Taler you keep for yourself.
2. In the first stage you can decide if you want to commit yourself and the
other participants in your group to certain contributions to the project in
stage 2. Only if all participants decide in stage 1 to commit all participants
in your group to certain contributions to the project, the contributions will
actually be fixed. If not all participants decide to fix the contributions, then
you and the other participants in your group will be able to choose any
contribution level in the second stage.
3. In the third stage you get to know the contributions of all participants in
your group to the project in stage 2 and the payoffs of all participants in
your group in this period.
At the beginning of each period every participant receives 20 Taler. In each
period you have to decide on how to use these 20 Taler. You can contribute
Taler to a project or put them on a private account. Every Taler that you don’t
contribute to the project is automatically put on your private account.
Income from your private account:
For each Taler you put on your private account, you earn exactly one Taler. For
example, if you put 20 Taler on your private account (thus contributing zero
Taler to the project), you would earn 20 Taler from your private account. If, e.g.,
you would put 2 Taler on your private account (thus contributing 18 Taler to the
project), your income from the private account would be 2 Taler. Nobody but
you receives Taler from your private account.
Income from the project:
For each Taler that you or another participant in your group contributes to the
project, you (and each other participant in your group) earn a certain number
of Taler. Each participant’s income from the project depends on his or her type
and is determined as follows:
Type A’s income from the project = 34 * sum of all contributions to the project
Type B’s income from the project = 12 * sum of all contributions to the project
Example 1: The sum of contributions from all participants to the project is 12
Taler (e.g., if you and the two other participants contribute 4 Taler each, or if
one of the three participants contributes 12 Taler and the two other participants
contribute 0 Taler). Then the two participants in your group who are of type A
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each receive an income of 34 * 12 = 9 Taler from the project, and the participant
in your group who is of type B receives an income of 12 * 12 = 6 from the project.
Example 2: The sum of contributions from all participants to the project is 36
Taler. Then the two participants in your group who are of type A each receive
an income of 34 * 36 = 27 Taler from the project, and the participant in your
group who is of type B receives an income of 12 * 36 = 18 from the project.
Income at the end of a period:
Your income at the end of a period is the sum of your income from your private
account and your income from the project:
Type A:
Income from the private account (20 – contribution to the project)
+ Income from the project (34 * sum of contributions to the project)
= Income at the end of the period
Type B:
Income from the private account (20 – contribution to the project)
+ Income from the project (12 * sum of contributions to the project)
= Income at the end of the period
Let us illustrate how your income at the end of a period is calculated using two
examples:
Example 1: Assume that you are of type A and contribute 16 Taler to the project,
just as the other two participants. The sum of contributions is then 16 + 16 +
16 = 48 Taler. Your income in this example would be:
4 Taler from the private account + 34 * 48 Taler from the project = 4 + 36
= 40 Taler
Example 2: Assume that you are of type A and contribute 0 Taler to the project,
while the other two participants contribute 16 Taler each. The sum of contribu-
tions is then 16 + 16 + 0 = 32 Taler. Thus, your income would be:
20 Taler from the private account + 34 * 32 Taler from the project = 20 + 24 =
44 Taler
The first stage
In the first stage you can decide whether you want to commit yourself and the
other participants in your group to a certain contribution to the project in the
second stage. All participants decide simultaneously. Only if all participants in
your group decide to commit themselves and the other participants to certain
contributions, are the contributions in stage 1 actually fixed. In this case contri-
butions will be fixed as follows:
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Type A: Contribution of 20 Taler to the project
Type B: Contribution of 8 Taler to the project
If not all participants decide to fix the contributions, you and the other partic-
ipants in your group can freely contribute any number of your 20 Taler to the
project in the second stage.
The second stage
At the beginning of the second stage you get to know how each participant in
your group decided in the first stage.
If in the first stage all participants decided to fix the contributions in the second
stage, then in the second stage you have to contribute the corresponding amount.
Thus, if you are of type A you have to enter a contribution of 20 Taler and if you
are of type B you have to enter a contribution of 8 Taler. Other inputs are not
possible and will automatically be adjusted by the computer program.
In this case the period income of the participants of type A is 34 * 48 = 36 Taler
each and the period income of the participant of type B is 12 + 12 * 48 = 36
Taler.
If in the first stage not all participants decided to fix the contributions in the
second stage, then in the second stage all participants can freely choose any
integer contribution between 0 and 20 to the project (0, 1, 2, . . . , 19, 20).
In this case your period income is computed as indicated above:
Type A: 20 – your contribution to the project + 34 * (sum of all contributions to
the project in your group)
Type B: 20 – your contribution to the project + 12 * (sum of all contributions to
the project in your group)
The third stage
In the third stage you get to know the contributions to the project by all partici-
pants in your group, as well as their period income. Furthermore, you will again
see how each participant in your group decided in the first stage.
Then the current period ends and the next period begins with the same partic-
ipants. Your type and the types of the other participants remain the same. All
participants can then again decide in the first stage whether they want to fix
contributions in the second stage. Again, the second stage follows and finally
the third stage.
Conclusion of the experiment and payment
The experiment ends after 20 periods. Subsequently, we will ask you to answer a
few general questions on the computer. Your answers to these questions have no
influence on howmuchmoney you earn in the experiment. When all participants
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have filled out the questionnaire, payments will bemade. Your total income from
the 20 periods will be converted into Euro and paid to you in cash.
Do you have any questions? If so, please raise your hand.
3
Cooperation and Redistribution:
Does “bundling” foster institution
formation? ?
3.1 Introduction
When it comes to cooperation problems, the formation of a “governing institu-
tion” provides a promising means to overcome the problem.1 However, potential
tensions arise if the returns from cooperation are not evenly distributed among
participating parties (e.g., Reuben and Riedl, 2013; Kube et al., 2015). In par-
ticular if neither side payments nor renegotiation are possible, parties profiting
less from successful cooperation might be inclined to reject institutions or bills
that favor others disproportionally.2 Such concerns might be alleviated in the
presence of formal redistribution rules. Yet, the implementation of these rules
could present a challenge in itself, because not all parties benefit to the same
extent from redistribution. In this paper, we shed light on this issue by exploring
procedures under which parties might potentially agree to implement formal
redistribution rules.
To this end, we take a prominent social dilemma as the underlying coop-
eration problem and compare the effectiveness of two different procedures for
deciding over the implementation of a redistribution rule: either a bundled or
a separate approach. In the bundling approach, redistribution forms an integral
? We thank audiences at the EEA 2015, M-BEES 2015, the ETH Workshop on Social Norms
and Institutions 2015 and Norms Actions and Games 2016 for their helpful comments.
1 Throughout the paper, “forming a governing institution” is meant as parties agreeing on a
set of rules (e.g., laws) that are backed up by deterrent sanctions.
2 Examples for this behavior are legion. The behavior of the republican party during the fi-
nancial shutdown 2013 can be thought of as prime example: willingly accepting the harsh conse-
quences – also for their own party – in order to prevent the current administration from gaining
large credit for their ability to avoid the fiscal cliff.
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part of the governing institution and parties vote over the joint implementation.
If they vote against implementation, neither a governing institution nor a formal
redistribution rule will be in place. Contrarily, in the separate approach gover-
nance and redistribution are separately available and parties have two distinct
votes at their disposal. Thus, in addition to the potential outcomes under the
bundling approach of having both redistribution and governance in place, or
neither of them, it is also possible that only the formal redistribution rule or
only the governing institution is implemented. As such, the separate approach
is more flexible in that it allows to foster efficiency-enhancing cooperation via
the governing institution even if the involved parties dislike redistribution (or,
vice versa, to have redistribution rules in place without modifying parties’ choice
sets through governance). Yet, this comes at the cost of introducing potential fric-
tions if the rejection of one proposal lowers the acceptance and induces rejection
of the other proposal.
Based on a theoretical model with social preferences, we show that behav-
ior under these two approaches might indeed differ. Of course, whether there
are environments where the outcomes actually do differ is ultimately an em-
pirical question. We use the controlled environment of laboratory experiments
to test for this. As in our model, the lab experiments allow us to vary the im-
plementation approach while keeping constant all other relevant aspects of the
environment. The workhorse that we use for our design is a linear public-good
game with a voluntary-contribution mechanism, as it is very frequently used
in the related strand of literature. Each player decides how to allocate a given
monetary endowment between a private good and a public good. Public-good
provision is socially efficient, but for each player the individual marginal return
rates from the private and public good are such that there exist free-riding in-
centives. Within this framework, we test two institutions that might potentially
mitigate the inherent cooperation problem, namely a governing institution and
a formal redistribution rule. The governing institution (if implemented) com-
mits all players to contribute their entire endowment to the public good. Yet,
players are heterogenous in their returns from the public good, which creates a
tension between equality and efficiency. This is addressed by the formal redistri-
bution rule. If implemented, it ensures equality in payoffs among all players at
all times, simply by redistributing payoffs from players that have a high return
or low contributions from the public good to those with a low return or high
contributions.
Players decide on the implementation prior to the public-good stage. In line
with previous literature (e.g., Kosfeld et al., 2009; Gerber and Wichardt, 2009;
Potters et al., 2005) we use the unanimity voting rule for the institution selec-
tion process. It ensures that players cannot be governed by institutions against
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their will.3 Between treatments, we vary the (combination of) institutions that
are available to the players. In our main treatments, there is both a formal redis-
tribution rule and a governing institution. They are bundled in treatment Bun,
i.e., players cast a single vote for or against their joint implementation. Contrar-
ily, redistribution and governance are available separately in treatment Sim and
players cast two individual votes, i.e., one per institution. We compare the out-
comes between these two approaches, but also relate them to three potential
benchmarks: no institution available at all (treatment Vcm), only redistribution
(treatment Re), or only governance (treatment Fix).
We find that both institutions are potentially able to increase cooperation
rates compared to the baseline Vcm, but cooperation rates and, in particular,
implementation rates differ significantly between treatments. If only a single in-
stitution is available (Re or Fix), the formal redistribution rule is implemented
more frequently than the governing institution (79% versus 56%). Given that
any institution that is able to eliminate the social dilemma should receive unan-
imous support from purely selfish players, the result suggests that behavior (at
least in parts) is driven by equality considerations.
Interestingly, this seems to create additional tensions when both redistribu-
tion and governance are separately available (Sim). Not only is there a drop
in the implementation rate of the governing institution (implemented in 66%
of all cases), but also the redistribution rule is implemented in only 43% of all
cases. 26% of all situations result in total failure to implement any institution. By
contrast, the bundled approach, where governance and redistribution are jointly
available and players cast a single vote (Bun), induces the highest implementa-
tion rate (87%). Strikingly, we observe in a subsequent, independent decision
experiment that the majority of subjects seem to dislike being restricted in their
choice set. When being asked which regime they prefer, 60% of people indicate
that they themselves would prefer the situation where the two decisions are not
interlinked but separately available (Sim instead of Bun).
Taken together, our findings suggest that if returns from cooperation are
heterogeneous, redistribution might generally serve as a way to mitigate the co-
operation problem. They also stress – and this is the more important and novel
contribution of our paper – that the exact details of the implementation approach
can make a difference. If parties decide on governance and redistribution sepa-
rately, lacking commitment to either one might render the process of institution
formation difficult. Thus, it might be worthwhile to restrict parties’ choice set by
taking a bundled approach; i.e., to link the decision on the governing institution
with the decision on redistribution.
3 As such, we consider it to be a natural starting point for our setup. It mimics that there are
sovereign players facing a social dilemma that try to overcome this initial, lawless state of nature
by forming an institution. Furthermore, the unanimity rule can be understood as a “stress test”
since already a single player’s veto is sufficient to reject an institution.
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This might explain why we observe many instances in natural environments
where different decision problems are intertwined although one could easily
decide on them separately. For example, the practice to bundle different bills is
extremely common in the Congress of the United States.4 In fact, outside the do-
mains of social dilemmas and redistribution there is a whole strand of literature
that examines whether the restriction of players’ choice sets is able to align con-
flicting interests among heterogeneous players. Such mechanisms are designed
by Jackson and Sonnenschein (2007) and Hortala-Vallve and Llorente-Saguer
(2010). They restrict the number of votes that players can cast on different initia-
tives in order to implement the ex-ante socially efficient solution. The efficiency
of this mechanism is supported empirically by Engelmann and Grimm (2012).
Casella and Gelman (2008) include the intensity of preferences by allowing for
a limited number of additional votes for every agent. However, both the choice
of the voting mechanism and the items on a ballot grant substantial power over
the final outcome to the legislator (Romer and Rosenthal, 1978), which might
in turn be responsible for a surprisingly low match between voters’ preferences
and outcomes in referenda (Romer and Rosenthal, 1979). This negative view on
the outcome of referenda stands in contrast to Lupia and Matsusaka (2004) and
Matsusaka (2010) which find that the availability of referenda leads to a better
representation of voters’ preferences in passed bills and less pronounced money-
power-money relationships; or Torgler (2005), who claims positive spillovers of
referenda to other social decisions (e.g., tax moral).
Our paper also ties into the literature on (endogenous) institution forma-
tion and social dilemmas. Over the last decade, a broad literature has been es-
tablished on institutions that are designed specifically to overcome social dilem-
mas; with some focusing on decentralized institutions (e.g., Ostrom et al., 1992;
Gächter and Fehr, 2000), and others focusing on centralized institutions (e.g.,
Falkinger et al., 2000; Kosfeld et al., 2009; Gerber and Wichardt, 2009). Most
of these articles study behavior in settings where the institution is exogenously
given, i.e., if it is already in place. Within this subset of the literature it has been
shown that redistribution of profits, be it carried out centrally (Falkinger et al.,
2000) or by participating subjects (Sausgruber and Tyran, 2007), is able to over-
come the social dilemma if players’ returns from cooperation are homogeneous.
Our paper extends on this by exploring the case of heterogenous returns from
cooperation. Moreover, we focus on the endogenous implementation of redistri-
bution. In a similar vain, other articles have studied the process of institution
formation, e.g., by explicit voting mechanisms (Ertan et al., 2009; Tyran and
4 For instance, each year congress is supposed to adopt twelve bills in order to finance the
operations of government, which are not necessarily interrelated. However it is also possible to
bundle several or even all bills into one “omnibus” spending bill. This option has been found to
be much more likely to pass and to receive fewer amendments (Hanson, 2014) than individual
bills. This method was just recently used for the fiscal year 2014.
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Feld, 2006; Markussen et al., 2013; Putterman et al., 2011; Ones and Putter-
man, 2007), by “voting by feet” (Gürerk et al., 2009; Ahn et al., 2008) or by
allowing participants to delegate their decisions to a central authority (Ham-
man et al., 2011; Fleiß and Palan, 2013), but did only focus on governing in-
stitutions because agents were homogenous (Gerber et al., 2013; Fischer and
Nicklisch, 2007). Or they did study the case of heterogenous agents, but did
not focus on redistribution (e.g., Kube et al., 2015; Fisher et al., 1995; Reuben
and Riedl, 2013). To the best of our knowledge, the only other study that has
looked at the endogenous formation of formal redistribution rules in the pres-
ence of heterogenous agents is Kesternich et al. (2014). In line with our findings
from treatment Re, they also find that redistribution can be an effective means
to overcome cooperation problems. Yet – and this is the novel aspect where our
paper takes the existing academic discussion on redistribution further – our find-
ings show that the actual impact of a formal redistribution rule depends on the
details of the approach that is used for deciding over the implementation of the
redistribution rule.
The outline of the paper is as follows. Section 3.2 describes the experimental
design. In Section 3.3 the theoretical predictions for subjects’ behavior will be
derived, using both standard and social preferences (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999).
Section 3.4 presents and discusses the empirical results. Section 3.5 concludes.
3.2 Experiment
In natural environments, the complexity of the process of institution formation
makes it particularly difficult to draw causal conclusions about the conditions
under which institutions come into being. As a starting point, we therefore use
the controlled environment of laboratory experiments to study the endogenous
formation of institutions. In this section, we present the design of our laboratory
experiment and describe the implemented procedures.
3.2.1 Experimental Design
The basic game underlying our experiments is a standard public-goods game
(VCM game), as it is frequently used in the literature to study elements of so-
cial dilemmas in the lab. In the game, each player has a private endowment E.
Players simultaneously decide on the amount ci that they want to contribute to
a public good, with 0≤ ci ≤ E, i = 1, ...,n. The returns from the public good are
enjoyed by all players, independently of their individual contribution ci . In some
treatments, players are heterogeneous, i.e., not all players benefit from the pub-
lic good to the same extent. To model heterogeneity, we allow the marginal per
capita return (MPCR) γi from the public good to vary across players. Given the
contributions of all players (c1, ..., cn), player i’s material payoff pii is thus given
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by
pii = E − ci + γi
n∑
i=1
ci . (3.1)
In all treatments, parameters for γi are chosen such that a social dilemma arises.
Efficiency, defined as the maximized sum of payoffs of all players, is reached if all
players contribute their entire endowment. Yet, from an individual perspective,
each player’s material payoff is maximized by not contributing to the public
good, given any set of contributions by the other players. Formally, this implies∑n
i=1 γi > 1 and γi < 1 ∀i.
Before the game starts, groups consisting of three players are formed. In
each period of the game, each player receives an endowment of E = 20. Within
every group there are two types of players, which vary in their return from the
public good γi (MPCR). Each group consists of two subjects with a high return
from the public good of γh = 0.75 and one subject with a low return of γl = 0.5.
Consequently the overall return from the public good is equal to 2. A players’
type stays constant throughout the entire game.
Except for the baseline treatment (Vcm), all treatment conditions feature an
additional institution formation stage that takes place before players make their
actual contribution decision to the public good. In this first stage the players
decide on the implementation of one or two institutions that govern the contri-
bution stage. Implementation of the institution is based on the unanimity rule,
i.e., an institution is only implemented if all three players agree to implement
it. Voting and implementation of the institutions are assumed to be costless.5
There are two kinds of institutions employed in the different treatments, a
governing institution and a formal redistribution rule. The governing institution
prescribes the contributions made by the agents to the public good. In order to
reach efficiency, obligations are set to the maximum amount for all agents, i.e.,
their entire endowment E.6 Thus, if the governing institution is implemented,
all contributions are fixed during the ensuing VCM to ci = E = 20. The formal
redistribution rule focuses on the distribution of the profits from the public
good after all contributions are made. If implemented, the institution will en-
sure equal total payoffs for all parties involved; irrespectively of their individual
contribution to the public good. This is done by redistributing payoff from play-
ers with high payoffs to those with lower payoffs, which is automatically done by
5 In general the theoretical predictions are not affected by costs, as long as they do not out-
weigh the gain provided by the corresponding institution.
6 This implies that the governing institution not only sets each player’s obligations, but also
installs a deterrent sanctioning technology to enforce the required contributions. We follow the
established approach of previous papers to not explicitly model this part of the institution as to
focus on our main effects.
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the computer at the end of a period (if the redistribution rule was implemented
in that particular period).
The availability of institutions is varied across treatments. In the benchmark
case (treatment Vcm) no institution at all is available and only the regular public-
good game is played. The second type of treatment employs one of the described
institutions separately. In treatment Fix, only the governing institution is avail-
able. If the institution is adopted, it forces all players to contribute their entire
endowment of 20 tokens. This results in payoffs of 45 tokens for the high-type
players with γh = 0.75 and of 30 tokens for the low-type player with γ= 0.5. In
treatment Re, only the redistribution rule is available. If adopted, all players re-
ceive the same payoff independently of their contributions and their individual
type.7
In treatments Sim and Bun, governance and redistribution are both available
at the same time, but the approach to decide on them differs between treatments.
In treatment Sim, both institutions are separately available and players have to
cast two distinct votes (one per institution). An institution that receives unan-
imous support is installed with the same consequences as above, regardless of
the voting outcome on the other institution. Hence, the ensuing VCM can have 4
different states: (1) the contributions are fixed but payoffs are not redistributed,
(2) contributions can be chosen by the players, but payoffs are redistributed, (3)
fixed contribution and redistributed payoffs or (4) just the regular VCM. This
implies that the resulting payoffs in (1) are as in Fix, in (2) as in Re, and in (4)
as in Vcm. In (3), the adoption of both institutions leads to a payoff of 40 tokens
for each player. By contrast, in treatment Bun both institutions are bundled such
that players cast only a single vote for or against the joint implementation of re-
distribution and governance. Hence players have to support either both of them
or neither. Consequently, if all players in a group affirm the bundle with their
vote, each of them receives a payoff of 40 tokens.
3.2.2 Procedures
The experiment was computerized by using z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007) and con-
ducted at the BonnEconLab at the University of Bonn in January and June 2012.
Students were recruited from all majors using Orsee (Greiner, 2015). In order
to keep the results of the different treatments as comparable as possible, all
setup details and parameters were kept constant throughout the experiment.
7 The following numerical example illustrates this mechanism: The player with γ= 0.5 con-
tributes 15 tokens and one of the players with γ= 0.75 contributes 5 tokens to the public good,
while the other high-type player contributes 0 tokens. If the redistribution rule is not implemented,
the payoffs would be 15, 30 and 35 tokens. If distribution is implemented, it distributes the to-
tal return from the public good (in this example 40 tokens) such that every subject receives the
same payoff (taking the remaining endowment into account). Here the total payoff is 80 tokens.
Consequently, if the redistribution rule is implemented, each subject would receive 26.66 tokens.
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We ran two sessions per treatment with 24 participants per session.8 In total
237 subjects participated. The subjects were randomly allocated into groups
of three, resulting in 16 independent observations per treatment (resp. 15 in
Vcm). Interaction took place within the same group of three players (partner-
matching protocol), but it was anonymous and decisions were taken in private at
the computer. The experiment consisted of 20 identical rounds. After each round
the subjects were informed about the voting decisions and contributions of the
other two players. Written instructions were distributed prior to the experiment
and read out aloud. Afterwards subjects had the possibility to ask questions for
clarification and had to answer several control questions. Throughout the entire
experiment tokens were used as artificial currency, with 40 tokens equalling 1
Euro. The average payment for the subjects ranged between 14.03 Euro in the
VCM treatment and 19.22 Euro in treatment Bun. The payments were made
privately in cash directly after the experiment. Each session lasted about 90
minutes.
3.3 Behavioral Predictions
For each treatment, we characterize players’ equilibrium behavior under two
alternative assumptions concerning the shape of the utility function. First, we
assume standard risk-neutral agents, i.e., each player’s utility function coincides
with the monetary payoff of the game, pii . Second, we generalize this framework
to include potential social preferences: in addition to valuing own monetary
payoff, players might suffer from inequality in monetary payoffs between them-
selves and other players (inequality-aversion as in Fehr and Schmidt (1999)). In
the remainder of this section, we will provide an intuition for the behavioral pre-
dictions for each treatment under the two alternative assumptions on the shape
of players’ utility functions using the parameters of our design. More general
proofs are provided in Appendix A.
Table 3.1 summarizes the behavioral predictions for players with standard
preferences. In any regular VCM game, players with standard preferences are
predicted not to contribute to the public good at all. Whenever γi < 1, contribut-
ing does not pay off from an individual perspective.
In every treatment featuring an institution the players are assumed to apply
backward induction. If the institution has not been implemented in the voting
stage, the players on the contribution stage are back in the regular VCM game an-
alyzed above. They are predicted not to contribute to the public good. Therefore,
each player’s monetary payoff will be equal to the initial endowment of 20 to-
8Note that one session in treatment Vcm consists of only 21 participants because some subjects
did not show up for the experiment. Moreover, note that the data that we use for additional
illustrative purposes from treatments Vcm and Fix are also used in Kube et al. (2015) (all being
conducted using the same subject pool, experimental procedures, lab, and instructor).
3.3 Behavioral Predictions | 55
Table 3.1. Behavioral Predictions Based on Standard Preferences
Vcm Fix Re Sim Bun
voting - implement implement implement 1 of implement both
institution institution the 2 institutions institutions
contribution c = 0 c = 20 c = 20 c = 20 c = 20
kens. The player will be supporting an institution whenever the utility obtained
under the institutional regime is larger than without (U(INST)≥ U(VCM)).
In the case of the governing institution, subjects are obliged to contribute
their entire endowment. The resulting payoffs would be 45 tokens for the player
with a high return and 30 tokens for the player with a low return. Compared
to the outcome under the regular VCM, the institution increases the monetary
payoffs. Hence in treatment Fix, the institution is unanimously supported in
equilibrium.
In treatment Re, the formal redistribution rule (if implemented) changes the
payoff function of the ensuing VCM to
pii =
1
3
(60 +
3∑
j=1
c j). (3.2)
Consequently, under redistribution every player’s payoff is increasing in her own
contribution. In equilibrium, this institution will incentivize every player to con-
tribute the entire endowment of 20 tokens to the public good in order to maxi-
mize the payoff. Thus, in equilibrium the payoff with institution is 40 tokens for
every agent and the players will support it in the voting stage.
The same is true for treatment Bun. The combination of governing institu-
tion and formal redistribution rule will be unanimously supported, which results
in payoffs of 40 tokens for every participating player.
The case of the separate approach in treatment Sim is more complex. As we
just saw, each institution on its own will increase each players earnings. Con-
sequently, at least one institution will always be used. Yet, both institutions at
the same time will never be used. If all agents vote for the governing institution
and fix contributions, the players with the high return from the public good will
reject redistribution in order to avoid being stuck with 40 tokens instead of 45.
If, however, the low type is rejecting the initiative to fix contributions, the best
response of the high types is to support the redistribution. Consequently, if both
institutions are potentially available and can be implemented separately (Sim),
either the contributions will be fixed (governance in place) or the payoffs will be
redistributed – but never both. Assuming successful coordination on either redis-
tribution or governance, standard theory still predicts that the efficient outcome
will be reached.
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Table 3.2. Behavioral Predictions Based on Social Preferences
Vcm Fix Re
voting - low type rejects implement
if αl high institution
contribution (ch, ch, cl = 2/5ch), ch ∈ [0,20] if reject: as in VCM c = 20
if βh > 2/7 and βl > 2/5; otherwise: ch = cl = 20
(0,0,0) otherwise
Sim Bun
voting low type rejects Fix if αl high implement both
high type supports Re if βh high institutions
contribution c = 20 c = 20
Table 3.2 displays the behavioral predictions for players with social prefer-
ences. If players have social preferences, there are multiple equilibria in the stan-
dard public good gamewith homogenous agents. The intuition is as follows: If all
players are sufficiently averse to advantageous inequality (β sufficiently high)9,
they are all willing to exactly match any possible contribution level c ∈ [0, E]
of the other players to equalize payoffs. If players are not or only mildly averse
to advantageous inequality (β low), the only equilibrium remains the one with
zero contributions of all players. The same basic mechanism is also driving the
existence of equilibria with positive contributions in the regular VCM with our
heterogeneous players. If players are sufficiently averse towards earning more
than others, they contribute positive amounts as soon as the other players con-
tribute positive amounts, in a manner such that unequal payoff distributions
are prevented (i.e., to achieve equal payoffs for all three players, the low type
contributes less than the two high types).
In treatments Re and Bun, the inclusion of inequity aversion into the utility
function does not change the behavioral predictions at all, because the formal
redistribution rule takes care of inequity considerations. Both institutions ensure
equality in monetary payoffs and they induce efficiency, either by forcing (Bun)
or by incentivizing (Re) the players to contribute their entire endowment. Hence
the payoff will be strictly larger than in the regular VCM, as no equilibrium with
full contributions by all players exists in treatment Vcm (recall that the low type
contributes less in the VCM to achieve equality in payoffs).
The predictions change in treatments Fix and Sim if players are inequality
averse. Here the potential inequality that is created by fixing the contributions
at the maximum without redistribution is the potential source of rejection. The
low-type players that would receive only 30 tokens, whilst the others receive
45, would reject if their measure for disadvantageous disutility is large (α). Low
type players might even prefer the outcome of a regular VCM without any con-
9 In the model of Fehr and Schmidt (1999), the parameter β captures the intensity of aversion
to advantageous inequality, while the parameter α measures the degree of aversion to disadvan-
tageous inequality.
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tributions over this unequal split. Consequently no institution at all might be
installed in treatment Fix. In treatment Sim, the additional availability of the re-
distribution rule could be able to mitigate this problem, but the actual prediction
depends on the degree of inequality aversion. If the players are sufficiently in-
equality averse, they are able to overcome the social dilemma by implementing
only the formal redistribution rule.10 If players are less inequality averse, only
the governing institution will be implemented. If high types are highly adverse
to advantageous disutility they also prefer an equal split over an unequal one
and both institutions will be implemented. In all cases, the maximum amount is
contributed to the public good ensuring efficiency.
3.4 Results
The results will be presented along the lines of five central results. At large these
results are in line with the behavioral predictions that were presented in the pre-
vious section, given the assumption that some players exhibit social preferences.
When comparing the different treatments we will focus on differences in the
contribution rates to the public good as well as the implementation rates of the
respective institution(s). Additionally, we will compare the voting behavior of
the different types within each treatment. All descriptive statistics are summa-
rized in Tables 3.3 and 3.4. Figure 3.1 plots contributions over time to the public
good across all treatments. Figure 3.2 displays the share of groups with an in-
stitution over time. The voting behavior of the high and low types in treatment
Sim are presented in Figure 3.3. The corresponding figures for the remaining
treatments can be found in Appendix 3.B.
In order to determine the effect of a multitude of different institutions we
need to understand the players’ behavior under the presence of each individual
institution first. Consequently, we start by describing the results of the treat-
ments that feature either the governing institution or the formal redistribution
rule. The treatments that feature both institutions at the same time follow suit.
The baseline Vcm will only serve as a baseline measure of contribution levels if
agents are heterogenous in their returns from the public good.
Contribution behavior in treatment Vcm confirms the results of Fisher et al.
(1995). Players with a high return contribute 9.4 tokens on average, while low
types average only 5.3 tokens. Consequently, payoffs for both types are rather
similar, and there is sufficient scope for improving cooperation by implementing
a governing institution, a formal redistribution rule or both.
10 Consequently the interest of the low type would then be able to dictate the entire outcome
of the game, as the claim to vote against the governing institution is entirely credible.
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3.4.1 Voting on a single institution
We first consider the contribution behavior in treatment Fix. The players con-
tribute 14.2 tokens on average. This level is significantly higher than in treat-
ment Vcm (Mann-Whitney ranksum test (MWU) p < 0.001).11 The governing
institution is installed in 56% of all possible instances and drives this increase.
If the governing institution is not implemented, the players contribute 8.1 (high
type) and 4.2 (low type) on average, which is similar to the corresponding contri-
bution levels in Vcm. The higher contribution rates are thus a result of successful
institution formation, and not an effect of institution availability per se. In line
with our prediction, we observe differences in players’ voting behavior: While
95.9% of all high types support the governing institution, only 59.7% of the low
types do so. The difference in support for the institution across type potentially
hints at inequality consideration as a major reason for the rejection.
Result 1:
Successful implementation of the governing institution in treatment Fix
results in average contributions that are significantly higher than in treat-
ment Vcm.
The equity concerns that cause rejections in treatment Fix are eliminated in
treatment Re. This results in the institution being installed more frequently
(79%) (MWU p = 0.053). The voting behavior across types is similar. 90% of
all high types and 97% of all low types vote in favor of the institution. This in-
dicates that the elimination of equity concerns allowed the institution to garner
support across both types of players. Despite the higher support, the players
contribute 15.6 tokens, which is only slightly more than in treatment Fix (MWU
p = 0.40). The contrast of increased institution formation and almost constant
contributions can be explained by the contribution behavior under redistribu-
tion. Even if the formal redistribution rule is implemented and thus payoffs are
redistributed, players do not contribute their entire endowment but “only” 18.1
tokens on average. In summary, the treatments featuring the single institution
confirm the intuition presented before.
Result 2:
a) Average contribution rates in treatment Re are not significantly larger
than in treatment Fix.
b) The formal redistribution rule in Re receives a larger support and is
implemented more frequently than the governing institution in Fix.
11 Throughout the paper, all statistical significances are computed based on two-tailed tests on
the group level.
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Table 3.3. Average Contributions by Treatment
Vcm Fix Re Bun Sim
Type
Without Institution
High 9.42 8.05 7.27 11.05 8.22
(7.07) (6.75) (7.24) (7.93) (7.54)
Low 5.33 4.17 5.26 2.88 3.67
(4.33) (4.41) (6.07) (5.55) (5.69)
With Institution
High - 20 18.18 20 19.4
- - (4.4) - (3.04)
Low - 20 18.0 20 19.18
- - (5.04) - (3.34)
Combined
High - 14.77 15.72 18.8 16.5
(7.42) (7.09) (4.21) (6.75)
Low - 13.07 15.43 17.7 15.16
- (8.38) (7.14) (6.18) (7.93)
Aggregate
8.05 14.21 15.63 18.43 16.05
(6.57) (7.79) (7.11) (5.0) (7.19)
Notes: Contributions are in tokens. Standard deviations are presented in parentheses.
Table 3.4. Share of Armative Votes and Implementation rates by treatment
Fix Re Bun Sim
Institution Type
Affirmative Votes
Fixed contributions
High .96 - .93 .94
Low .6 - .98 .73
Redistribution
High - .9 .93 .68
Low - .97 .98 .88
Implementation Rates
Fixed contributions .56 - - .31
Redistribution - .79 - .08
Both - - .87 .35
Notes: For treatment Sim the implementation rates denote the shares of the specific institutional
regimes that were installed.
3.4.2 Voting over both institutions
Above, we saw that the governing institution in Fix guarantees efficiency by
design (if it is implemented), but the lacking equality reduces its implementa-
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Figure 3.1. Development of Average Contributions over Time
Notes: In all treatments (except for Vcm) contributions exhibit an increasing time-trend. The
trend is significant for Re (Spearman’s rho r = 0.18, p < 0.01) and Bun (r = 0.13, p = 0.02). In
treatments Fix and Sim they fall short of being significant (Fix: r=0.08, p=0.16; Sim: r = 0.09,
p = 0.12). For Vcm, the trend is significantly negative (r = 0.47, p < 0.01).
tion rate. In Re, the forced equity garners high support among all types, but
fails to ensure efficiency. In essence, the singular institutions are only able to
address a singular matter of the efficiency-equity tradeoff. In the next step, we
analyze whether the joint availability of both institutions will be able to handle
this tradeoff successfully.
3.4.2.1 Treatment Sim
First, we look at the behavior in treatment Sim, where both institutions are avail-
able and can be implemented separately. Here the voting process can have one
of four outcomes: (1) if both institutions are supported by all three players, both
will be installed and efficiency and equity will be ensured simultaneously. (2) if
only the governing institution receives unanimous support, the ensuing VCM is
governed by the same institution as in treatment Fix; (3) if only redistribution
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Figure 3.2. Share of Groups with Institution over Time
Notes: In the treatment with single institutions the share of successful formations increases sig-
nificantly over time (Fix: r = 0.654, p < 0.01; Re: r = 0.45, p = 0.05). The trend is similar but
weaker in other treatments (Sim: r = 0.403, p = 0.058; Bun: r = 0.34, p = 0.14 ).
is adopted, the institution of treatment Re is present; (4) if both institutions are
rejected, the regular VCM is played.
When faced with the two institutions simultaneously, the players vote such
that at least one institution is installed in 74% of all cases. The share of groups
with an institution is thus higher than in treatment Fix, but slightly lower than
in treatment Re. Only the governing institution is implemented in 31%, while
solely redistribution is established in only 8% of all cases and both institutions
are installed in 35% of all cases. Especially the high prevalence of both insti-
tutions being installed hints either at a high degree of inequality aversion by
the high-type subjects or at the fear of a reciprocal exchange of votes among
the different types (rejection of one institution inducing rejection of the other
institution). Turning to voting behavior, we see that each type of player votes
more frequently for the institution that offers the larger benefits to himself. High
types vote in favor of the governing institution in 94% of all instances, but they
support redistribution in only 68% of all cases. For low types the picture is just
the opposite: 73% vote for the governing institution with fixed contributions
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Figure 3.3. Voting behavior on the two institutions by subject type in treatment Sim
Notes: Left displays voting on the governing institution, right displays voting on redistribution.
Support of high types for the governing institution increases significantly over time (r = 0.227,
p < 0.01).
and 88% vote for redistribution.12 Overall, the implementation rates are similar
to the other treatments, and the contribution level of 16 tokens is only slightly
higher (vs. FixMWU p = 0.17; vs. ReMWU p = 0.87). If an institution is imple-
mented, the contributions reach 19.2 tokens, which is very close to the efficient
level of 20.
Result 3: If governance and redistribution are separately available,
a) the governing institution receives more support from high type players,
b) the redistribution rule receives more support from low type players,
c) and average contributions are not significantly higher compared to
treatments with only a single institution.
Overall, we find that the simultaneous presence of both institutions is not
able to increase contributions significantly above the level that was already
achieved by a single institution. The inverse voting patterns of high and low
types highlight their conflict to settle on a common institutional setup. We will
now check whether this conflict is eliminated by the bundling procedure in treat-
ment Bun.
12 If examined using a Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-ranks test that uses the difference in
average voting behavior of single group as independent observation, the differences in voting
behavior across types are significant at the 5 % level (p = 0.012 for voting on governance, p =
0.014 for voting on redistribution).
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3.4.2.2 Treatment Bun
Recall that the only difference between treatments Bun and Sim is the more
restrictive choice set in Bun, because the decision on the formal redistribution
rule is linked to the decision on the governing institution. Thus, subjects either
have to support both institutions or none. In principle, both institutions could
also be implemented in Sim. Yet, our data show that bundling is better at elimi-
nating the tradeoff between equality and efficiency. The bundled institutions are
installed in 87% of all instances. The share of successful institution formation
is larger than in treatment Sim, even if the difference falls short of significance
(MWU p=0.109). The high implementation rate is the result of nearly identical
voting behavior by both types. High types vote in support in 93% of all cases,
compared to 98% of low types. Already after a few periods, the support is nearly
unanimous across both types.13 The high rates of support come along with high
contribution rates. Average contribution reaches 18.4 tokens, which is signifi-
cantly more than in treatment Sim (MWU p=0.048). The average contribution
rate being close to the efficient maximum indicates that the bundling approach is
able to overcome the conflicting interest between heterogenous types (that was
still present in treatment Sim, as seen by the frequent rejections). By bundling
the governing institution and the redistribution rule, i.e., by combining equity
and efficiency, the negative effects of heterogeneity and social preferences on
institution formation are eliminated.
Result 4: The details of the implementation approach make a difference:
a) Support and implementation rates for the institutions are higher in
treatment Bun than in treatment Sim.
b) Contribution rates are significantly higher in treatment Bun than in
treatment Sim.
3.4.3 Reciprocal exchanges of votes among types
The support of the governing institution by the low types increases between
treatments Fix and Sim. This difference could hint at some kind of trust in the
support of equal outcomes by the high types. This might have two causes. Ei-
ther the low-type players expect their counterparts to be inequality averse or
they expect reciprocity for their own support of the fixed contribution.14 Both
situations would lead to support for the formal redistribution rule. As a corollary
from this observation, the question is raised whether the remaining difference
13 The voting behavior of both types over time is displayed in Appendix 3.B.
14 As the voting decision is made simultaneously, this kind of reciprocity would need to be
belief driven. The beliefs on the action of the other subjects’ actions might be wrong in the first
place and are corrected in the rounds afterwards.
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between types is a result of the low types’ expectations that the high types will
reject the redistribution. If this hypothesis is true, one should expect a decrease
in the support for the governing institution if the formal redistribution rule has
been rejected previously. In line with this, we find that the institution formation
process hinges critically on the results of the previous period and its voting de-
cisions (see Tables 3.B.1 and 3.B.2 in Appendix 3.B for further details on the
determinants of individual voting behavior).
The observed trend of continued institution formation has, of course, direct
implications on contributions and exemplifies the repeated nature of the game.
The specific outcomes of a given group determine their future voting behavior
to a large extent. This results in large variations in profits over time. Contribu-
tions spread apart as they adhere to different trajectories. Successful institution
formation in previous rounds increases the subjects’ probability to vote for this
particular institution again. Note the special role of treatment Sim. We observe
that low types tend to reject the governing institution more frequently when it
was the only institution that was implemented previously, i.e., if the redistribu-
tion rule was rejected in the previous period. This indicates that the low types
are willing to forego efficiency in order to secure them a more equal payoff, sim-
ilar to what we observe in treatment Fix. This behavior points at a struggle of
“choosing” the preferred equilibrium or retaliation effects. The analog behavior
by high types cannot be observed. The likely reason for that is that the payoff for
high types does not change under redistribution as long as all player contribute
fully. Moreover, the establishment of the governing institution only impacts the
voting decision on the governing institution but not on the redistribution. This
supports the hypothesis that the low types react upon the voting behavior of
high types. They change their pattern if an undesired outcome was chosen, but
do not change their voting decision on their preferred institution.
3.4.4 Preferring the separate (Sim) over the bundled (Bun) approach
As explained previously, we introduced the integration of redistribution into the
governing institution to determine whether this will lead to higher implemen-
tation rates and payoffs. However, it remains unclear how subjects evaluate the
two frameworks. Do subjects anticipate the higher payoffs that are associated
with the bundling approach? Which framework would they prefer if they would
be able to select between the two? To answer these questions, we conducted a
simple decision experiment with 50 additional subjects in a follow-up study. The
subjects were from the same pool as in the main experiment, but did not partic-
ipate in the main study. They received the original instructions, were told that
other subjects had previously participated in this study, and were then asked
two questions.
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First, they had to estimate which framework yielded the higher average pay-
offs, Sim or Bun. A correct estimate was rewardedwith 3 Euro. Amajority of sub-
jects (68%) predicted correctly that the restricted voting option in Bunwould re-
sult in higher payoffs for the participants. Second, they were asked which regime
they themselves would prefer if they had to choose between the two treatments.
Strikingly, 60% of subjects indicated that they themselves would prefer Sim over
Bun, that is, they stated a preference for the regime where redistribution and
the governing institution are not interlinked.
Given this data, the potential of a bundled approach indeed seems to be an
open question ex ante, since for many subjects it was not trivial to determine
which treatment condition resulted in higher average payoffs. Moreover, even
if they correctly anticipated that payoffs would be higher in Bun, a substantial
share of these subjects (and 28% of all subjects) still prefers the unbundled sce-
nario Sim, where they can vote separately between implementing redistribution
and implementing a governing institution. This implies that they are willing to
forego higher monetary payoffs for a richer menu of potential institutional ar-
rangements – suggesting that people might intrinsically value the freedom to
choose and not being restricted in their choice set. In view of the outcomes
from our main experiment, the follow-up study highlights a tradeoff between
optimal design from an efficiency point of view and the individuals’ preferences
for freedom of choice.
3.5 Conclusion
This paper has investigated the effect of bundling institutions on the voting deci-
sions of heterogeneous agents in the context of a public good game. The differ-
ent institutions allowed subjects to overcome the free-rider problem of the social
dilemma by either fixing contributions at a maximal level (governance), redis-
tributing payoffs (redistribution), or by doing both at the same time. Players
were allowed to vote on different institutions. In order to ensure that the sup-
port of each interest group is required, voting was governed by the unanimity
voting rule. In each scenario, it was rational for self-centred agents to support
the establishment of at least one of the available institutions. In order to create a
conflict of interest among subjects, different marginal returns to the public good
were introduced. If one considered inequity averse subjects, a rejection of the
fixed contributions was to be expected. The predictions were partially supported,
as a larger tendency of the players with a high MPCR to vote for governance and
against redistribution was observed. The behavior of the low types exhibited the
opposite tendency. This led to frequent rejections of either or even both institu-
tions if they were offered simultaneously. We addressed this problem by offering
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the bundled institution, which limited subjects’ decision on both institutions (or
none at all).
The experiment demonstrated that the bundling of institutions is able to
foster coordination and cooperation among subjects which have conflicting in-
terests. The bundled institution was installed about 17%more often than at least
one institution in the treatment in which both institutions could be voted upon
separately. Contributions were significantly higher in the Bun treatment as well.
The bundling of institution seems to work as a commitment device for subjects.
The data support the hypothesis that institutions are often rejected if the other
subjects are not expected to cooperate by supporting both institutions them-
selves. Additionally, our results highlight the importance of path dependency:
Successful institution formation in past periods was shown to predict institution
formation in the present period.
Even though the lab experiment has to abstract from features that might po-
tentially affect behavior in natural environments, our experimental observation
supports evidence from political events as described by Burkhart and Manow
(2006). Large “packages” of bills in parliament often are a bundle of several dif-
ferent initiatives. Commitment to support such a bundle of bills can be credible.
Similarly “issue bundling” has been proposed as a means of increasing support
for the reduction of green house gas emissions if they are combined with indi-
vidual interests such as morbidity, mortality or stress reduction (Koehn, 2008).
In the context of referenda, a bundling of bills would allow politics to “sell the
good with the bad” and thereby reach support for both initiatives. Naturally, it
is not clear whether the bundling of different initiatives is indeed welfare en-
hancing. The overall effects depend very much on the specific environment and
initiatives at stake. A related negative example can be found in the literature on
industrial organization: The bundling of initiatives is equal to the bundling of
products which can be used to extract additional surplus from consumers.
Given the strength and significance of our findings, we believe that bundling
should be able to overcome the phenomenon of mutual blockades that is inher-
ent in many political interactions. It might be very interesting to see in future
studies whether this indeed holds true for other institutional arrangements and
voting mechanisms; like the use of majority voting or the use of different in-
stitutions (e.g., partial redistribution of payoffs, enforcement costs, suboptimal
obligations, delegation, etc.). Future treatments might also further enrich the
situation by including entitlement considerations, too. Subjects frequently men-
tioned in our questionnaire that they perceived redistribution to be “fair”, since
low types were not viewed to be responsible for their ex-ante disadvantage of
lower marginal returns from the public good. Thus, following up on the discus-
sion in Cappelen et al. (2013), it might be interesting to see how (the perception
about) such feelings of entitlement might interact with the support of institu-
tional arrangements, in particular if they include formal redistribution rules.
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Appendix 3.A Theoretical Framework
In this section the following public good game with n players will be analyzed
formally. Each player possesses an identical private endowment E. The player
can decide individually on a contribution ci ∈ 0, E which she contributes to the
public good. Given all players contributions (ci , ..., cn) the material payoff of
player i is denoted by
pii = E − ci + γi
n∑
j=1
c j .
In order to create a social dilemma 0< γi < 1 and
n∑
i=1
γi > 1 is assumed. The
first condition ensures that a self-centered player never profits from contribut-
ing to the public good, while the second assumption creates the effect that a
contribution equal to the endowment by all players would be socially efficient.
The individual return to the public good (MPCR) induces heterogeneity among
the players. Throughout the complete analysis heterogeneity will always refer
to this difference in MPCRs and not to any other difference in individual prefer-
ences. The mechanism described in chapter two is a two stage n player coordina-
tion game. During the first stage the players can vote on the establishment of an
institutional regime. The treatments as introduced before differ in the kind of in-
stitution that is available. The second stage of the game is the contribution stage
with each player choosing the personal contribution to the public good simulta-
neously. In order to keep the analysis comprehensible perfect information about
all characteristics of the players is assumed. From this can be inferred that the
players on the voting stage posses complete information about the outcome on
the later stage of the game. The method to solve the game will always be that of
a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in pure strategies. We treat the experiment
as an one shot game with the behavior within a single period being predicted.
The addition of additional rounds does not change the predictions as the num-
ber of rounds within the experiment is exogenously given and fixed. Hence, if
all players apply backward induction, the number of rounds has no influence on
the decisions compared to the one shot game. Due to the unanimity voting rule
a large number of SPNE arise. If one player rejects an institution it will never be
established. Hence the other players will always be indifferent between voting
in favor or rejecting the institution. This problem has already been discussed in-
tensively in the literature. Kosfeld et al. (2009) for instance, focus on stagewise
strict equilibria. By definition a Nash equilbrium is stagewise strict if on every
stage game each player’s strategy is a unique best response towards the other
players’ strategies. Unfortunately this refinement is too strict for most situations
considered here. If a rejection of an institution is justified for a player, the other
players’ decision does not influence the voting outcome. Thus, no stagewise
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strict equilibrium can exist if rejections are reasonable. Hence we will deploy a
slightly different refinement. Gerber et al. (2013) introduce a more relaxed ver-
sion of strictness in that sense, that they consider only these Nash equilibria, for
which in every stage game exists at least one player whose equilibrium strategy
is an unique best response to the other players’ equilibrium strategies. In the
following analysis we will concentrate on this class of “semi-strict” equilibria
exclusively.
3.A.1 Standard Predictions
Proposition 1 (voting behavior and contributions of heterogeneous players). In
treatment Vcm, all players contribute ci = 0. In treatments Fix, Re and Bun it is a
subgame perfect Nash equilibrium for all players to vote in favor of implementing
the proposed institutions. The institutions are always implemented. In case of the
treatments Fix and Bun all players contribute according to the institutional rules,
i.e., ci = E, i ∈ h, l. In the treatment Re the players will contribute their complete
endowment, ci = E,∀i voluntarily. In the treatment Sim exists a subgame perfect
Nash equilibrium in which the low types support both institutions. The high type
players’ unique best response is support for the fixed contributions only.
The proof of proposition 1 will be structured the following way: First the
baseline scenario will be analyzed. The results of the Vcm treatment will then
be used in order to compare the payoffs under the different institutions using
backward induction.
Heterogeneous VCM. In treatment Vcm both the two high types and the low
type are predicted not to contribute to the public good at all: ∂ pii∂ ci = −1+ γi < 0
for both types of players because γi < 1 by definition of the VCM game. This
behavior will be used in all following treatments as result from the VCM. All
other potential behavior will be ignored.
Fixed Contributions. In the two-stage game defined in treatment Fix, play-
ers will apply backward induction. If the institution has not been implemented
in the voting stage, the players on the contribution stage are back in the VCM
game analyzed above. They are predicted not to contribute to the public good.
Therefore, each player’s monetary payoff will be equal to the initial endowment
E. If players have unanimously agreed on implementing the institution in the
voting stage, all players are obliged to contribute their whole initial endowment
E and will earn γinE. γinE > E whenever γi >
1
n . This condition has to hold
for all players of type γi = γl . Otherwise these players obtain a payoff smaller
than their initial endowment under the symmetric institution and will conse-
quently reject it. The values used for γ in our experiment fulfill this condition
(γl =
1
2 >
1
3) With unanimity voting it is consequently a unique best response for
all players to vote in favor of the symmetric institution that requires each player
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to contribute the efficient contribution level E. Intuitively this is clear from the
beginning as the players will support the institution if they profit from it.
Pure Redistribution. In order to determine the behavior of the players in
the treatment in which only the redistribution rule is available, the behavior
in the subsequent VCM with the redistribution rule must be analyzed and con-
trasted with the predictions for the standard VCM without any institution. The
redistribution rule changes the payoff from the public good entirely. As assumed
the redistribution takes place in such way that every player receives the same
monetary payoff. Hence for the decision of the player only the sum of all pay-
offs is important. As efficiency of the public good was assumed in that sense,
that
n∑
i=1
γi > 1, the total payoff from public good under full contributions, is
larger than the endowments. Technically this can be seen by the fact that the
payoff from the public good is now denoted by pii =
nE+(
n∑
j=1
γ j−1)
n∑
j=1
c j
n . Whenever
∂ pii
∂ ci
=
n∑
j=1
γ j−1
n > 0 the costs of the contribution are smaller than the accumulated
benefit. Hence under the given redistribution rule a self-centred, money maxi-
mizing player will always contribute the complete endowment E. This is the
condition for the efficiency of the public good. Thus all players will always con-
tribute their complete endowment E. Their contributions lead to a payoff of
pii =
n∑
j=1
γ jE. Naturally this payoff will larger than the endowment E whenever
n∑
j=1
γ j > 1 – the condition for the efficiency of the public good. Thus every player
will always earn a higher payoff with the institution in place and consequently
support it on the voting stage. The redistribution rule eliminates the free-rider
problem by distributing the benefits of the public good equally among all players.
Hence the players profit from their own contributions the same way they profit
from other players’ contributions. Costless redistribution is predicted eliminate
the social dilemma. The result holds costly redistribution mechanisms as well.
As long as the marginal costs for the redistribution are lower than the marginal
gain achieved by the public good, contribution can be expected.
Bundled Institutions. As the players will apply backward induction, they
will compare their payoff from the bundled institution with the payoff from the
normal VCM. As players are predicted not to contribute at all in the VCM, the
payoffs which need to be compared are again the endowment E in the case of
the VCM and
n∑
j=1
γE under the institutional regime. Hence it is once more the
mutual unique best response to support the institution. Thereby the predicted
results for the bundled institution are identical to the treatment in which only
the institution for redistribution is available.
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Simultaneous Availability. The analysis of the decision in the presence of
two individually selectable institutions is not as easy as the analysis for a single
institution, because the players have to reach two decisions. Hence each player
has now four possible bundles of actions in the first stage. In order to create
a simultaneous move game with only one stage, it is again assumed that back-
ward induction is applied. Hence, E is used as payoff if no institution at all is
established, and
n∑
j=1
γiE if only the redistribution rule or both institutions are
implemented. If one assumes that the players of the same type will always act
identical their payoffs can be presented in the 2x2 matrix below.15 Here the pos-
sible actions have the following form: The first part denotes the vote towards
governance (fixed contributions) and the second part the vote towards the re-
distribution.
high type
yes, yes yes, no no, yes no, no
yes, yes
∑
γiE,
∑
γiE γhnE, γlnE
∑
γiE,
∑
γiE E, E
low type yes, no γhnE, γlnE γhnE, γlnE E, E E, E
no, yes
∑
γiE,
∑
γiE E, E
∑
γiE,
∑
γiE E, E
no, no E, E E, E E, E E, E
As
n∑
j=1
γi ≥ γln, it is obvious that the low type’s voting decision “yes, yes”
offers a payoff at least as large as all other voting options. The unique best re-
sponse of the high type would then be to play “yes, no”, whichwould result in the
acceptance of the governing institution and the rejection of the redistribution.
However, this concentration on these Nash equilibria excludes other equilibria.
There are some more pure strategy equilibria to find. In that sense the strate-
gies “no, no” played by at least two players forms a Nash equilibrium as well,
like in all other treatments. The last two equilibria arise if at least one of the low
type players chooses “no, yes”. Then the best response by the high types is to
play either “yes, yes” or “no yes”, which both result naturally in the same payoff.
Nevertheless no strategy is a unique best response as always the decisions “yes,
yes” and “no, yes” if played by all players induce the same outcome. It can be
concluded that in any Nash equilibrium in pure strategies at most one, but never
both of the institutions will be accepted.
Under standard predictions in all institutional treatments efficiency is ex-
pected independently of the institution available. This is either created by forced
contributions or voluntary full contributions in the treatment Re. Hence the vot-
ing procedure should have no influence on the contributions. In all treatments
15 Their payoffs will always be identical independently of their actions. If one drops this sim-
plifying assumption some additional equilibria arise.However, these lead only to more rejections
of the institutions (e.g., one high type and one low type reject both institutions).
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at least one institution should be adapted at all times if the players behave ac-
cording to the standard preferences.
3.A.2 Fehr-Schmidt (1999) Preferences
In the next part behavioral predictions will be determined not using the standard
model of rational self-centered players. Instead the model of inequity aversion
developed by Fehr and Schmidt (1999) will be used. This model assumes that
players compare their outcome with the outcome of all other players. In order
to model this departure from the standard model they introduce the following
utility function:
Ui = pii −αi 1n−1
n∑
j=1
max{pi j −pii; 0}− βi 1n−1
n∑
j=1
max{pii −pi j; 0}
The first term represents the monetary payoff obtained from the game. The sec-
ond term captures disadvantageous utility derived from being worse off than
other players. αi is hereby the individual envy parameter. The last term denotes
losses the player receives from being better off than the other players. βi is
typically interpreted as a measure for compassion. Additionally two important
properties are assumed. The first is αi ≥ βi , which indicates that envy is at least
as strong as compassion and secondly βi < 1, which prevents potential players
from “burning” money to achieve a larger degree of equality. In the described
setup with heterogeneous returns to the public good players might vote against
the establishment of an institution with symmetric obligations in order to pre-
vent inequality. Hence we consider the model of Fehr and Schmidt (1999) as a
natural choice to derive predictions for this setup. In order to keep the follow-
ing part as comprehensible as possible, the analysis of the treatments featuring
heterogeneous players with social preferences will be restricted to the case of
three players. For the case of heterogeneous players one player with γi = γl ,
two players with γi = γh and with γh − γl =∆γ≤ 12 will be described during
the analysis. A generalization of this results to n players would create a larger
amount of asymmetric equilibria and thereby crowd the analysis unnecessarily.
In the following the subscript l will used to mark all decisions, characteristics
and consequences for the player with the low level of MPCR (low type). Similar
the other two players will be marked using the numbers 1 and 2 (high types).
Without any restriction we will only analyze the decisions of the high type player
1. Let further c¯ denote that level of contribution by the low type that induces
equal payoffs between the low type and at least one other high type, given both
high types players level of contribution. ch will always denote the equilibrium
level contribution of the high types. The formal analysis of the experiment us-
ing Fehr and Schmidt (1999) preferences will be structured as follows: First
the behavior in the standard VCM with heterogeneous players is determined.
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Afterwards the possible payoffs will be compared to the payoffs created by the
institutional regimes, in order to derive the predictions for the treatments Fix,
Re, Bun and Sim. First the decision of the low type in the heterogeneous treat-
ments will be analyzed, the decision of the high types follows afterwards.
3.A.2.1 Heterogeneous-VCM
The behavioral predictions for the heterogenous VCM are derived in greater
detail in the Appendix 2.A.2 of Chapter 2. Hence, only the resulting equilibrium
behavior is highlighted here. If one uses the calibration of the experiment the
predicted behavior of the low type player can be summarized as follows:
1. If βl ≥ 25 and both high types contribute a positive amount, the low type
will contribute until the payoff of herself and the high type contributing
less will be equalized.
2. Otherwise the low type will never contribute a positive amount to the
public good.
The predicted behavior of the high type players using the calibration of the ex-
periment can be summarized as follows:
1. If β1/2 ≥ 27 and both other players contribute a positive amount to the
public good the high type will contribute in such a way that the payoff
of herself and the monetary payoff of the player with the second highest
payoff will be equalized.
2. Otherwise the high type will never contribute a positive amount to the
public good.
3. Both high types will always contribute the same amount to the public
good.
These findings result in the following possible equilibria for the treatment Vcm:
1. If β1/2 ≥ 27 and βl ≥ 25 , every level of contribution with c1 = c2 ∈ [0; E]
and cl = c1
2
5 is an equilibrium.
2. If ∆γ= 12 , the contribution of the low type resulting in equal payoffs will
be zero. Thus the low type will never contribute in any equilibrium. Hence
if β1/2 ≥ 27 , but βl < 25 it is still possible that both high types will con-
tribute c1 = c2 ∈ {0; E}
3. Otherwise the only remaining equilibrium is characterized by c1 = c2 =
cl = 0
The other possible, asymmetric equilibria have been eliminated due to the cho-
sen parametrization of the experiment.
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3.A.2.2 Governance (Fixed Contributions)
The behavioral predictions for the institutions that fix the contributions to
the public good are derived in greater detail in Appendix 2.A.3 of Chapter 2.
Hence, only the resulting equilibrium behavior is highlighted here. Using the
parametrization of the experiment will simplify the results drastically as it has
be shown previously that equilibria with asymmetric payoffs cannot arise. Hence
for treatment Fix the predicted behavior of players with Fehr-Schmidt prefer-
ences can be summarized as follows:
1. The players with γl = 0.5 will reject the establishment of the proposed
contribution rule for αl >
2
3 − 475 ch.
2. The players with γh = 0.75 will never reject the establishment of the con-
tribution rule.
3.A.2.3 Pure Redistribution
Proposition 2 (Behavior in treatments Re and Bun). The high types will al-
ways prefer the establishment of the institution over the VCM in treatment Re.
Low type players will only reject the redistribution if an asymmetric equilibrium
is played in the subsequent VCM. The low type players will then reject whenever
ch
E >
2γh+γl−1
2γl−βl(1−∆γ) . Otherwise the low type will always support the institution. With
redistribution all players will always contribute their complete endowment. (i.e
ci = E;∀i) The voting behavior in treatment Bun is identical to the voting behavior
of all players in treatment Re.
The predictions for the VCM with redistribution are mainly the same as un-
der standard preferences. Since the redistribution rule prevents the existence of
inequality between the players the utility function remains the same as above
and thereby the predictions do not change. All players will contribute completely
and receive U ri = (2γh + γl)E. Nonetheless, differences might arise if the players
compare this outcome with their payoffs from the normal VCM, in which under
the existence of social preferences other equilibria are possible. If the players
compare this payoff with the one from the VCM, it is obvious that if a symmet-
ric equilibrium is played in the VCM all players will support the redistribution.
In the VCM all players obtain the same payoff, but efficiency is not reached, as
the low type does not contribute her complete endowment. As both efficiency
and equity is reached by redistribution, this payoff must consequently be larger
than the payoff from the VCM. Technically this can be seen by the fact that the
highest possible payoff from the VCM is denoted by U gl = U
g
h = γhE(
3
1+∆γ). In
order to induce a rejection this must be a larger than U ri = (2γh + γl)E, the pay-
off under redistribution with full contribution. Comparing the two results leads
76 | 3 Cooperation and Redistribution: Does “bundling” foster institution formation?
to 2γh + γl > 1 as condition for the support of the institution. This is the condi-
tion for the efficiency of the public good and will always be fulfilled. Hence if
only symmetric equilibria are possible, the institution will always be supported
by all players. In a second step the behavior of the low type in the presence
of asymmetric equilibria in a potential VCM will now be discussed. As shown
previously the low type’s payoff from an asymmetric equilibrium is denoted by
U gl = E + ch(2γl − β l(1−∆γ)). A comparison of the payoffs establishes the re-
sult, that for chE >
2γh+γl−1
2γl−βl(1−∆γ) the low type will reject the establishment of the
redistribution as the material payoff will be larger in the VCM. This condition
is fulfilled only if the high types contribute a fraction of their endowment large
enough to the public good. The high type will never reject the redistribution.
This is obvious, as the highest payoff from a asymmetric equilibrium is smaller
than the highest payoff from the symmetric equilibrium, since the low types
contributes a positive amount. As shown above, the redistribution rule implies a
higher payoff for every player than the symmetric equilibrium of the standard
VCM. Thus the payoff from the asymmetric equilibrium must be smaller than
the payoff under the institutional regime as well. Again the chosen parameters
exclude the existence of asymmetric equilibria. This simplifies the result such
that the support of the institution guarantees all players a payoff, which is at
least as large as the maximum payoff from the VCM.
3.A.2.4 Bundled Institutions
The predictions for the bundled institutions are identical to the to the analysis
done for the treatment Re. This can be seen easily. As has been shown previously
under the existence of the redistributional regime, all players will contribute
their complete endowment and thereby induce the same result as the bundled
institutions, which enforce full contribution. Hence the voting decisions on the
bundled institutions are predicted to be identical to the decisions on the redis-
tribution rule.
3.A.2.5 Simultaneous Availability
Proposition 3 (Behavior in treatment Sim). If no asymmetric equilibria are
played the low type will prefer the implementation of both institutions as long
as αl <
3γl−1
3∆γ − ch3E∆γ(2γh+γl−11+∆γ ). The best response for the high types will be the
rejection of the redistribution if β1/2 <
2
3 , and the support of both institutions
if β1/2 ≥ 23 . If αl > 3γl−13∆γ − ch3E∆γ(2γh+γl−11+∆γ ) and only symmetric equilibria are
played, the low type will support only the redistribution. The best response of the
high types is then to support this one as well. If asymmetric equilibria would be
played during the VCM, the low type will reject both institutions if chE >
2γh+γl−1
2γl−βl(1−∆γ) .
Otherwise the behavior remains the same as in the case of symmetric equilibria,
3.A Theoretical Framework | 77
with the threshold for the rejection of the governing institution by the low type now
being βl >
2
3
3γh−1
∆γ − 2ch3E∆γ(2γh+γl−11+∆γ ).
The treatment in which the two institutions are available independently is
the most complex treatment to analyze. The results from all the treatments
above will be combined. The following table shows the outcomes for each deci-
sion combination under the simplification that the two high players are summa-
rized here as one player. This is done solely for reasons of visualization. Nonethe-
less the two high type players might vote differently due to differences in their
specific values of α and β . When using the following representation, one must
keep in mind that each institution will only be established if it is supported by
all three players. The cells display to which other treatment the voting results
correspond. Then the already established knowledge about the treatments will
be used to determine subgame perfect Nash Equilibria in pure strategies.
high type
yes, yes yes, no no, yes no, no
yes, yes Bun Fix Re Vcm
low type yes, no Fix Fix Vcm Vcm
no, yes Re Vcm Re Vcm
no, no Vcm Vcm Vcm Vcm
In order to determine possible equilibria, the proof for proposition 5 will be di-
vided into two parts. Like before in the first part the behavior of the players
will be analyzed under the assumption that a symmetric equilibrium is played
during the VCM. The second part considers the behavior under possible asym-
metric equilibria. In the next step a preference relation between the different
treatments for the two types of players types will be established in order to solve
the three player game above. Abover it has been shown that in the presence of
symmetric equilibria the low type will always prefer the identical treatments Re
and Bun over the treatment Vcm. Obviously, they will also prefer these two over
the treatment Fix as they offer a higher monetary payoff with less inequality
among the players. Furthermore, we know that the Vcm offers a higher util-
ity than Fix if αl >
3γl−1
3∆γ − ch3E∆γ(2γh+γl−11+∆γ ) if a symmetric equilibrium is being
played. This results in two possible preference ordering of the treatments:
1. RE ∼ BUN  F IX ¥ VCM , if αl ≤ 3γl−13∆γ − ch3E∆γ(2γh+γl−11+∆γ ) (type 1)
2. RE ∼ BUN  VCM  F IX , else (type 2)
If one takes now a closer look at the table presented above, it becomes obvi-
ous that the support of both institution is weakly preferred over all other voting
decisions by type 1, given the behavior in the ensuing VCM. Conversely type
2 weakly prefers the voting decision “no, yes” over all other options and sup-
ports thereby only redistribution. The next step will determine the high types’
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possible best answers to the proposed strategies. For this a preference ordering
similar to the one presented above needs to be established. As shown before,
the high type will always prefer the establishment of the identical outcome of
the treatments Bun and Re over the Vcm. High type players will actually prefer
the case of full contribution with redistribution (Bun) to the case without redis-
tribution (Fix) if their sensitivity towards advantageous utility is too strong. In
order to derive this threshold the payoff from the two different scenarios will
be compared. The payoff without redistribution is U f1 = 3γhE − β12 3E∆γ and
with redistribution U r1 = (2γh + γl)E. Thus the high type will prefer the redistri-
bution institution whenever β1/2 >
2
3 . Additionally it has been shown, that the
high type will prefer the Vcm over Fix if βh >
2
3
3γh−1
∆γ − 2ch3E∆γ(2γh+γl−11+∆γ ), in case
of a symmetric equilibrium. Moreover, it is known, that the treatments Re and
Bun are equivalent and preferred over the outcome of treatment Vcm. Thus we
derive the following three possible preference relations for the high type.
1. F IX  RE ∼ BUN  VCM , if β < 23 (type 1)
2. RE ∼ BUN ¥ F IX  VCM , if β ≥ 23 and βh < 23 3γh−1∆γ − 2ch3E∆γ(2γh+γl−11+∆γ )
(type 2)
3. RE ∼ BUN  VCM ¥ F IX , else (type 3)
The high type player of type 1 will react to a support of both institutions by
the low type with a rejection of the redistribution institution. Under these cir-
cumstances Fix would be played. Players of type 2 and 3 will react to a support
of both institutions by either supporting institutions as well or only the redis-
tributing one. This behavior results in the treatments Re or Bun being played
and in the same payoffs for all players. If, however, the low type is of type 2
and will always support only the redistribution institution the high type can de-
cide between the treatments Vcm and Re being played. Here all high types are
predicted to support the institution Re. Re is hence always established in equi-
librium if the low type is of type 2. That results in the following equilibria:16
1. If the low type is of type 1 and both high types are of type 1, only the gov-
erning institution is established. The results are the same as for standard
predictions.
2. If the low type is of type 1 and one of the high types is of type 1, while
the other is of type 2 or 3, only the redistribution is supported.
16 These are not the only equilibria possible. Nevertheless, they are the only equilibria in which
only voting decisions are selected whose outcome are weakly preferred over the outcomes of all
other voting decisions, given the behavior in the VCM game. Thus we concentrate on these during
the analysis. The description of all equilibria existing in pure strategies would crowd the analysis
further. An example of an omitted Nash equilibrium is the rejection of all institutions by all players.
3.A Theoretical Framework | 79
3. If the low type is of type 1 and both high types are of type 2 or 3, either
both institutions or redistribution is established.
4. If the low type is of type 2, governance is always rejected and redistribu-
tion is always established.
The next section will analyze the behavior if an asymmetric equilibrium would
be played during the VCM. The different equilibria change only the payoff of
the VCM. In this case it has been shown previously that the low type will
prefer the treatment Vcm over the institutions in the treatments Re and Bun
whenever chE >
2γh+γl−1
2γl−βl(1−∆γ) and over the governing institution whenever αl >
3γl−1
3∆γ − ch3E∆γ(2γl − βl(1− 2∆γ)). This implies again that the contributions by
the high types must be large enough warrant a rejection of the institutions. As
before the redistribution and the bundled institutions are preferred over gover-
nance only. In this case three preference orderings are possible.
1. RE ∼ BUN  F IX  VCM , if αl < 3γl−13∆γ − ch3E∆γ(2γh+γl−11+∆γ ) (type 1)
2. RE ∼ BUN ¥ VCM ¥ F IX , if αl ≥ 3γl−13∆γ − ch3E∆γ(2γh+γl−11+∆γ ) and
ch
E ≤ 2γh+γl−12γl−βl(1−∆γ) (type 2)
3. VCM  RE ∼ BUN  F IX , if chE > 2γh+γl−12γl−βl(1−∆γ) (type 3)
The preference relation of the first two types is the same as in the case of symmet-
ric equilibria. Hence their behavior must be the same as well. The only difference
is type 3. For this type it is always the best response to reject both institutions
in order to force that the unregulated Vcm is played during the second stage of
the game. Hence the decision of the high types does not matter in this case at
all. Thus only the behavior in case of support of governance and redistribution
(type 1) and the redistribution rule (type 2) must be analyzed. Fundamentally
the behavior of the of the high types remains unchanged. They still prefer the
bundled institutions over the singular governing institution whenever β ≥ 23 and
prefer them always over the Vcm. However the cutoff value for the high types
to prefer the Vcm over the governing institution is now different. As derived in
section 2.A.3.2, it is now denoted by β1 >
2
3
3γh−1
∆γ − chE (2γh − 1− α12 (1− 2∆γ)).
Thus the following equilibria are possible under asymmetric equilibria in the
Vcm and if only voting decisions are made that are weakly preferred over all
other voting options, given the behavior of all players in the Vcm:
1. If the low type is of type 1 and both high types are of type 1, only the gov-
erning institution is established. The results are the same as for standard
predictions.
2. If the low type is of type 1 and one of the high types is of type 1, while
the other is of type 2 or 3, only the redistribution rule is supported.
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3. If the low type is of type 1 and both high types are of type 2 or 3, either
governance and redistribution or only redistribution are established.
4. If the low type is of type 2, governance is always rejected and the redistri-
bution rule is always established.
5. If the low type is of type 3, no institution is established.
The results are much less crowded if the parametrization of the experiment is
used. As before the asymmetric equilibria are excluded. Then it is known that
the high type will always prefer the governing institution over the Vcm. Thus
it can be established, that the low type will support both institutions or only
the redistribution rule. If αl >
2
3 − 475 ch, the fixed contribution of the govern-
ing institution will be rejected. High types will support the redistribution rule
only if the governing institution are already rejected by the low type or if their
sensitivity towards disadvantageous disutility is too large (β > 23). Thus three
possible outcomes remain. If the high types care about advantageous disutility,
both institutions should be established. If the low type is susceptible to disadvan-
tageous disutility, only the redistribution rule is established. If inequity aversion
is rather small for all participants, the outcome of the standard predictions will
be realized.
3.A.2.6 Behavioral Predictions
In the result section we will test explicit behavioral predictions on the players’
voting and contribution behavior. For these predictions we assume that at least
some players’ true preference are different from standard preferences. Addition-
ally we assume that the players will play the VCM in case of institution failure
in the same manner they would play the baseline in treatment Vcm.
Prediction 1:
a) In treatment Fix the contributions are weakly higher than in treatment
Vcm.
b) In treatment Fix the institution is not installed in all cases.
c) Rejections of the institution are caused by the voting behavior of low
types.
Prediction 2:
a) In treatment Re the average contribution and the implementation rates
are higher than in treatment Fix and treatment Vcm.
b) In treatment Re no difference in voting behavior exists.
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Prediction 3:
a) In treatment Sim the average contribution and the implementation
rates are (weakly) higher than in treatment Fix.
b) In treatment Sim the average contribution and the implementation
rates are not higher than in treatment Re.
c) High types will support governing institution more frequently than low
types.
d) Low types will support the redistribution rule more frequently than
high types.
Prediction 4
a) In treatment Bun the average contribution and the implementation
rates are weakly higher than in treatment Sim.
b) In treatment Bun no difference in voting behavior exists.
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Appendix 3.B Determinants of Voting Behavior
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Figure 3.B.1. Voting Behavior by Type in Treatment Fix
Notes: For both types the affirmative votes exhibit an increasing time trend. The trend is significant
both for high types (Spearman’s rho r = 0.14, p = 0.013) and low types (Spearman’s rho r =
0.13, p = 0.019).
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Figure 3.B.2. Voting Behavior by Type in treatment Re
Notes: For the high types the affirmative votes exhibit an increasing time trend. The trend is
significant for high types (Spearman’s rho r = 0.17, p < 0.01). For the low types there is almost
no time-trend (Spearman’s rho r = 0.03, p = 0.54).
0
.
2
.
4
.
6
.
8
1
Sh
ar
e 
of
 A
ffi
rm
at
ive
 V
ot
es
0 5 10 15 20
Period
high types low types
Figure 3.B.3. Voting Behavior by Type in treatment Bun
Notes: For the low types the affirmative votes exhibit an increasing time trend. The trend is sig-
nificant for low types (Spearman’s rho r = 0.15, p < 0.01). For the high types there is almost no
time-trend (Spearman’s rho r = 0.07, p = 0.22).
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Table 3.B.1. Determinants of individual voting behavior on xing contribution
vote on fixing contributions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Fix 0.072 0.004 0.297
(0.19) (0.01) (0.87)
Bun 0.964** 0.860** 0.589
(2.49) (2.47) (1.64)
hightype 1.111*** 1.225*** -0.101 1.541***
(4.02) (4.41) (-0.34) (3.25)
own vote fix 0.455*** 0.629*** 0.194
prev. period (3.92) (2.71) (0.71)
outcome fix 0.239*** 0.670*** 1.057***
prev. period (3.80) (2.94) (2.96)
low*fix only -2.663***
prev. period (-7.14)
only fix 0.108 -1.325***
prev. period (0.33) (-4.51)
only re 0.150
prev. period (0.53)
other controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 2880 2736 2736 912 912
Notes: This table reports the results of probit panel regressions. We use subjects per period as unit
of analysis. Regression (4) and (5) include only treatment Sim. *, **, and *** denote significance
at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level. textitz statistics in parentheses and observations clustered on
matching-group-level.
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Table 3.B.2. Determinants of individual voting behavior on redistribution
vote on redistribution
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Re 0.929*** 0.729*** 0.834***
(3.21) (3.10) (2.97)
Bun 1.406*** 1.171*** 1.306***
(4.56) (4.49) (4.26)
hightype -0.787*** -0.967*** -1.214*** -1.225***
(-3.47) (-3.82) (-3.65) (-3.72)
own vote re 0.896*** 0.995*** 0.966***
prev. period (7.71) (5.78) (5.49)
outcome re 0.714***
prev. period (6.68)
high*re only -0.044
prev. period (-0.09)
only fix -0.113
prev. period (-0.74)
only re -0.525 -0.584**
prev. period (-1.15) (-2.53)
other controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 2880 2736 2736 912 912
Notes: This table reports the results of probit panel regressions. We use subjects per period as unit
of analysis. Regression (4) and (5) include only treatment Sim. *, **, and *** denote significance
at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level. textitz statistics in parentheses and observations clustered on
matching-group-level.
86 | 3 Cooperation and Redistribution: Does “bundling” foster institution formation?
Appendix 3.C Instructions
The instructions below are translations of the German instruc-
tions for the experiment. Differences between the treatments
are marked by T Vcm:“...”, T Fix:“...”, T Re:“...”, T Bun:“...”, T Sim:“...”
General instructions for the participants
You are now participating in an economic experiment. If you read the following
explanations carefully, you will be able to earn a considerable amount of money
– depending on your decisions and those of the other participants. Thus it is im-
portant to read these instructions very carefully.
During the experiment, it is absolutely prohibited to communicate with
the other participants. Should you have any questions, please ask us. If you
violate this rule, you will be dismissed from the experiment and forfeit all pay-
ments. How much money you will receive after the experiment depends on your
decisions and those of the other participants. The experimental payoffs will be
calculated in Taler. The total amount of Taler that you have accumulated during
the experiment will be converted into Euro and paid to you in cash at the end
of the experiment. The exchange rate from Taler to Euro is as follows:
40 Taler = 1 Euro
The experiment consists of exactly one part. This part is divided into 20 periods.
At the beginning of the experiment you are randomly assigned to a group of
three. Thus, there are two other participants in your group. In each group of
three, there are two participants of type A and one participant of type B (the
exact difference between type A and type B will be explained shortly). Whether
you are of type A or of type B is determined randomly. In all periods your
type remains the same, just as the types of the other participants in your
group remain the same. You will be interacting with the same two participants
in all periods. Neither during, nor after the experiment will you receive any
information about the identities of the other participants in your group.
3.C Instructions | 87
Detailed Information about the Course of each Period
Each period is divided into three stages:
1. In the second stage you have to decide on howmany Taler you contribute
to a project and how many Taler you keep for yourself.
2. T Fix, Bun, Sim: In the first stage you can decide if you want to commit
yourself and the other participants in your group to certain contributions
to the project in stage 2 (T Bun: and redistribute the incomes such that
all participants receive the same payoff at the end of the period.) Only if
all participants decide in stage 1 to commit all participants in your group
to certain contributions to the project, will the contributions actually be
fixed (T Bun: and the income will be redistributed). If not all participants
decide to fix the contributions, then you and the other participants in your
group will each be able to contribute any number of your 20 Taler to the
project in the second stage (T Bun: and the incomes will be not redis-
tributed).
T Re, Sim: (T Sim: Afterwards) In the first stage you can decide, whether
you want to distribute your income and the income of the other partici-
pants, such all participants receive the same payoff at the end of the pe-
riod, independently of their contribution in stage 2 . Only if all participants
decide in stage 1 to redistribute the incomes, the incomes will actually be
redistributed at the end of the period.
3. In the third stage you get to know the contributions of all participants in
your group to the project in stage 2 and the payoffs of all participants in
your group in this period.
At the beginning of each period every participant receives 20 Taler. In each
period you have to decide on how to use these 20 Taler. You can contribute
Taler to a project or put them on a private account. Every Taler that you don’t
contribute to the project is automatically put on your private account.
Income from your private account:
For each Taler you put on your private account, you earn exactly one Taler. For
example, if you put 20 Taler on your private account (thus contributing zero
Taler to the project), you would earn 20 Taler from your private account. If, e.g.,
you would put 2 Taler on your private account (thus contributing 18 Taler to the
project), your income from the private account would be 2 Taler. Nobody but
you receives Taler from your private account.
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Income from the project:
For each Taler that you or another participant in your group contributes to the
project, you (and each other participant in your group) earn a certain number
of Taler. Each participant’s income from the project depends on his or her type
and is determined as follows:
Type A’s income from the project = 34 * sum of all contributions to the project
Type B’s income from the project = 12 * sum of all contributions to the project
Example 1: The sum of contributions from all participants to the project is 12
Taler (e.g., if you and the two other participants contribute 4 Taler each, or if
one of the three participants contributes 12 Taler and the two other participants
contribute 0 Taler). Then the two participants of type A each receive an income
of 34 * 12 = 9 Taler from the project, and the participant of type B receives an
income of 12 * 12 = 6 from the public good.
Example 2: The sum of contributions from all participants to the project is 36
Taler. Then the two participants of type A each receive an income of 34 * 36 =
27 Taler from the project, and the participant of type B receives an income of 12
* 36 = 18 from the project.
Income at the end of a period:
T Bun: If contributions have not been fixed and income is not redistributed, T
Re: If not all participants decided to adopt the redistribution, Your income at
the end of a period is the sum of your income from your private account and
your income from the project:
Type A:
Income from the private account (20 – contribution to the
project)
+ Income from the project (34 * sum of contributions to the
project)
= Income at the end of the period
Type B:
Income from the private account (20 – contribution to the
project)
+ Income from the project (12 * sum of contributions to the
project)
= Income at the end of the period
Let us illustrate how your income at the end of a period is calculated using two
examples:
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Example 1: Assume that you are of type A and contribute 16 Taler to the project,
just as the other two participants. The sum of contributions is then 16 + 16 +
16 = 48 Taler. Your income in this example would be:
4 Taler from the private account + 34 * 48 Taler from the project = 4 + 36
= 40 Taler
Example 2: Assume that you are of type A and contribute 0 Taler to the project,
while the other two participants contribute 16 Taler each. The sum of contribu-
tions is then 16 + 16 + 0 = 32 Taler. Thus, your income in this example would
be:
20 Taler from the private account + 34 * 32 Taler from the project = 20 +
24 = 44 Taler
TRe, Sim: If all participants supported the redistribution, the incomes calculated
above will added up and be distributed evenly among the participants:
Total income from all private accounts
+ Total income from the project (34 * sum of contributions
to the project)
= Total income of all participants
÷ 3 participants
= Income at the end of the period
Let us illustrate this calculation using one example, as well:
Example: Assume that you are of type B and contribute 0 Taler to the project.
The other participants contributed 12 Taler each. Your income in this example
would be
20 Taler from the private account + 12 * 24 Taler from the project = 20 +
12 = 32 Taler
The income of the other participants would be
8 Taler from the private account + 34 * 24 Taler from the project = 8 + 18
= 26 Taler
If the redistribution was adopted every participants receives one third of the
total income of 26 + 26 + 32 = 84 Taler. The income would be 28 Taler.
T Fix, Re Bun Sim: The first Stage
T Fix, Bun Sim: In the first stage you can decide whether you want to commit
yourself and the other participants in your group to a certain contribution to
the project in the second stage. (T Bun: and redistribute the income such that
all participants receive the same payoff.) All participants decide simultaneously.
Only if all participants in your group decide to commit themselves and the other
participants to certain contributions, are the contributions actually fixed. In this
case contributions would be fixed as follows:
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Type A: Contribution of 20 Taler to the project
Type B: Contribution of 20 Taler to the project
T Bun: The income of all participants is then given by:
Income type A (20 - 20 + 34*60=45 Taler)
+ Income type A (20 - 20 + 34*60=45 Taler)
+ Income type B (20 - 20 + 12*60=30 Taler)
= Total income of all participants (120 Taler)
÷ 3 participants
= Income at the end of the period (40 Taler)
T Fix, Bun, Sim: If not all participants decide to fix the contributions, you and
the other participants in your group can freely contribute any number of your
20 Taler to the project in the second stage.
T Re, Sim: In the first stage you can decide (T Sim: independently from your
previous decision) whether you want to commit yourself and the other partici-
pants in your group to redistribute all income such that everybody in your group
receives the same payoff at the end of the period. All participants decide simul-
taneously. Only if all participants in your group decide to commit themselves
and the other participants to the redistribution, the incomes are actually redis-
tributed. Only then the incomes will be redistributed such that every participant
receives the same payoff.
T Re, Bun, Sim: If not all participants decide to redistribute the incomes, your
income is given by your income from your private account and from the project.
The second (T Vcm: first) stage
T Fix, Re, Bun, Sim: At the beginning of the second stage you get to know how
each participant in your group decided in the first stage.
T Fix, Bun, Sim: If in the first stage all participants decided to fix the contribu-
tions in the second stage, then in the second stage you have to contribute the
corresponding amount. Thus, if you are of type A you have to enter a contribu-
tion of 20 Taler and if you are of type B you have to enter a contribution of 8
Taler. Other inputs are not possible and will automatically be adjusted by the
computer program.
In this case the period incomes of the participants of type A is 34 * 60 = 45 Taler
and the period income of the participant of type B is 12 * 60 = 30 Taler.
T Bun: This is redistributed automatically such that every participant receives
40 Taler.
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T Sim: If the participants committed themselves to redistribute the incomes dur-
ing the first stage, the incomes will be redistributed at the end of the period
such that every participant receives 40 Taler.
T Fix, Bun, Sim: If in the first stage not all participants decided to fix the contri-
butions in the second stage (T Bun: and redistribute the incomes), then in the
second stage all participants can freely choose any integer number between 0
and 20 to contribute to the project (0, 1, 2, . . . , 19, 20).
T Vcm, Re: In the second (T Vcm first )stage all participants can freely choose
any integer number between 0 and 20 to contribute to the project (0, 1, 2, . . . ,
19, 20).
T Sim, Re: If the participants did not commit to redistribute the incomes at the
end of the period,
The period incomes of the participants are computed as indicated above:
Type A: 20 – contribution to the project + 34 * (sum of all contributions to the
project)
Type B: 20 – contribution to the project + 12 * (sum of all contributions to the
project)
T Sim: If the participants committed themselves to redistribute the incomes, the
total income calculated above is divided by three and every participant receives
the same payoff.
The third (T Vcm: second) stage
In the third (T Vcm: second) stage you get to know the contributions to the
project by all participants in your group, as well as their period income. T Fix,
Re, Bun, Sim: Furthermore, you will again see how each participant in your
group decided in the first stage.
Then the current period ends and the next period begins with the same partici-
pants. Your type and the types of the other participants remain the same. T Fix,
Re, Bun, Sim: All participants can then again decide in the first stage whether
they want to fix contributions (T Re: redistribute incomes) in the second stage.
Again, the second stage follows and finally the third stage.
T Vcm: All participants can then again decide upon their contributions to the
project. Again, the second stage follows.
Conclusion of the experiment and payment
The experiment ends after 10 periods. Subsequently, we will ask you to answer
a few general questions on the computer. Your answers to these questions have
no influence on how much money you will earn in the experiment. When all
participants have filled out the questionnaire, payments will be made. Your total
income from the 10 periods will be converted into Euro and paid to you in cash.
Do you have any questions? If so, please raise your hand.

4
Peer Evaluation and Compensation
Schemes in a Real Eort
Experiment?
4.1 Introduction
Team based work has seen a large rise over the last 60 years. While allowing
tremendous gains from close cooperation and specialization, a single worker’s
production in such teams might be hard to observe for employers and super-
visors. This poses a serious challenge for incentive based contracts, as they no
longer can be tailored directly to an individual’s performance. In many situ-
ations, however, the teammates can be assumed to have a good knowledge
about the individual contributions to a project (May and Gueldenzoph, 2006):
researchers know what their co-authors contributed to an article; employees
know who prepared the slides for the CEO. In order to leverage this knowledge
firms employ payment schemes that depend on the evaluation by team-members
(peer evaluation). Roughly a third of all Fortune 500 companies uses them for
incentive purposes (see Bohl, 1996; Johnson, 2004).
While this additional information is undoubtedly valuable for principals, ex-
tracting them is not necessarily straightforward. Especially the monetary con-
sequences of the underlying reporting mechanism might affect the reporting
behavior. For example, if the evaluations are not subject to any further con-
straints overly positively evaluations might arise due to a likability or in-group
bias as reported by Golman and Bhatia (2012). A different negative effect arises
if colleagues compete for promotions or under fixed bonus schemes (Huang et
? I thank Sebastian Kube for his guidance as well as audiences at Bonn, Trier and ESA Europe
2016 for their helpful comments. Laura Ehrmantraut provided excellent research assistance. Fi-
nancial support by the BGSE is gratefully acknowledged.
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al., 2017). These circumstances might put team-members in direct competition
with each other. Thus they could be inclined to evaluate certain competitors
overly negative in order to increase their own chances of receiving a high pay-
off. While these arguments put the meaning of performance appraisals in doubt,
there exists only scant empirical evidence on the causal determinants of eval-
uation behavior in different work environments. In this paper I shed light on
how incentives, reciprocity and the reporting mechanism itself affect the peer
evaluation behavior if workers compete for bonuses.
To study the impact of team-incentives and the reporting mechanism on
evaluation behavior I conducted a laboratory experiment. Subjects perform a
real effort task in groups. Afterwards they have to evaluate the performance
of their fellow teammates. The resulting ranking determines bonus payments
for the subjects. Across treatments the evaluation scheme is varied. Subjects
either evaluate their teammates independently or are forced to rank them. In
addition, between treatments I vary whether teammates profit from each others
work; on top of a bonus payment subjects receive either a flat wage or are paid
on cumulative team performance. Hence, this design enables me to causally
identify how team-incentives and reciprocity affect the willingness to evaluate
others truthfully.
In order to analyze the potential implications of peer evaluation in a tourna-
ment setting I derive behavioral predictions based on both standard theory and
action-based reciprocity. I consider the situation of teams, featuring three work-
ers. The workers play a two-stage game, consisting of an real effort task and an
ensuing evaluation stage. During the evaluation stage the workers compete for
prizes through a tournament, which are distributed based on the result of the
workers’ evaluations. Effort levels are assumed to be common knowledge among
workers. If no team-incentives are employed subjects are always predicted to
evaluate their co-workers in the worst way possible. Consequently resulting eval-
uations and rankings should bear no similarity with the true performance of the
workers. This changes as soon as incentives based on team output (here defined
as the sum of all workers’ outputs) are introduced. Standard theory still predicts
that rankings should not reflect a worker’s true performance. If subjects are as-
sumed to be reciprocal, however, the theoretical framework predicts subjects to
evaluate each other truthfully once the differences in output among them be-
come sufficiently large. The differences in output that induce truthful rankings
are predicted to be lower under the forced ranking treatment. Profound conse-
quences of this behavior are expected on effort choice. If evaluation behavior is
indeed truthfully, an incentive for higher effort choices is created. The model
is consequently able to endogenize costs of lying in a team-setting by making
them conditional on reciprocal feelings.
Nevertheless, whether reciprocity and team-incentives are indeed able to in-
duce workers to evaluate each other truthfully remains ultimately an empirical
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question. Analyzing the results of the laboratory experiment I find that, if sub-
jects do not profit from their teammates work, their evaluation behavior is very
close to the selfish benchmark. They do not evaluate each other positively (un-
der unconstrained evaluations) or seem to randomize the ranking (under con-
strained evaluations). The results are similar, if team-incentives are introduced
under unconstrained evaluation. Subjects do not respond to good performances
of teammates by rewarding them with positive evaluations. This behavior, how-
ever, changes once they are asked to rank their teammates. In this treatment
the share of truthful evaluations increases significantly by 15 percentage points.
This results in more than half of all subjects receiving the bonus in line with their
actual output rank, in contrast to only a third of subjects receiving it without
team-incentives. In both treatments, subjects react to performance differences
between their teammates. If one of their teammates performed much better
than the other, it becomes significantly more likely that they will be ranked
in line with their actual performance. The effect is even stronger under team-
incentives. This implies that it is indeed not the existence of the team-incentives
per se which induces more truthful evaluations; team-incentives rather change
how the participants react to individual performance differences. Interestingly,
across all treatments the highest performing individuals tend to evaluate other
participants more truthfully. Under unconstrained evaluations this might be a
purely technical effect, as here evaluating nobody positively can be part of a
true ranking. However, no such technical reasons apply for the other treatments.
In general these high performing individuals might be intrinsically motivated to
perform and contribute to a public good, potentially signifying preferences for
fairness and cooperation in general. In line with this, those participants that do
not work at all in a given period tend to evaluate less truthfully as well.
Taken together, these results suggest that evaluations by teammates can be
used as a basis for compensation schemes – even if wages are partially deter-
mined in a tournament based on said evaluations. However, they indicate that
the specific details of the evaluation mechanism, as well as the overall compen-
sation scheme, can have an impact: If employees do not profit from each other’s
work, or are not forced to rank their co-workers, the resulting evaluations carry
little to no meaning. Only if these two aspects are combined, the workers tend
to evaluate in line with the true performance and their informational advantage
can be leveraged. Given that higher performing individuals seem to be more
honest at evaluating (as in Davison et al., 2014) supervisors could try to iden-
tify these workers from past periods and might want to weigh their evaluations
stronger.
Even if no formal way of performance appraisals by peers is introduced, the
results presented here still have implications that should be considered. Em-
ployees will always have the opportunity to report on their co-workers. Natu-
rally these “office politics” can hardly be regulated. Combined with the results
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from above, this implies that these unofficial ways might rarely be used to tout
a teammate’s good work, but rather to report shirking behavior. Nonetheless,
team-incentives might be useful in these situations to increase the likelihood of
truthful peer reports, as in Carpenter et al. (forthcoming). While this might help
to identify underperforming employees it does not incentivize them to stand out
in a positive way.
The results are also in line with evidence that negative reciprocity (e.g., Of-
ferman, 2002; Abbink et al., 2000) is stronger than positive reciprocity, as an
unwillingness to reward lower performing co-workers seems to be the driver of
the increased meaning of evaluations. While larger performance differences be-
tween teammates are associated with more truthful evaluations, subjects seem
to punish performance below their own level. This implies that the workers are
especially unwilling to reward a teammate at the expense of higher performing
ones.
More generally, the results presented are also of interest for the literature on
public goods with rewards or punishment. Frequently, individuals are observed
to reward high contributions – even at their own costs (Fehr and Gächter, 2000).
The treatments that feature a team payment constitute a public good game as
well; the only difference being that the contributions are based on the perfor-
mance in the real effort task. In contrast to the previous literature voluntary
rewards are rarely observed. This indicates that the results from standard VCM
with rewards might be more difficult to generalize to settings that feature non-
monetary contributions or larger rewards.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 4.2 describes
the experimental design. Section 4.3 introduces a theoretical framework and
presents predictions for the subjects’ behavior, using both standard and social
preferences. Section 4.4 presents and discusses the results of the laboratory ex-
periment. Section 4.5 concludes.
4.1.1 Related Literature
The results in this paper relate to several recent strands of literature on tour-
naments, performance evaluation and wage setting (for a broad overview see
Dechenaux et al., 2015).
The complexity of modern day work relations makes it harder to correctly
asses individual workers’ performances and to determine the according wages.
A natural way for principals is to use performance appraisals from supervisors.
While these were found to have a positive impact on effort (Berger et al., 2012;
Engellandt and Riphahn, 2011) they also tend to be biased by social ties (Breuer
et al., 2013). All these studies focus on the evaluation decision of a principal
towards his employees. This might not always be possible, as in some situations
even direct supervisors are not able to observe individual effort.
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Given the high prevalence of close work ties in modern work environment
a strand of literature tries to leverage the presumably superior information of
teammates about each other’s performance. For instance, co-workers might be
the only one’s who witness an individual trying to avoid unpleasant tasks (Fedor
et al., 1999). Towry (2003) finds that teams are able to successfully govern them-
selves once their identity is strong enough; given a strong team-identity individ-
ual payments can be agreed upon endogenously without the help of a supervisor.
Even when agents do not have any kind of social preferences, peer evaluations
can help to extract additional information: Kim (2011) demonstrates theoreti-
cally that peer evaluations can be employed optimally to gain information on
whom to promote, while Marx and Squintani (2009) show that they can be used
to implement first-best efforts in a team-production setting.
Although theoretical models have stressed the advantages of peer evalua-
tions, some empirical findings question the meaning of resulting evaluations.
Huang et al. (2017) find that workers indeed alter their evaluations to harm
highly qualified colleagues and support lesser qualified ones. Team-incentives
were found to increase the propensity to lie in peer evaluations (Conrads et al.,
2013), increase in-group favoritism (Hammermann et al., 2012) and increase
effort through peer pressure (Mohnen et al., 2008).
In a laboratory experiment, Carpenter et al. (2010) find that subjects do eval-
uate each other overly negative once these evaluations determine the outcome
of a tournament. The lack of positive evaluations under fixed wages basically
replicates this finding. The closest paper to mine is Carpenter et al. (forthcom-
ing): The authors look at the interplay between team-incentives and reporting
teammates for shirking. Subjects can report their teammates if they deem their
work unsatisfactory. The principal in turn has then the opportunity to alter their
wages. In contrast to my paper, reporting is never expected to influence a sub-
ject’s payoff directly, but a principal has the opportunity to punish upon a nega-
tive report. In addition the desire to report relies solely on negative reciprocity.
The authors find that workers tend to report their teammates for shirking only
under team-incentives. My results support the notion that team-incentives can
help to encourage truthful evaluations of co-workers. However, they also indi-
cate that this crucially depends on the fact that the evaluating individuals do
not sacrifice their own income when doing so.
In my paper, the teammates are confronted with a potentially competitive
tournament situation. This might affect effort provision, as well as their behav-
ior towards teammates, as competitive mindsets were found to increase effort
choices and prevent collusion if subjects were informed about the competitors
behavior (Maas et al., 2011). On the flip side competitive situations are known
to increase sabotage (Schwieren and Weichselbaumer, 2010). While no explicit
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form of sabotage1 is present in this paper, negative evaluations towards a high
performing teammate might be seen that way. Gürtler et al. (2013) find that sab-
otage is frequently directed at exceptionally strong subjects. This is in line with
my finding that additional output by high performing subjects does not always
increase their chances to be evaluated positively, but might even be harmful in
the absence of team-incentives.
4.2 Experiment
To empirically test the effect of team-incentives on performance appraisals by
teammates I conducted a series of laboratory experiments. The laboratory set-
ting allowed me to implement team-incentives as well as to vary the evalua-
tion scheme. Even more crucial, clear and objective performance levels can be
recorded and are observed by evaluating teammates. Lastly, all interaction was
anonymous and participants could not track each other across time periods. In
contrast to a field setting, this has twomajor advantages: No personal bias can af-
fect evaluations and positive or negative evaluations cannot be exchanged across
different time periods through collusion or vendettas thus allowing for a clear
interpretation of the treatment intervention.
4.2.1 Experimental Design
In each period of the experiment, the subjects were randomized into groups of
three workers. The period itself consists of two stages: During the first stage the
participants work on a real effort task. In the second stage they are asked to
evaluate other participants on their performance during the previous stage. In
each period of the experiment the subjects work on the slider task (as introduced
in Gill and Prowse, 2012). They see 48 bars on their computer screen. Their task
is to center a slider on each bar using only the mouse of the computer. The goal
is to center as many sliders as possible during a two minute stretch. This task
yields outcomes that can easily be observed and evaluated by other participants.
Moreover, the outcome is mainly determined by the willingness to exert effort
during each period and cannot be completed by guessing or knowing.
After the effort stage subjects were informed about their own performance
(the number of correctly positioned sliders) and about the performance of the
other two workers within their group. The participants then had to evaluate the
performance of these two group members. The resulting evaluations were used
to pay out an individual bonus that was a part of their payment.
Across treatments two evaluation procedures (Free and Forced) were em-
ployed. In both procedures the participants were asked to award points for
1 Sabotage in organizations has been studied extensively, both theoretically as well as empiri-
cally (e.g., Gürtler, 2008; Gürtler and Münster, 2010; Kräkel, 2005).
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“good” work to their team-members. In condition Free the subjects could eval-
uate their group-members individually. They had the option to evaluate each of
the two other subjects either positively by assigning them a point or negatively
by assigning no point. That means they could assign points to both, one or none
of them. By contrast, in condition Forced the subjects had to hand out exactly
one positive and one negative evaluation to the other two group-members (i.e.,
they had to assign exactly one point to one other group-member).2 After all
participants finished their evaluations, the number of points that each of them
received were counted. The individual with the most points gained a fixed bonus
payment that was not impacted by the number of points received. The subject
with the second most points received also an, albeit smaller, bonus payment.
The subject with the least number of bonus points received no bonus at all. That
means that the three subjects that form a group compete in a setting, where the
resulting payments are determined by their own evaluations.
This bonus B and a base wage w determined the subjects’ payoffs. The struc-
ture of the base wage was varied across treatments. In treatments Fix the base
wage was fixed and independent of any performance. Each subject received a
flat wage of w= 80 points per period. The other treatments (Team) featured a
variable base wage. Subjects are paid for the cumulative number of correctly po-
sitioned sliders by all three subjects within their group. For each slider correctly
positioned by a group-member every subject within the group received a point.
This results in two possible wage functions:
pi= 80+ B
and
pi=
3∑
i=1
Output i + B.
As detailed above, the second part of the payment – the individual bonus B –
is determined via the peer evaluation. The subject with the highest number of
points received a bonus of B1 = 80, the subject with the second most points
received B2 = 40, and the subject with the least points was paid B3 = 0. If there
was a tie between two or three subjects the corresponding boni were equally
split amongst them. That means if two subjects received a point each, whilst
the third group-member received no point at all, the two subjects with a point
shared B1 and B2 and received 60 tokens each. Combining the two evaluation
schemes and the two wage regimes results in a 2× 2 treatment matrix, featuring
two different evaluation stages and two different base wages. A summary of the
treatments is shown in the Table 4.1 below.
2 In this sense the forced ranking scheme mirrors the classical Borda count. This evaluation
mechanism can be found in Eberlein and Walkowitz (2008).
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Table 4.1. Summary of Treatments
fixed wage team payment
w= 80 w=
∑
Output
free evaluation Fix-Free Team-Free
forced ranking Fix-Forced Team-Forced
4.2.2 Procedures
The experiment was computerized using z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007) and con-
ducted at the BonnEconLab at the University of Bonn in 2014. Students were
recruited randomly from all majors using Orsee (Greiner, 2015). Two sessions
were conducted for each treatment featuring 24 participants each. In total 192
subjects participated. The subjects were randomly divided into two matching
groups of 12 subjects each. The experiment consisted of 10 identical periods.
For each period new groups of three workers were formed (stranger matching
protocol). The three workers were always drawn from the same group of 12
participants. Subjects were informed about this procedure. This was done to
prevent the subjects from carrying positive or negative reciprocal feelings over
into following periods. During two practice periods prior to the experiment the
subjects had the opportunity to familiarize themselves with the slider task.
Each session lasted about 90 minutes. All interaction between the partici-
pants was anonymous and decisions were taken in private at the computer. After
each period the subjects were informed about the evaluation decision of their
team-members, as well as the results and the payoffs for the period. Written
instructions were distributed prior to the experiment and read out aloud. After-
wards subjects had the possibility to ask questions for clarification and had to
answer control questions to ensure their understanding. Throughout the entire
experiment tokens were used as artificial currency, with 75 tokens equaling 1
Euro. The average payment for the subjects was 14.24 Euro, ranging from 12.48
in the team-paid treatments to 16 Euro in the treatments with fixed payment.
The payments were made in cash in private directly after the experiment.
4.3 Theoretical Framework
In this section, I present a simple model of action based reciprocity to motivate
how team-incentives can endogenously create sincere evaluations.3 Following
3 Reciprocity is not the only non-standard preference that might explain truthful evaluation
in a one-shot experiment. Aversion to lying might be another possible motive. Nonetheless this
motive would be the same across all treatments and would not predict any treatment differences.
A similar argument can be made for other social preferences such as inequity aversion. If solely
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the experimental design, I will analyze how an individual reacts to observed
effort (or output) choices. Workers might want to reward their teammates for
high effort with positive evaluations or punish them with bad ones. Hence, I con-
sider a model that features action-based-reciprocity as a natural choice to derive
behavioral predictions for the evaluation behavior. The form of reciprocity con-
sidered here will thus be similar to the models of Cox et al. (2007) or Englmaier
and Leider (2012).4 Reciprocity between teammates should only be present if
workers actually profited from each other’s effort in the first place. As a conse-
quence this version of reciprocity will predict sincere evaluations only under the
presence of team payments. If wages are fixed, reciprocal individuals will act the
same as selfish individuals. Assume that each individual incurs effort costs c(ei),
with c′ > 0, c′′ > 0, for performing the task. pii denotes that individual’s mone-
tary payoff. This consists of the bonus B that the individual receives based on the
evaluation as well as either the fixed payment w or the team-payment
∑3
i=1 ei .
I assume the output to be a deterministic function of effort, thus random events
do not play a role.5 In the following I assume that an individual’s own level of
effort serves as a reference point for the evaluation of teammates.6 This means
that individuals react to efforts that are larger than their own with positive feel-
ings and to lower efforts with negative feelings. I assume the following utility
function:
Ui = pii − c(ei) + φ
∑
j 6=i
(c(e j) − c(ei))(pi j − pi f airj ) (4.1)
This means that individuals profit from higher payoffs for their co-workers,
if these co-workers exerted more effort than they did. The opposite holds true
for teammates that exerted lower effort. The marginal utility from higher or
lower payoffs increases in the effort distance. This implies that more extreme
effort choices carry more weight. In short, if the positive reciprocity is strong
enough, the worker might be willing to reward a high-performing teammate. In
differences in effort costs would induce favorable evaluation for those that worked more, the
presence of team wage should not matter.
4 Throughout this paper I focus on action-based reciprocity, i.e., reciprocity arises in response
to previous kind or unkind actions. Nonetheless belief based reciprocity could play a role in all
treatments as well. That would imply that subjects would reciprocate to positive evaluations that
they believe they will receive during that period. This form of reciprocity, however, would not
predict any treatment differences.
5 If output was at least partially random, it would not be fully attributable to an individual.
Given that lack of responsibility, reciprocal feelings are harder to justify between teammates.
6 This setting of a reference point is not restrictive. Any other reference point for the evaluation
of performances will lead to qualitatively similar results. Higher reference points simply require
higher performances by teammates in order to induce positive reciprocal feelings. Consequently,
higher reference points simply result in stronger requirements for truthful evaluations but do not
rule them out.
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general this willingness increases in the effort difference as well as the workers’
individual propensity to reciprocate (φi).
In the following, I shortly describe the equilibrium evaluation behavior in re-
sponse to observed effort choices across treatments. First, for individuals without
reciprocal preferences, then for individuals with. Extensive derivations of these
predictions are provided in Appendix 4.A. As the paper focuses on the evaluation
behavior in response to effort differences, I will only present prediction on the
workers’ evaluation behavior and not on the effort decision itself. Appendix 4.A
provides a detailed analysis of the effort choice in response to sincere evalua-
tions.7
If an individual does not posses any reciprocal attitudes, this person will
seek to maximize their own monetary payoff. Hence, neither previous effort lev-
els of teammates nor the payment scheme in the first stage are predicted to
have any influence on the workers’ evaluation decisions. Consequently the stan-
dard model predicts no behavioral differences between treatments that feature
group wages or fixed wages. Effort differences among the workers are not ex-
pected to impact the decision as well. A worker with standard preferences will
always evaluate as to maximize her own monetary payoff. Thus, positive eval-
uations in the unrestricted condition are never predicted to occur. A positive
evaluation will always (weakly) decrease the bonus payment of the individual
that handed it out. If no positive evaluations are used, this results in all workers
being ranked equally. In expectation the results are not different for the Forced
treatments. Again, effort differences are not predicted to impact evaluation de-
cisions. Hence, in equilibrium the subjects would randomize the positive vote
among their teammates, as their own payoff is never impacted by their evalua-
tion decision.8 Consequently, in expectation all workers will be ranked equally.
In general, under standard preferences the resulting ranking will never be af-
fected by the individual performances.
The evaluation behavior is predicted to differ for subjects with reciprocal
preferences (φi is sufficiently large). In the treatments that feature no con-
straints on the evaluation scheme subjects do not have to hand out positive
evaluations. A positive evaluation – depending on the teammates’ evaluation
behavior – might or might not impact a subject’s own monetary payoff. If their
own wage is not affected by the evaluation, they will always be (weakly) better
7Given that the evaluation behavior is truthful, I argue that no equilibrium in pure strategies
for the effort choice exists. Rather, effort is selected from a certain interval.
8 If an individual does not receive any positive evaluation from her teammates, she will be
ranked last no matter her decision. If she receives two positive evaluations, she will be ranked
first, independently of her action. If she receives a single positive evaluation, she can hand her
positive evaluation to that teammate that has already received one. Then she will be ranked
second. Otherwise she hands it to the teammate, that has not yet received a positive evaluation.
Then all team-members received one positive evaluation and will be ranked equally. Given the
parameters of the experiment this results in the same payoff.
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off by reporting truthfully. An example of this would be two workers awarding a
point to each other but none to the third co-worker. No matter the third worker’s
action, she will always receive the smallest bonus. Her evaluation, however, can
impact the bonuses of the two other subjects. Rewarding the better performing
worker is always the best reply in this situation: The downside of reducing the
higher performing subject’s payoff will always be larger than the upside of im-
proving the payoff of the lower performing one. If the subject’s own monetary
payoff is affected by a potential evaluation decision, this decision is not as clear
cut as before. A positive evaluation will always lower the own wage, while it in-
creases the wage of the positively evaluated teammate. This is only desirable for
the subject, if the utility from the money forfeited is smaller than the gains from
awarding the teammate the higher bonus. This second utility from awarding
the “deserved” bonus gets larger with increasing effort differences. This means
that if her own monetary payoff is affected by positive evaluations, a subject will
hand them out only to those co-workers that performed sufficiently better than
herself.
If the evaluation scheme is constrained, the evaluation decisions become
interrelated. Awarding a point to one co-worker simultaneously serves as a pun-
ishment for the other one, as her payoff will (weakly) decrease. As the worker
suffers from rewarding co-workers with lower effort levels, the forced evalua-
tion scheme increases incentives to reward workers with higher effort levels.
Hence, awarding the point to the co-worker which exerted the lesser effort will
decrease the reciprocity utility the worker receives. The subject will always be
at least indifferent between the two options as long as her own monetary payoff
remains unaffected. Given the parametrization used in the experiment this will
always be the case.9 Hence, a reciprocal worker is always predicted to evaluate
truthfully. In case of a tie, the worker will randomize.
In summary, reciprocal preferences predict that more truthful evaluations
arise if the teammates profit from each other’s effort. Moreover, the share of
truthful evaluations is expected to be higher under the constrained evaluation
scheme and to be higher for larger differences in the effort level among the
teammates.
Prediction 1:
Bonus payments reflect performance differences more in treatments with
team-incentives than in treatment without.
9 In the Appendix 4.A I demonstrate, that only one worker can affect her own ranking by
switching from truthful to untruthful evaluations. This deviation results in all subjects being
ranked equally. As the bonus is linear in the rank in this experiment, this subject is not able
to increase her monetary payoff this way.
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Prediction 2:
Bonus payments reflect performance differencesmore in treatments Team-
Forced than in treatment Team-Free.
4.4 Results
The experimental design allows me to study the impact of team-incentives on
peer evaluations. The evaluation scheme was varied across treatments such that
it either allowed subjects to evaluate their teammates independently (Free-
Treatments) or forced them to rank their teammates (Forced-Treatments).
While the subsequent analysis focuses on the evaluation behavior, I start by de-
scribing the performance levels across the different treatments. If subjects would
have refused to work at all in the treatments without team-incentives, this would
make the subsequent analysis meaningless. In a next step the evaluation behav-
ior of the subjects as well as the resulting rankings will be analyzed. Here, I will
mainly compare evaluation behavior across treatments that feature the same
evaluation scheme, as evaluation options differ fundamentally across schemes.
4.4.1 Performance levels
Across all treatments the participants position on average 17 sliders per period
correctly. Reciprocal preferences predict that workers react to output differences
under the team-wage conditions but not under the fixed-wage conditions. If
participants would not work at all if wages are fixed, identifying the impact of
team-incentives on evaluation behavior would be impossible. While the subjects
indeed reposition less sliders in the treatments with fixed wages, almost all par-
ticipants still work on the task. Only 8.2% of all observations in the treatments
with fixed wages feature participants that did not work on the sliders at all. In
treatments with fixed wages the participants position on average 15.9 sliders
per period. This increases to 18 sliders per period in treatments that feature the
team payment. This means the average output is 12% lower in the treatments
where wages are fixed compared to those with team-incentives. The detailed
outcomes by treatment are summarized in Table 4.2. Looking at the dispersion
of performances I find that the standard deviation is higher in the two treat-
ments that feature the fixed wages.10 The lower part of Table 4.2 which breaks
the output level down by the subject’s rank within her team reveals that the
10 By design the incentives to produce any output are different across the two payment schemes.
Only in the treatments without team-incentives participants ever decided not to work at all. I
check whether the output is different beyond this unwillingness to work at all in Table 4.B.1
in Appendix 4.B. This table presents the results of a corresponding regression analysis. If one
accounts for the subjects that do not work at all, only the output levels for subjects in treatments
Fix-Forced and Team-Free differ at the 10%-level.
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fixed wage primarily affected the performance of the less productive subjects
within a group (i.e., the bottom of the performance distribution). In contrast,
the outputs of the highest performing subject in a team are very similar across
treatments and never statistically different from each other.11
Table 4.2. Summary Statistics for Sliders Solved
Fix-Free Team-Free Fix-Forced Team-Forced Total
Aggregate 15.86 18.37 15.91 17.68 16.96
(7.22) (4.26) (6.80) (4 .85) (6.01)
Observations 480 480 480 480 1920
By Outputrank
Output Rank = 1 21.12 21.66 20.71 21.33 21.20
(4.68) (3.49) (4.04) (4.50) (4.21)
Observations 171 174 176 177 698
Output Rank = 2 14.82 18.12 15.70 17.23 16.44
(6.41) (3.06) (5.21) (2.91) (4.84)
Observations 173 162 161 160 (656)
Output Rank = 3 10.59 14.67 10.25 13.66 12.32
(6.35) (2.94) (6.65) (3.40) (5.44)
Observations 136 144 143 143 566
Notes: Standard deviations are presented in parentheses. Note that in some groups ties between
the participants occurred. If their output was the highest within the group both were counted as
rank=1, if the tied occurred not for the first rank, both were counted as rank=2.
In general, the performance levels of the subjects vary greatly within their
respective teams, independent of the wage scheme. Nonetheless, the average
output level still differs across treatments. Consequently, the subsequent section
will take this into account by including the output levels and their differences
within a team into the subsequent analysis.
4.4.2 Outcome of the Evaluation Stage
In this section I will compare the results of the evaluation stage across treat-
ments. First, I will analyze how many subjects received a bonus that was in line
with the actual output rank within their group, i.e., are ranked correctly.12 Stan-
dard theory predicts no differences between treatments: In each treatment a
third of all subjects is predicted to receive the wage in line with their output
11 Even if all observations in a treatment are viewed as independent, the highest output in a
group does not differ significantly across groups (MWU p>0.10 for all possible treatment com-
parison).
12Note, that implies also that whenever all subjects receive identical evaluation and are ranked
equally the second highest performing subject receives the correct bonus.
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Figure 4.1. Share of subjects with “correct” bonus over time
Notes: The figure presents the share of subjects that received the bonus associated with their
output rank across periods.
rank. If reciprocal preferences are assumed, the share is predicted to be higher
in treatments with team-incentives.
In the next step I will investigate how the evaluation decisions that lead
to these outcomes differ across treatments. As highlighted in section 4.3 the
two evaluation schemes introduce different motives to evaluate the other work-
ers sincerely. While the unconstrained evaluation scheme is predicted to rely
only on positive reciprocity for positive evaluations through rewards, under con-
strained evaluation positive and negative reciprocity are predicted to play a role.
A positive evaluation (reward) for one co-worker always implies a negative (pun-
ishment) for the other. As the set of evaluation option differs fundamentally, I
will focus on the direct comparison of the two treatments that feature the con-
strained evaluation first, and then on the ones with the unconstrained evalu-
ation scheme. In the Forced treatments only awarding a point to the better
performing teammate can be regarded as sincere evaluation. In the Free treat-
ments, however, other evaluations can also lead to a correct ranking (e.g.: Not
awarding points at all by the highest performing subject, or awarding points
to both other teammates by the lowest performing subject). Infrequently two
teammates had the same output. In the treatments with the constrained eval-
uation scheme, neither the remaining teammates evaluations nor the resulting
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rankings could reflect that tie. Hence, these observations were excluded from
the analysis. Figure 4.1 displays the share of subjects that are correctly ranked
in each treatment across time. Table 4.3 shows the corresponding averages for
each treatment.
Table 4.3. Share of Subjects with “correct” Bonus by Treatment and Rank
Fix-Free Team-Free Fix-Forced Team-Forced
Aggregate 32.71 26.25 38.65 62.14
Observations 480 480 414 412
By Outputrank
Output Rank = 1 26.90 21.84 26.06 54.61
Observations 171 174 142 141
Output Rank = 2 50.29 40.74 50.39 72.66
Observations 171 162 129 128
Output Rank = 3 17.65 15.28 40.56 60.14
Observations 136 144 143 143
Notes: Note that in some groups ties between the participants occurred. If their output was the
highest within the group they were counted as rank=1; if the tie occurred not for the first rank,
they were counted as rank=2. Their received bonus was counted as correct only if it reflected
that tie, i.e., in a case of two subjects both having the highest output, this means they share the
two largest boni. This was only possible in the Free-treatments. In the Forced-treatments these
observations were excluded.
Across all periods the share of correctly ranked subjects is highest in treat-
ment Team-Forced. The results of the other three treatments are relatively sim-
ilar. On aggregate 62% of subjects receive the bonus that is in line with their
output rank within their group. This share is significantly lower in treatment Fix-
Forced, where only 38% of all subjects are ranked correctly (MWU p < 0.01)13.
In both treatments with unconstrained evaluation these shares are slightly, but
not significantly lower than in Fix-Forced (MWU p > 0.17, for all possible com-
parisons). 32% of subjects are ranked correctly in Fix-Free and only 26% in
Team-Free – both values are even below the theoretically predicted share for
selfish subjects. Notably, the treatments display different patterns across peri-
ods: In Fix-Forced the share of correctly ranked subjects increases significantly
over time (Spearman’s ρ = 0.83, p < 0.01), whereas the other three treatments
display stable or slightly decreasing time trends (p > 0.05). The corresponding
regressions that utilize the entire data are displayed in Table 4.4. Column (1)
13While the shares quoted encompass all periods, the statistical tests on the treatment compar-
isons are based on group averages in the first period only. Here the voting behavior in each single
group can be seen as independent from all other groups. As this approach disregards the over-
whelming part of the observed behavior, the later parts of the analysis will focus on regression
analysis that clusters on the matching group level and controls for possible time-trends.
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Table 4.4. Impact of treatments on ranking outcomes
Correctly ranked
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Team-Forced 0.95*** 0.99*** 0.98*** 1.08***
(0.20) (0.21) (0.21) (0.28)
Fix-Forced 0.35*** 0.39*** 0.36** 0.35
(0.12) (0.14) (0.14) (0.23)
Fix-Free 0.19 0.21 0.17 0.32
(0.16) (0.17) (0.19) (0.30)
Output Rank=2 0.58*** 0.62*** -0.45 ***
(0.13) (0.14) (0.13)
Output Rank=3 0.02 0.03 -0.07
(0.10) (0.10) (0.14)
abs. Output size -0.00 -0.00 -0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Output=0 -0.40** -0.52*** -0.17
(0.18) (0.19) (0.22)
|∆Output| to teammate 0.01
with higher output (0.01)
|∆Output| to teammate 0.01
with lower output (0.01)
Period dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 1786 1786 1786 1114
PseudoR2 .06 .09 .09 .09
Notes: This table presents probit regressions using the resulting rank as the dependent variable. *,
**, and *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level. Standard errors in parentheses
and clustered on matching-group-level.
shows again that the forced evaluation scheme leads to boni being more often in
line with the subjects’ output ranks; this effect is higher under team-incentives.
Result 1:
a) Significantly more subjects receive a bonus in line with their output in
treatment Team-Forced than in all other treatments.
b) Team-incentives do not lead to more subjects being ranked under the
free evaluation scheme.
Table 4.3 highlights a strong heterogeneity by the output rank of the subject.
Across all treatments subjects that performed second-best in their group received
the correct bonus most often – almost twice as often as the other subjects. Hence,
output ranks are included in column (2) to (4) of Table 4.4. Column (4) excludes
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ties in the ranking outcome and demonstrates that they are the sole reason for
this effect.14 The theoretical framework predicted that subjects might be ranked
in line with their output rank if the output differences to their teammates are
larger. Thus column (3) includes the output differences to the two teammates –
separately for the one with the higher and the lower output of the two. However,
these output differences do not have any significant effect on the evaluation
outcome.15
In the next step I will present the sources of the treatment differences by
analyzing the individual evaluation behavior and its determinants. As the bonus
payments are a direct result of the subjects’ evaluation behavior, this broadly mir-
rors these results. As mentioned above, when interpreting the share of sincere
evaluations one has to separate between the two evaluation schemes. Under the
Forced scheme, subjects have only two options to evaluate their teammates –
either they evaluate one or the other positively. This implies that even a random-
izing individual will evaluate half of the time truthfully. The rational benchmark
for the Free-treatments is lower (33%). If nobody evaluates anyone else posi-
tively, this can be considered a sincere evaluation for the best performing subject.
The subsequent analysis will be separated between the two evaluation schemes.
4.4.2.1 Constrained Evaluation Scheme
Under fixed wages (Fix-Forced) the share of truthful evaluations is close to the
selfish benchmark: Evaluations are correct in 59.3% of all cases. This share rises
significantly to 74.5% under team-incentives (MWU p < 0.01). Table 4.5 dis-
plays the share of sincere evaluations by treatments and output rank within the
group. The share of correct evaluation differs markedly between output ranks.
In both treatments, subjects that had the highest output in their group evaluate
their teammates sincerely with the highest frequency. There is no such gap in
evaluation behavior between the subjects that ranked second or third in their
respective groups. In treatment Fix-Forced they evaluate sincerely in about half
of all cases, this rises to more than 70% with team-incentives. The best perform-
14 Tables 4.C.2 and 4.D.4 in the Appendix repeat this analysis for the two evaluation schemes
separately. Under constrained evaluation all ranks are equally likely to receive their correct bonus.
Under unconstrained evaluation second-ranked subject receives it significantly less often if ties are
excluded. A correct bonus for the second best performing subject in the absence of ties requires
that three positive and correct evaluation are awarded within a group. As presented only very few
positive evaluation were handed out, making this event very unlikely. In addition, Table 4.C.2 in
Appendix 4.C presents a further analyses that includes the cumulative absolute output differences
to the two teammates for treatments with constrained evaluation scheme.
15 As the treatments alter the incentives to produce any output, the treatments might also
change who is ranked first or second within a given group. Hence these controls are at least
partially endogenous and I do not claim a causal relationship between a person’s output rank
and the probability to receive the correct bonus.
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Table 4.5. Share of True Evaluations by Treatment and Rank
Fix-Free Team-Free Fix-Forced Team-Forced
Aggregate 48.33 42.08 59.32 74.49
Observations 480 480 444 443
By Outputrank
Output Rank = 1 88.89 81.61 70.00 80.75
Observations 171 174 160 141
Output Rank = 2 32.95 17.90 53.80 70.70
Observations 171 162 158 157
Output Rank = 3 16.91 21.53 52.38 71.20
Observations 136 144 126 125
Notes: Note that in some groups ties between the participants occurred. If their output was the
highest within the group they were counted as rank=1, if the tied occurred not for the first
rank, they were counted as rank=2. In the Forced-treatments evaluations could not reflect ties
between the teammates. These observations were excluded.
ing subjects also evaluate sincerely in 70% of all cases without team-incentives.
In treatment Team-Forced this share rises even further to over 80%.
Result 2: Under constrained evaluation
a) Evaluations are significantly more likely to be truthful under team-
incentives.
b) Particularly the best performing subjects evaluate truthfully.
The regression analysis presented in Table 4.6 confirms that there is indeed
a significant impact of team-incentives (column (1)), as well as the individual
rank on the sincerity of the evaluation (column (2)). Dummy variables for each
period are included to flexibly control for potential time trends. Based on the the-
oretical framework a subject is predicted to evaluate more truthfully the higher
the output differences between the two teammates are. Hence, this output dif-
ference is included in column (3), in addition to a subject’s own output.16 In
line with the theoretical prediction higher output differences between the two
teammates make true evaluations more likely. Column (4) interacts the output
differences and treatment. While higher output differences make truthful eval-
uation more likely in both treatments their impact is greater in treatment Team-
Forced; the difference between the estimated coefficients is weakly significant.
16 Table 4.C.3 in Appendix 4.C presents alternate specifications that include additionally the
output difference between the evaluator and the two teammates individually. Results on the
effect of the treatment remain similar, but they indicate that a lower performance of the worse
performing teammate increases the likelihood of sincere evaluations.
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Table 4.6. Determinants of Evaluation Behavior Forced treatments
True Evaluation
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Team pay 0.43** 0.42** 0.46** 0.34*
(0.17) (0.18) (0.19) (0.20)
Output Rank=2 -0.41*** -0.48*** -0.50***
(0.11) (0.12) (0.12)
Output Rank=3 -0.42** -0.40** -0.42***
(0.17) (0.16) (0.16)
abs. Output size -0.01 -0.01 -0.01
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Output=0 -0.32 -0.36 -0.37
(0.43) (0.43) (0.44)
|∆Output| between teammates 0.02**
(0.01)
Fix pay × |∆Output| between teammates 0.01**
(0.01)
Team pay × |∆Output| between teammates 0.03***
(0.01)
Period dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 887 887 887 887
PseudoR2 .03 .04 .04 .05
p-value: Team vs. Fix .098
Notes: This table presents probit regressions using the truthfullness of the evaluation behavior
as the dependent variable. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level.
Standard errors in parentheses and clustered on matching-group-level.
The treatment indicator is only weakly significant once this interaction is ac-
counted for. This reveals that the higher truthfulness of evaluations is not only
an effect of the team-incentives per se, but that they change how the subjects
respond to output differences.
Result 3: Under constrained evaluation
a) Larger differences between the teammates’ outputs are associated with
more sincere evaluations.
b) This effect is slightly stronger with team-incentives than without.
4.4.2.2 Unconstrained Evaluation Scheme
If subjects can allocate positive and negative evaluations freely, selfish individ-
uals are predicted to never evaluate positively. This behavior can never be seen
as sincere evaluation except for the best performing subject. This would mean
that only the best performing subjects would ever evaluate truthfully.
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In treatment Fix-Free 48.3% of all subjects evaluate their teammates cor-
rectly. The share of sincere evaluations rises to 88% if a subject actually evalu-
ated at least one teammate positively. However, positive evaluations are rather
scarce; only 0.27 positive evaluations are handed out per period and subject.
Positive evaluations are mainly used to reward teammates that produced a high
output. If a subject created the highest output, she received on average 0.49
positive evaluations, this drops to 0.26 for the next best teammate and to 0.09
positive evaluations for the lowest performing teammate. At 42.1% the share
of truthful evaluations is also low in treatment Team-Free. The differences be-
tween the two treatments Team-Free and Fix-Free is not significant at any
conventional level (MWU p > 0.2). If there is at least one positive evaluation
handed out, these evaluations are truthfully in 80.9% of all cases. However, at
only 0.3 positive evaluations per period, they are similarly rare as in Fix-Free.
Their distribution differs only slightly: The most productive group member re-
ceived on average 0.44, the second highest 0.35 and the lowest output 0.14
positive evaluations respectively.
While outcomes of the evaluation process did not vary substantially across
periods, the positive evaluations that are used exhibit a strong time trend. 47.3%
of all points are already awarded in the first three periods and very rarely after-
wards.17
Table 4.7 displays the results of the corresponding regression analysis. Col-
umn (1) shows that team-incentives do not seem to have a significant impact
on the share of truthful evaluations.
Result 4:
If evaluation options are not constrained, evaluations are not more sincere
with team-incentives than without.
Column (2) additionally includes their own output level as well as output
ranks. The inclusion of these additional mediators result even in the treatment
indicator becoming significantly negative. Similar to the treatments with con-
strained evaluation there are strong differences in the truthfulness of evalua-
tion behavior across the relative placements within the group. As can be seen in
Table 4.5 most correct evaluations come from subjects that performed the best;
they are truthful in 88.9% (Fix-Free) and 81.6% (Team-Free) of all cases. How-
ever, this has clear mechanical reason. For the subjects with the highest output
in a group awarding no positive evaluation is still sincere. Sincere evaluations
are less frequent for the other subjects, with slightly more truthful evaluations
occurring in treatment Fix-Free. Combined with a nearly identical number of
17 As a result the share of true evaluation decreases in both treatments slightly across time
(Spearman’s ρ =-0.66, p=0.04 for Fix-Free and ρ=-0.59, p=0.07 for Team-Free). This means
that the aggregate numbers discussed above will even overstate the equilibrium-level meaning of
the evaluations. This decreasing share is presented in Figure 4.D.2 in Appendix 4.D.
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Table 4.7. Average treatment eects for Free evaluation
(a) True Evaluation
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Team pay -0.14 -0.37** -0.41** -0.73***
(0.11) (0.17) (0.19) (0.21)
Output Rank=2 -2.40*** -2.41*** -2.40***
(0.17) (0.17) (0.16)
Output Rank=3 -2.32*** -2.26*** -2.27***
(0.23) (0.23) (0.23)
abs. Output size 0.03* 0.03 0.02
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Output=0 -0.13 0.04 0.13
(0.21) (0.22) (0.24)
|∆Output| to teammate -0.03*
with higher output (0.02)
|∆Output| to teammate 0.00
with lower output (0.01)
|∆Output| to teammate -0.04**
with higher output × Fix pay (0.02)
|∆Output| to teammate -0.00
with higher output × Team pay (0.03)
|∆Output| to teammate -0.00
with lower output × Fix pay (0.02)
|∆Output| to teammate 0.03***
with lower output × Team pay (0.01)
Period dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 960 960 960 960
PseudoR2 .0091 .41 .41 .41
p-value: Team vs. Fix High .36
p-value: Team vs. Fix Low .03
Notes: This table presents probit regressions sing the truthfullness of the evaluation behavior
as the dependent variable. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level.
Standard errors in parentheses and clustered on matching-group-level.
points awarded across treatments, this implies that in Team-Free positive eval-
uations are given out to the worse performing of the two teammates more often
than in Fix-Free (25.3% vs. 16.6%).18
18Within the theoretical framework rewarding of worse performing subjects is never predicted.
However during the questionnaire that followed the experiment some subjects stated that they
sent points to low performing subjects in order to motivate them for upcoming periods – even in
the presence of stranger matching.
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If a teammate produced a much higher output than the subject, she might
be willing to reward that teammate with a positive evaluation. Column (3) in-
cludes these differences in output to the two teammates. The subjects evaluate
each teammate individually. Hence, I include differences in output to them sep-
arately, i.e., one difference in output for the higher performing teammate, and
one difference in output for the lower performing teammate. Column (4) sepa-
rates these effects by treatment. While column (3) seems to indicate that larger
output differences are not associated with more truthful evaluations, column
(4) reveals an interaction with the presence of team-incentives. Without them
subjects tend to evaluate less truthfully for larger output differences. The op-
posite holds for the lower performing subjects under team-incentives: Subjects
evaluate more often truthfully if the output difference gets larger, e.g., the team-
mate performs worse. This means that subjects rarely reward their teammates
for high output.19 In summary, these findings show that team-incentives are not
able to encourage subjects to reward their teammates with positive evaluations
for high output. If anything, evaluation behavior is more truthful under fixed
wages. This implies that either no reciprocal feeling were induced by the task
among the teammates or that positive reciprocity was too weak to encourage
the subjects to reward their teammates.
In general, the results imply that a restriction of the evaluation options can
have beneficial effects for the meaningfulness of evaluation behavior. Still eval-
uations tend to be truthful only if they are coupled with some kind of team-
incentive. If not, evaluation behavior occurs to be almost random. Consequently
only treatment Team-Forced resulted in a high share of correctly ranked sub-
jects in equilibrium. The share of correct ranks in the other treatments is close
to the prediction for workers without reciprocity. Combining these observations
with the results on the unconstrained evaluation scheme implies that only the
combination of positive and negative reciprocity is able to impact the report-
ing behavior significantly. This supports the view that there is a high degree
of unwillingness to reward participants for their low output. These results are
in line with the behavior observed for negative reciprocity by Carpenter et al.
(forthcoming).
19 In general, the impact of the output differences might differ depending on their sign. If sub-
jects were reciprocal, only suitably large positive output difference should lead to truthful eval-
uations, large negative output differences should not matter at all. Table 4.D.5 in Appendix 4.D
separates the output differences by sign. In contrast to the theoretical predictions a better per-
formance of the higher performing teammates decreased the likelihood of a truthful evaluation
significantly.
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4.5 Conclusion
Inmanyworkplace-situations individual work efforts are hard to observe. Asking
well informed co-workers is a prominent way to determine individual payments.
In this paper I demonstrated how the existence of team incentives, as well as
the evaluation mechanism, affect peer evaluations. Evaluations were used to
determine bonus payments for workers. Across treatments, subjects had to eval-
uate each other either independently or were forced to rank their teammates.
In addition to the bonus the subjects received a base wage. This wage was either
fixed or depended on the cumulative performance of all teammates. In all treat-
ments money-maximizing subjects’ evaluations are never predicted to be related
to the actual performance levels: If not forced, they should not evaluate anyone
positively; if forced to rank their teammates, the ranking should be random. In
the presence of reciprocal subjects, this might change under team-incentives. If
the performance difference was large enough, the theoretical framework pre-
dicted that reciprocal subjects should report a truthful ranking or use positive
evaluations. These predictions were only partially supported by the data. Team-
incentives indeed increased the amount of truthful evaluations, but only if sub-
jects were forced to rank their teammates; otherwise very few positive evalua-
tions were handed out. In line with the predictions, higher performance differ-
ences between the teammates encouraged subjects to rank them correctly. Even
though this effect could be observed in both treatments, it was stronger under
team incentives. Hence, it highlights the importance of inducing reciprocal feel-
ings among teammates for truthful evaluations.
While the quantitative results might be specific to this experiment and the
laboratory setting, the general influence of the evaluation scheme is of broader
interest. The results suggest that peer evaluation should be more informative un-
der some form of profit sharing. Additionally, workers seem reluctant to reward
co-workers for good performances if their own wage might suffer from doing
so. However, they respond to negative performances. Thus, principals might be
well advised to minimize this spillover on own wages, and – even more impor-
tantly – making bad as well as good evaluations mandatory in order to punish
low-performers as well as to incentivize and reward high-performers. Although
informal evaluations, such as peer reporting or whistle-blowing, might be able
to inform managers about bad behavior, handing out rewards to the better per-
forming individuals becomes far more attainable in a more formalized evalua-
tion process that forces workers to rank each other.
In general, behavioral biases or social preference frequently affect optimal
contracts or wage setting. In this situation reciprocity makes individual incen-
tives possible in the first place. Even if the principal was not present in this
experiment, the design presented here can be readily extended to include a su-
pervisor. Further research could possibly analyze payment decisions under con-
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strained and unconstrained evaluation schemes or give principals leeway over
whose evaluations to follow. Another starting point for further research arises
from the observation that subjects evaluated teammates positively to motivate
them for future periods. Whereas this behavior might not drastically affect a sub-
ject’s future performance much given the one-shot nature of interaction, positive
or negative evaluations might carry a different meaning if teammates interact
repeatedly. Similar to repeated public good games (see, e.g., Sutter et al., 2010),
workers might select rewards and punishment schemes to ensure sustained co-
operation.
In this paper I highlight that peer evaluations can serve as a tool to distribute
bonus payments to high performing employees only under some strong con-
straints. Consequently, further research on how to leverage co-worker insights
on individual work behavior to design appropriate incentives is needed.
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Appendix 4.A Behavioral Predictions
4.A.1 Theoretical Framework
In general each subject will receive her monetary payoff pii and has to pay effort
costs c(ei)
Ui = pii − c(ei). (4.A.1)
pii consist of two parts: the wage (either fixed or based on team-
performance) and the respective bonus. For the effort costs I assume that c′ > 0
and c′′ > 0. Additionally these costs are assumed to be homogeneous across
workers.20 In order to include reciprocal preferences, I extend the utility func-
tion from above:
Ui = pii − c(ei) + φ
2∑
j=1
(c(e j) − c(ei))(pi j − pi f airj ) (4.A.2)
The third part accounts for reciprocal preferences. φ denotes the reciprocity
parameter. For simplicity I assume here, that the reciprocity parameter is iden-
tical for both positive and negative reciprocity. The reciprocity is induced by
the differences in effort choices on the first stage only under the team payment
20 Even though this might not apply in general, as be people might posses different subject
costs for doing certain tasks (e.g., solving brain-teasers or math-questions). This is not a problem
for the subsequent derivations. The workers need to believe only, that their cost functions are
identical to the ones of their fellow workers, s.t. they treat their own cost function as a reference
point for all other workers. This is perfectly reasonable in the context of a laboratory experiment
where workers do not have additional information about each other.
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regime.21 If the baseline wage is fixed, the employees will never profit from any
additional effort of their fellow workers and thus never establish any reciprocal
feelings.22 Individuals are assumed to have a positive attitude towards employ-
ees that exerted more effort that they did and a negative towards those that
exerted less. In that sense their own effort choice serves as reference point for
evaluating the others performance. Thus they tend to receive a positive marginal
utility from an increase of these co-worker’s monetary payoff. The co-worker’s
payoff is evaluated against her “fair”-payoff . The “fair”-payoff corresponds the
material payoff if an employee is ranked in accordance with her effort rank.23
Themultiplicative structure ensures that the reciprocal feelings regarding others
are larger if these workers chose more extreme effort levels, i.e., an employee
will behave much more hostile towards a worker that chose an effort level dras-
tically below hers than towards one that chose an effort level only slightly below.
The utility function is similar to the one used by Englmaier and Leider (2012).
It can also be identical to the utility function from Falk and Fischbacher (2006)
if one abstracts from the underlying belief structure and assumes every action
to be intentional.
4.A.2 Evaluation behavior
In order to determine the employees’ behavior by backward induction the eval-
uation stage has to be considered first. I consider the case of three workers –
called 1, 2 and 3.
Constrained Evaluation. In a first step the constrained option mechanism
will be evaluated. Here the workers can choose between voting truly (award-
ing the point to the teammate with the higher effort level) or not (evaluating
the opposite way). If the employees are not reciprocal (φ = 0) their behavior
is straight forward. The behavior on the previous stage has no influence on the
evaluation behavior as it does not influence the employees utilities. For every
strategy combination there is one subject that can guarantee herself either the
second highest payoff by evaluating truthfully or the equal split of the entire
bonus pool by deviating. This becomes obvious if one considers the following
situation: One teammate received two positive evaluations. Then there must
be another subject that received a positive evaluation, as the subject with two
points had to hand out one, as well. This worker – currently ranked second –
21 It it is essential for this model that effort and not solely performance can be observed by all
employees, otherwise potential output differences could never be tied directly to differences in the
effort choice. This particular approach will eliminate the symmetric equilibria in pure strategies
that arise in tournaments games.
22 A higher effort choice under the team payment can be seen as more generous in the sense
of Cox et al. (2007), as it enlarges the co-worker’s budget set.
23 This reference point is not necessary for the subsequent predictions. Nonetheless it shortens
the subsequent analysis, as under a truthful ranking of all workers the reciprocal utility will be
zero for all workers.
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evaluated the teammate ranked first positively. However, by shifting her posi-
tive evaluation from the co-worker with two positive evaluation to the one cur-
rently ranked third, she can ensure that the bonus pool is split evenly among all
workers, potentially increasing her own payoff. As long as the bonus scheme is
weakly convex, this will always be the case. Naturally, there exists also a mixed
equilibrium. Here the every employee distributes the positive evaluation with
equal probability among the other two co-workers. Again, the outcome is not
informative at all.
Proposition 1 (Existence of true rankings under constraint evalua-
tion options). The true ranking of the workers can form an equilib-
rium, whenever the second ranked worker is sufficiently reciprocal, i.e.,
φ2 ≥ B¯−B2(c(e1)−c(e2))(B¯−B1)+(c(e3)−c(e2))(B¯−B3) . Otherwise the ranking will never
be tied to the actual performance of the workers during the first stage.
In a next step I will show that informative equilibria where every worker
evaluates truthfully can exist if workers are sufficiently reciprocal. Under these
circumstances only the behavior of the worker with the second highest effort
during the first stage is important.24 In order to show that this is sufficient I
will look at the option of the two other employees first under the equilibrium as-
sumption that everybody else evaluates truthfully. The employee with the high-
est effort has no need to manipulate her ranking anyway as she is ranked first
by the others, and thus first overall. Her decision determines the ranking of
the other two employees. There she is expected to act truthfully. The employee
will suffer more from rewarding a worker who exerted less effort. This can be
seen by comparing the resulting payoffs: Ui(t rue)= pii − c(ei) vs. Ui(unt rue)=
pii − c(ei)+φ((c(e2)− c(e1))(B3 − B2)+ (c(e3)− c(e1))(B2 − B3)). The differ-
ing term between these two is clearly negative as the difference in effort costs
between the evaluating worker and the last ranked worker is larger than be-
tween her and the second ranked worker. Thus the worker suffers more from
an increase in the payoff of the last ranked worker, than she does profit from
the losses of the second ranked worker. In summary, conditionally on the co-
workers acting fair, worker 1 will do so as well. The decision is similar for worker
3. Under fair behavior by the two other workers, she will never receive a point
and will always be ranked last. Thus her decision will determine only the rank-
ing of the two other employees. Awarding the point to worker 1 will induce
the true ranking. This is predicted as worker 3 profits more from a increase in
24 Strikingly this does not change if the number of employees is increased but forced ranking
system through a Borda count is maintained. In case of a m-worker game, the worker with the
nth highest effort will receive (m− n)(m− n− 1)+ (n− 1)(m− n)= (m− n)(m− 2) points if
everybody evaluates in a fair manner. Thus the difference between the nth and n+ 1th ranked
employee will be (m− 2) or the highest amount of points to be distributed. Thus only the second
ranked worker can bridge the gap to the employee in front of her by awarding ranking her last if
everybody else reports truly.
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worker 1 payoff as from worker 2. The reciprocal utility is zero under the fair
behavior and φ((c(e1)− c(e3))(B2 − B1)+ (c(e2)− c(e3))(B1 − B2))< 0 other-
wise. Thus again the true evaluation is to be expected. As mentioned before
worker 2 is the critical worker. Given the true behavior of the other workers, she
as well as worker 1 have already been awarded a point. By distributing her point
towards worker 1 the true ranking is induced. Otherwise everybody is ranked
equally and receives the bonus B¯ = B
1+B2+B3
3 . The utility from acting fair is de-
noted by
U2(t rue) = γ
3∑
i=1
f (ei) + B
2 − c(e2) (4.A.3)
and from acting money-maximizing
U2(unt rue) =γ
3∑
i=1
f (ei) + B¯ − c(e2) (4.A.4)
+ φ2((c(e1) − c(e2))(B¯ − B1) + (c(e3) − c(e2))(B¯ − B3)).
Comparing them yields that U2(t rue)≥ U2(unt rue), whenever
φ2 ≥ B¯ − B
2
(c(e1) − c(e2))(B1 − B¯) + (c(e2) − c(e3))(B¯ − B3) . (4.A.5)
Thus worker 2 will evaluate worker 1 positively, whenever her measure for reci-
procity or the differences in efforts are relatively large or the monetary loss
endured through fair evaluation is sufficiently small. Notably, not only the ef-
fort levels of the worker with the two highest effort levels matter, but a lower
effort level of the third worker results in a lower threshold. Increasing effort
differences between the workers with the highest and lowest effort levels are
predicted to make true evaluation more likely. In general, setting B2 = B¯ will
always result in the true ranking being the lone equilibrium (as long as φ > 0
for all subjects), as the second ranked individual has nothing to gain from eval-
uating not truthfully, but rather prefers the true ranking over the equal split.
Consequently the equal split cannot be an equilibrium. The same is true for the
other workers. They prefer the true ranking of their teammates over the other
ranking they can induce, but cannot gain in the money dimension by deviating.
Unconstrained Evaluation. Under the more complex free scheme, the work-
ers have four options to evaluate their co-workers. They can distribute a point
to both other employees, only one to one of their co-workers or no points at all.
If a worker awards no points at all even though at least one co-worker has per-
formed better in the previous stage, this behavior will be called an untruthful
evaluation. At the same time it will always maximize a worker’s monetary pay-
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off. In fact this strategy is a weakly dominant one. The distribution of a positive
amount of points results in the receiving worker being ranked weakly higher as
the awarding one.25 In equilibrium other evaluations might handed out if the
employee exhibit the reciprocal preferences introduced above:
Proposition 2 (Existence of true rankings under free evaluation options). The
workers are able to replicate the stable true ranking of the constraint evalua-
tion mechanism, whenever the second ranked worker is sufficiently reciprocal, i.e.,
φ2 ≥ 1c(e1)−c(e2) . A second equilibrium resulting in the true ranking is possible if
additionally also the third ranked worker is reciprocal, i.e., φ3 ≥ 1c(e2)−c(e3) .
Two different evaluation patterns can be considered "true": Awarding points
to all employees that exerted more effort or awarding one point to the better
performing co-worker. If the workers mix these two behavior from these two
equilibria, the resulting ranking will nevertheless coincide with the true rank-
ing in almost all cases.26 In order to exclude one evaluation possibility from the
equilibrium analysis, it can be shown that no worker will reward a certain per-
formance without rewarding a better one.
As stated before standard workers will never award any points. The distribution
of points will weakly increase the receiving workers bonus, while simultane-
ously weakly lowering all other workers’ bonuses (including her own). The same
logic can be used to exclude actions that reward certain co-workers, without re-
warding a higher ranked one. Given the assumed reciprocal utility function the
marginal utility change induced by a higher material payoff for the two other
workers depends one the difference in effort costs from the first stage. The dif-
ference is simply denoted by ∂ Uipi j − ∂ Uipik = φi(c(e j)− c(ek)). This is always pos-
itive as long as e j > ek. The marginal utility from increasing the payoff of the
higher ranked co-worker is always larger. Thus if it is worthwhile to increase
the payoff of the lesser ranked worker, it must be even more utility increasing
to increase the payoff of the other one. Simultaneously, workers will profit more
from punishing the lesser ranked co-worker, e.g., by not awarding the point to
them. In summary this implies that evaluating their co-workers, no worker will
ever award a point to the co-worker that exerted the lesser effort without award-
ing a point to the one with the higher effort level. Consequently one can restrict
the subsequent equilibrium analysis to three choices: Awarding one point to
25 If the receiving worker is already ahead due to the behavior of others, this cannot be altered
through the own evaluation. If she is currently ranked equally or worse, awarding any points
might lead to draw between the two or to a swap in rankings. As both a draw and a change in
ranking will decrease the monetary payoff, under standard preferences the employee will always
be (weakly) better off by not awarding any points at all.
26 The lone exception arises if the worker with the lowest effort awards one point to the worker
with the highest effort level and the highest ranked worker awards no points at all.
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the worker with the higher effort level, awarding points to both co-workers and
awarding no points at all.
In order to keep the analysis in this section short I will focus on two different
equilibria inducing the true ranking. The first arises if the workers chose the
decisions of the restricted mechanism (i.e., everybody awards a point to the
better ranked of the other two workers). Under the equilibrium each worker
will award a point to all co-workers that exerted more effort than herself, that
means the worker with the highest awards no points at all. The next best worker
awards a point towards the first worker 1 and the worker with lowest effort 3
rewards both co-workers.
The first equilibrium is basically the same as the equilibrium presented in
the section before. Only worker 2 can behave in such a way to bridge the gap
to the next ranked worker. As she would suffer from increasing the payoff of
worker 3, she would only deviate from awarding a point to worker 1 by award-
ing no points at all. This deviation would consequently result in herself and
worker 1 being equally ranked, while worker 3 remains last. Thus the free eval-
uation scheme does not have the drawback, that the unfair evaluation of a higher
ranked worker necessarily induced a too positive evaluation of a lesser ranked
worker. Consequently, this deviation becomes more attractive. Comparing the
utilities while keeping the other decisions fixed reveals, that worker 2 will now
deviate whenever
φ2 <
1
c(e1) − c(e2) . (4.A.6)
Thus the decision whether to deviate will only depend on the difference in ef-
fort level between herself and the first ranked worker. If this difference is large
enough the second ranked worker will induce the true ranking by awarding a
point towards worker 1. Worker 1 and 3 have no incentive to deviate, as their de-
cision will not affect their own ranking. Additionally they prefer the true ranking
of co-workers over every other ranking of them.
If worker 2 is not reciprocal enough or the performance differences are too
small, there might be other equilibria where someworkers still hand out positive
evaluations.
As mentioned before a second equilibrium will result in the true ranking
of all workers: All workers reward all co-workers that exerted more effort than
they did. Thus worker 1 will again have no incentive to deviate, as her action
could potentially only decrease her own payoff or change the payoffs of the
other workers. However, as shown before the true ranking of the co-workers is
always preferred over any other possible ranking of them. Considering worker 2
this equilibrium puts the same requirements on her as the previous one, as her
equilibrium decision is the same and a deviation towards awarding no points
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at all has the same effect. It will not affect the outcome of worker 3, but only
the ranking of herself and worker 1. She will support this equilibrium if φ2 ≥
1
c(e1)−c(e2) . As worker 3 will be distributing the only point towards worker 2 in
equilibrium, she can force a tie between them two by not awarding any points
at all or only rewarding worker 1. In both cases deviations are profitable if φ3 <
1
c(e2)−c(e3) . Again the decision depends only on the differences in the specific
effort costs. If the differences in the selected efforts among all three workers is
sufficiently large the true equilibrium should be induced. Notably, this decision
is not impacted by the bonus sizes.
Again, if workers 2 and 3 are not reciprocal enough or there is little sepa-
ration in the performances, a true ranking will not be an equilibrium. However,
other equilibria with positive evaluations might still persist.27
Comparing the two mechanism yields that the requirements for equilibria
with true rankings are stronger in the free evaluation mechanism.28 If the price
structure is flat, the true ranking should always be attainable under the con-
straint evaluation system, while this is not true under free conditions. This holds
additionally true if the prize structure is concave, as under these circumstances
the second prize will always be larger than the average prize. This changes natu-
rally if the prize structure becomes convex. Such structures arise if there is only
one prize to be distributed, i.e., as in promotion tournaments. Furthermore it is
noteworthy that the existence of these equilibria solely depends on the distance
between the effort choices but not on the bonus structure. Intuitively, a worker
will only acknowledge differences between themselves and their co-workers if
they are sufficiently large. Around every effort choice exists an area in which
a worker is not willing to separate her choice from other effort choices in that
area.
4.A.3 Eort choice
Even though effort choices are not discussed to great detail in this paper, this sec-
tion sketches the influence of reciprocal attitudes on the previous effort choice
for the case of constrained evaluations. In order for the analysis of the evaluation
decision to have any bite, it is necessary that it is actually reasonable to expect
different effort choices. This section provides an equilibrium analysis under the
assumption that a truthful equilibrium will always be played. This is expected
under forced evaluation with a linear bonus scheme.
27 Imagine the following situation: Worker 1 does not hand out any positive evaluations, while
worker 2 is not willing to reward worker 1. Then worker 3 might still prefer to give a positive
evaluation to worker 1 if the performance differences are large enough, i.e., φ3 ≥ 1/(2c1 − c2 −
c3). In the resulting equilibrium, workers 2 and 3 are ranked equally with worker 1 being in first
place.
28 This is obvious, as each individual has more options to improve only their standing within
the free evaluation mechanism.
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During the first stage the individuals have to take into account whether an
informative equilibrium will be played during the second stage or not. If this
happens not to be the case, the employees will exert that amount of effort that
maximizes their utility with regard to the team based incentive scheme. Thus
effort is chosen s.t. c′(ei)= γ f ′(ei). This effort level will be denoted by emin.
The exertion of additional effort is never worthwhile, as it will not increase the
likelihood of winning the second stage tournament.29 This changes however
if the employees assume that a truthful equilibrium will be played during the
second stage. If one assumes that the employer selects B2 = B¯, the true ranking
can always be expected to emerge under the constrained scheme. Under the
complex evaluation scheme the true equilibrium will only emerge if and only
if the difference in chosen effort levels is sufficiently large. Then the prospect
of a potentially higher reward during the second stage serves as incentive to
exert additional effort. If a truthful equilibrium is played, the employee with
the highest effort will be awarded B1, the second B2, the third B3. This can be
interpreted as an all-pay auction with three bidders, three prizes and convex
bidding costs. Bidding costs are convex due to the convexity of effort costs. The
pure bidding costs are determined by the difference between the effort costs
above the efficient level and the additional income generated by the return form
the team payment.
If all workers are reciprocal, mutual true evaluation is the only equilibrium in
pure strategies under the constrained evaluation scheme. Hence, I will analyze
the influence of mutual true evaluations on effort in the first stage. As common
in all-pay auctions no equilibrium in pure strategies exists. Otherwise workers
would have an incentive to overbid each other up to the point where the bidding
costs are equal to the largest bonus payment. However, the other workers are
then again not expected to exert any effort, which again renders the exertion
of the maximum amount of effort useless. Consequently, I will show that there
exists a monotonically increasing atomless distribution function F from which
effort choices are randomly selected in equilibrium. By exerting the minimal
rational effort emin a worker can always guarantee herself the bonus B3 with
certainty. Her utility is consequently given by
E(U(emin)) = γ
2∑
j=1
(2E( f (e j) + f (e
min)) − c(emin) + B3. (4.A.7)
For further illustration I will use the standard function f (e)= e and c(e)= e
2
2 ,
resulting in emin = γ and E(U(emin))= γ
2
2 + B
3 + γ2E(ei). In order to allow for
29 It is important to note this behavior is not maximizing the entire groups welfare. This is due
to the public good structure of the team-payment. Every teammate profits from the individual’s
extra effort. The team-efficient effort level would naturally be c′(ei)= n ∗ γ f ′(ei).
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a mixing effort choices the expected payoff of all other effort choices that are
played with positive probability must be equal to this amount. Consequently the
upper limit of this interval is pinned down by this equation. c(emax) ensures the
worker the maximum bonus B1 with surety. This results in the utility being equal
to
E(U(emax)) = γ(2E(ei) + e
max) + B1 − c(emax). (4.A.8)
Setting this equal to the payoff from the lowest effort and using the specified
functions results in emax = γ+
p
2(B1 − B3). Given the c.d.f. F(e), which is as-
sumed to be chosen s.t. equal utilities across all selections between emin and
emax are induced, the utility of certain effort choice e is given by
E(U(e)) =γ(2E(ei) + e) − c(e) (4.A.9)
+ F2(e)B1 + 2F(e)(1 − F(e))B2 + (1 − F(e))2B3.
Equating this function with determined utility leads to the following equilibrium
density function
F(e) =
(γ − e)2
2(B1 − B3) . (4.A.10)
This analysis can be extended for settings were the true ranking will only oc-
cur if the output differences between the subjects are large enough. This would
imply that even a subject with the minimal effort level has a chance to receive
a larger bonus (either shared between her and the second highest performing
teammate, or shared between all teammates). This increases the expected pay-
off of that choice. Likewise even very high effort choices cannot longer guarantee
the highest possible bonus. This decreases the value of additional effort the sub-
jects exert and compresses the range of output levels. The central argument that
eliminates symmetric equilibria in pure strategies is the same.
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Figure 4.B.1. Sliders solved across periods
Notes: The figure presents average amount of sliders solved across periods.
Appendix 4.B Performance Levels
As discussed in section 4.4 the subjects solve more sliders in the treatments
with team-incentives. Notably, these two treatments show significant time trends
(Spearman’s ρ =0.48, p<0.01 for treatment Team-Free and Spearman’s ρ
=0.63, p<0.01 for treatment Team-Forced). Similar trends cannot be observed
under fixed wages. Table 4.B.1 shows that in the absence of team-incentive the
average output is slightly lower in the treatments with fixed wages. The differ-
ence, however becomes very small if those observations are excluded, where the
subject did not work on the task at all.
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Table 4.B.1. Impact of Treatments on Output
Sliders Correctly Positioned
(1) (2)
All Output > 0
Fix-Forced -1.76* -0.59
(0.98) (0.50)
Team-Free 0.69 0.69
(0.79) (0.79)
Fix-Free -1.81 -0.10
(1.21) (0.69)
Period dummies Yes Yes
N 1920 1841
R2 .046 .036
Notes: This table presents regressions using individual output in a single period as dependent
variable. Column (2) excludes all observations where a subject did not produce any output at all.
*, **, and *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level. Standard errors in parentheses
and clustered on matching-group-level.
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Appendix 4.C Constrained evaluation
This section reports alternate specifications for the estimation of treatment ef-
fects for the treatment with constrained evaluation scheme. The analysis in-
cludes different measures of performance between the subjects and their team-
mates.
Table 4.C.2. Alternate specication for ranking outcomes in Forced treatments
Correctly ranked
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Team pay 0.60*** 0.67*** 0.39 0.73*** 0.75***
(0.19) (0.20) (0.26) (0.23) (0.23)
Output Rank=2 0.58*** 0.57*** -0.09
(0.13) (0.12) (0.09)
Output Rank=3 0.20 0.15 0.18
(0.16) (0.16) (0.20)
abs. Output size -0.01 -0.02 -0.02
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Output=0 -0.60*** -0.48** -0.17
(0.14) (0.19) (0.26)
cumulative |∆Output| 0.02*
(0.01)
Fix pay × cumulative |∆Output| 0.01
(0.01)
Team pay × cumulative |∆Output| 0.03**
(0.01)
Period dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 826 826 826 651 651
PseudoR2 .05 .08 .084 .067 .079
p-value: Team vs. Fix .085
Notes: This table presents probit regressions using resulting ranks as the dependent variable. *,
**, and *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level. Standard errors in parentheses
and clustered on matching-group-level.
Table 4.C.2 presents additional analyses for the determinants of rank out-
comes. Again, column (1) replicates the baseline specification from Table 4.4,
column (1), however, only for the two treatments with Forced evaluation. In
column (2) the cumulative output difference to the other two teammates is
included as mediator. Column (3) interacts this with the two treatments. The
cumulative output difference is especially large if a subject performed much
better or much worse than both of her teammates. This might give both team-
mates an incentive to evaluate that subject truthfully. As both teammates have
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to evaluate truthfully to induce the true ranking of a subject, this measure is
included here rather than the individual differences. In line with the findings
for the evaluation behavior a higher cumulative output difference is associated
with a higher likelihood to be ranked correctly. This effect is slightly stronger un-
der team-incentives. Column (4) and (5) exclude those groups were all subjects
were ranked equally. Column (4) features no additional controls, while column
(5) corresponds to column (4) of Table 4.4. In contrast to the results column
(2) Table 4.4, the indicator for the second best performing subject is no longer
significant. This indicates that this effect was indeed an artifact of ranking ties
resulting in the appropriate bonus for the second ranked subject. The overall
treatment effect remains significant and becomes even slightly larger.
Table 4.C.3 extends the analysis in section 4.4. Column (1) corresponds to
the specification presented in Table 4.6, column (1). In column (2) the absolute
differences in output to the two teammates are included separately. While the
effect size is rather similar, there is only a significant effect of a larger output
differences to the lower performing teammate. As the impact of output differ-
ences might differ depending on their sign, column (3) separates the output
differences. In both treatments subjects tend to evaluate more truthfully the the
lower the relative performance of the lower performing teammate. Higher out-
put by a better performing subject does not seem to be associated with more
truthful evaluations.
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Table 4.C.3. Alternate specication for evaluation outcomes in Forced treatments
True evaluations
(1) (2) (3)
Team pay 0.43** 0.48** 0.12
(0.17) (0.19) (0.22)
Output Rank=2 -0.34*** -0.16**
(0.08) (0.08)
Output Rank=3 -0.44*** -0.48***
(0.12) (0.09)
abs. Output size -0.01 -0.02
(0.02) (0.01)
Output = 0 -0.59 -0.44*
(0.37) (0.24)
|∆Output| to better teammate 0.02
(0.02)
|∆Output| to worse teammate 0.02***
(0.01)
Fix pay × |∆Output| to better teammate - 0.01
(0.02)
Team pay × |∆Output| to better teammate 0.04
(0.03)
Fix pay × |∆Output| to worse teammate 0.03***
(0.01)
Team pay × |∆Output| to worse teammate 0.04***
(0.01)
Period dummies Yes Yes Yes
N 887 887 887
PseudoR2 .028 .053 .058
p-value: Team vs. Fix High .18
p-value: Team vs. Fix Low .15
Notes: This table presents probit regressions using evaluation behavior as the dependent variable.
*, **, and *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level. Standard errors in parentheses
and clustered on matching-group-level.
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Figure 4.D.2. Positive evaluations over time
Notes: The figure presents the average amount of positive evaluations used per subjects in the
two treatments with unconstrained evaluations.
Appendix 4.D Unconstrained evaluation
This section presents additional material on the treatments that feature the un-
constrained evaluation scheme.
Figure 4.D.2 displays the average number of positive evaluations subjects
used in a given period. Positive evaluations are handed out predominately in the
beginning of the experiment. Subjects almost stop using them during the second
half; only about a quarter of all subjects hands out a single positive evaluation
during that period. Consequently in both treatments the positive evaluations
exhibit a negative time-trend: Spearman’s ρ =-0.57, p<0.01 for Fix-Free and
ρ=-0.57, p<0.07 for Team-Free.
In Table 4.D.4, I check whether the results evaluation outcomes change if
one focuses only on the treatments with unconstrained evaluation. Additionally,
column (2) excludes those groups where no positive evaluations were handed
out all. Here, this is equivalent to all subjects being ranked equally. Column
(3) includes additional controls. Results do not change; the treatment has no
significant effect on the share of subjects that are ranked correctly. Interestingly,
if positive evaluations are actually handed out, they result in actually the highest
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Table 4.D.4. Alternate specication for ranking outcomes in Free treatments
Correctly Ranked
(1) (2) (3)
Team pay -0.19 -0.31 -0.37
(0.16) (0.28) (0.31)
Output Rank=2 -0.87***
(0.12)
Output Rank=3 -0.30*
(0.16)
abs. Output size 0.02
(0.02)
Output=0 0.18
(0.47)
Period dummies Yes Yes Yes
N 960 493 493
PseudoR2 .0055 0.018 .084
Notes: This table presents probit regressions using resulting ranks as the dependent variable. *,
**, and *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level. Standard errors in parentheses
and clustered on matching-group-level.
performing subjects receiving the correct bonus significantly more often than the
others.
In order to highlight the potential impact of output differences for the eval-
uation behavior the analysis included the absolute output differences between
the evaluating subject and each of their teammates. Nonetheless, the impact of
the output differences might differ depending on their sign. If subjects were re-
ciprocal, only suitably large positive output difference should lead to truthful
evaluations, large negative output differences should not matter at all. While
columns (1) and (2) correspond to columns (1) and (3) of Table 4.7, column
(3) includes the output differences separated by their sign. In contrast to the the-
oretical predictions a better performance of the higher performing teammates
actually decreased the likelihood of a truthful evaluation significantly.
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Table 4.D.5. Alternate specication for evaluation outcomes in Free treatments
(a) True Evaluation
(1) (2) (3)
Team pay -0.14 -0.41** -0.42**
(0.11) (0.19) (0.19)
Output Rank=2 -2.41*** -2.16***
(0.17) (0.28)
Output Rank=3 -2.26*** -2.05***
(0.23) (0.32)
abs. Output size 0.03 0.02
(0.02) (0.03)
Output=0 0.04 0.02
(0.22) (0.23)
|∆Output| to better teammate -0.03*
(0.02)
|∆Output| to worse teammate 0.00
(0.01)
|∆Output|< 0 × |∆Output| to better teammate 0.04
(0.04)
|∆Output| ≥ 0 × |∆Output| to better teammate -0.04**
(0.02)
|∆Output|< 0 × |∆Output| to worse teammate -0.01
(0.02)
|∆Output| ≥ 0 × |∆Output| to worse teammate 0.01
(0.03)
Period dummies Yes Yes Yes
N 960 960 960
PseudoR2 .0091 .41 .41
Notes: This table presents probit regressions using evaluation behavior as the dependent variable.
*, **, and *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level. Standard errors in parentheses
and clustered on matching-group-level.
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Appendix 4.E Instructions
The instructions below are translations of the German instruc-
tions for the experiment. Differences between the treatments
are marked by Free:“...” and Team “...”.
General instructions for the participants
You are now participating in an economic experiment. If you read the following
explanations carefully, you will be able to earn a considerable amount of money
– depending on your decisions and those of the other participants. Thus it is im-
portant to read these instructions very carefully.
During the experiment, it is absolutely prohibited to communicate with
the other participants. Should you have any questions, please ask us. If you
violate this rule, you will be dismissed from the experiment and forfeit all pay-
ments. How much money you will receive after the experiment depends on your
decisions and those of the other participants. The experimental payoffs will be
calculated in Taler. The total amount of Taler that you have accumulated during
the experiment will be converted into Euro and paid to you in cash at the end
of the experiment. The exchange rate from Taler to Euro is as follows:
75 Taler = 1 Euro
The experiment consists of exactly one part. This part is divided into 10 periods.
At the beginning of the experiment you are randomly assigned to a group of
three. Besides yourself, there are two other participants in your group. In each
period you will interact with different, randomly assigned participants. Neither
during the experiment, nor afterwards you will receive any information about
the identity of the other participants in your group.
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Detailed Information about the Course of each Period
Each period consist of three stages
The 1st Stage
During the 1st stage you will be presented with 48 scales. Each scale goes from
0 to 100. On each scale, there is a slider. You can move this slider with you
mouse. You have exactly two minutes to position as many slider as you like
on the value 50 on the scale. At the beginning each slider is positioned at the
extreme corner of the scale, at zero. Below the scale, the current position of the
slider is displayed. You are free to work on the sliders in whichever order you
like. Prior to the main part of the experiment, you will have the opportunity to
familiarize yourself with the task during two practice periods.
The 2nd Stage
At the beginning of the 2nd stage you will be informed on how many sliders
each participant in your group has positioned correctly during the 1st stage.
Now, you will have the opportunity to evaluate the other members of your group.
For this you can award points indicating good work. Forced: “You have to award
1 point to exactly one of your teammates.” Free: “You can award each of your
teammates 1 or 0 bonus-points. That means, you have the option to award both
of them 1 point, you can award only one of them 1 point or you award no points
at all.” Other decisions are not possible. The points awarded by yourself and the
other group-members will be used to determine a bonus payment. The team-
mate with most points will receive 80 Taler, the next teammate will receive 40
Taler and the teammate with the lowest amount of points will receive 0 Taler.
The 3rd Stage
During the 3rd stage you will be informed on the points each group-member
received as well as their income during that period. Additionally you will be
shown again, how many slider each group-member positioned correctly during
the 1st stage.
Afterwards this period ends and a new one begins. The participants within your
group are randomly selected only for that single period. During the 1st stage, all
participants can reposition sliders, again. The 1st stage is followed by the 2nd
stage and finally the 3rd stage.
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Detailed Information about the Income in each Period
Your income for each period will always consist of two parts.
Fix: “Basic income:
In each period, you and each of your teammates receive a basic income of 80
Taler each. The basic income is completely independent of your decisions in that
period and will always be paid out to you.”
Team: “Income from the project:
You and all other teammates receive 1 Taler each for each slider, that you or one
of the participants in your group positioned correctly during the 1st Stage. If
you and your teammate positioned a total of 50 sliders correctly, you will earn
exactly 50 Taler from the project.”
Income from the bonus payment:
At the end of each period, you and the other members of your group have the
opportunity to award a bonus-point to exactly one of your teammates. The serve
as base for the calculation of the bonus payments. For this the points a partic-
ipant received are added up. The participant with the most points receives 80
Taler. The participant with the second most points receives 40 Taler. The group-
member with the fewest points receives no bonus payment. If more than one
teammate received the same amount of points, the corresponding bonus pay-
ments will be split among them.
Payment for the most bonus-points = 80 Taler
Payment for the 2nd most bonus-points = 40 Taler
Payment for the fewest bonus-points = 0 Taler
Example 1: Participant A received 2 bonus-points, participant B received 0
bonus-points and participant C 1 bonus-point. Then participant A receives a
bonus of 80 Taler. Participant B receives 0 Taler and participant C 40 Taler.
Forced:
“Example 2: Participant A and B and C received 1 bonus-point each. Then the
participants share the entire sum of bonus-payments. Everyone receives a bonus-
payment of (80+ 40+ 0) /3= 120/3= 40 Taler.”
Free:
“Example 2: Participant A and B received 2 bonus-points, each. Participant C re-
ceived 1 bonus-point. Then the participants A and B share the largest two bonus-
payments. Both of them receive a bonus-payment of (80+ 40) /2= 120/2= 60
Taler. Participant C receives a bonus-payment of 0 Taler.”
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Income at the end of each period:
Your income at the end of each period is equal to the sum of your basic income
and the your income from the bonus payments. This means:
Fix: “Basic income” Team: “Income from the project”
+ Income from the bonus payment
= Income at the end of the period
We will demonstrate this calculation with the use of two examples:
Example 1: Assume, you and the other participants in your group correctly po-
sitioned 16 slider, each. Each participant in your group has received exactly one
bonus point. Fix: “Your basic income is 80 Taler.” Team: “Your income from the
project is given by 16 + 16 + 16 = 48 Taler.” Your income from the bonus pay-
ment is (80+ 40+ 0) /3= 40 Taler. Consequently, your income in this period
will be:
Fix:
“80 Taler basic income + 40 Taler bonus payment = 80 + 40 = 120 Taler”
Team:
“48 Taler from the project + 40 Taler bonus payment = 48 + 40 = 88 Taler”
Example 2: Assume, you positioned 0 sliders correctly, while the two other par-
ticipants in your group repositioned 20 slider, each. You received 0 bonus-points
and the other two participants received 1 and 2 bonus-points, respectively. Fix:
“Your basic income is 80 Taler.” Team: “Your income from the project is given
by 0 + 20 + 20 = 40 Taler.” Your income from the bonus payment is 0 Taler.
Consequently, your income in this period will be:
Fix:
“80 Taler basic income + 0 Taler bonus payment = 80 + 0 = 80 Taler”
Team:
“40 Taler from the project + 0 Taler bonus payment = 40 + 0 = 40 Taler”
Conclusion of the experiment and payment
The experiment ends after 10 periods. Subsequently, we will ask you to answer
a few general questions on the computer. Your answers to these questions have
no influence on how much money you will earn in the experiment. When all
participants have filled out the questionnaire, payments will be made. Your total
income from the 10 periods will be converted into Euro and paid to you in cash.
Do you have any questions? If so, please raise your hand.
5
The impact of self-selection on
performance?
“The first thing I would do every morning was look at
the box scores to see what Magic did. I didn’t care about
anything else.”
– Larry Bird
5.1 Introduction
Basketball hall of famer Larry Bird used to motivate himself to train harder not
by focusing on any player but rather by looking at his rival Magic Johnson’s
performance during the previous night’s game. Similarly, seeing a specific class-
mate study long and continuously might also help to focus on one’s own work. In
various dimensions of life – ranging from students in educational settings (Sacer-
dote, 2001; Duflo et al., 2011) over cashiers in supermarkets (Mas and Moretti,
2009) and fruit pickers on strawberry fields (Bandiera et al., 2005, 2009) to
fighter pilots during World War II (Ager et al., 2016) – we look at the behavior
of our peers and compare our own performance and choices with theirs.1
? We thank Lorenz Götte, Sebastian Kube, Pia Pinger for their guidance and support. We also
thank Viola Ackfeld, Philipp Albert, Thomas Dohmen, Ingo Isphording, Ulf Zölitz and audiences
at Bonn, MBEPS 2017, VfS 2017, ESA Europe 2017, IZA Brown Bag, Rady Spring School in
Behavioral Economics 2017, Bonn-Mannheim Ph.D. Workshop, 20th IZA Summer School in Labor
Economics, 12th Nordic Conference on Behavioral and Experimental Economics, and Max Planck
Institute for Research on Collective Goods for helpful feedback and comments.
1 The influence of peers on our own behavior has long been recognized in the social sciences
in general, as well as in economics more specifically. Such effects – commonly referred to as “peer
effects” – are widely observed across a wide range of outcomes, not only for performance on
the job or in school: indeed, other contexts include investment behavior (Bursztyn et al., 2014),
consumption (Kuhn et al., 2011), program participation (Dahl et al., 2014), propensity to exercise
(Babcock and Hartman, 2010; Aral and Nicolaides, 2017) and wages in a firm (Cornelissen et al.,
2017). The settings across these studies differ enormously, as does the underlying mechanism
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In many natural environments, the persons with whomwe compare are care-
fully chosen rather than exogenously assigned. This peer selectionmay generally
occur across two dimensions. In some cases, people know others well and are
able to select their peers accordingly. This type of selection takes place mostly
in settings where people interact frequently with each other, such as classrooms
or workplaces. In other settings, selection is based on limited information, e.g.,
only past performance is observed or only certain characteristics are available as
a basis for selection. People might consciously select into schools or workplaces
comprising peers with a known ability.2 Therefore, individuals self-select into
certain environments and even into specific peer groups within given environ-
ments. This is in stark contrast with environments where peers are randomly or
exogenously assigned. Self-selection should therefore result in different peers,
can affect subsequent behavior, and might even have a direct effect on our mo-
tivation.
In this paper, we study how different peer assignment rules – self-selection
versus random assignment – affect individual performance and how self-
selection itself affects interactions between peers. In a first step, we investigate
how self-selected peers – based on either identity or relative performance – af-
fect average performance in contrast to randomly assigned peers. After docu-
menting differences in performance, we then analyze the underlying mecha-
nisms. We explore whether self-selection leads to a different peer composition
and we decompose performance improvements into a direct effect – stemming
from being able to self-select a peer per se – and an indirect effects from a change
in the relative peer characteristics. We provide evidence on the sources of the
direct effect by documenting changes in the peer interaction and discuss which
individuals tend to benefit most from these peer assignment mechanisms.
In order to study the effects of self-selection, we conducted a framed field
experiment with over 600 students (aged 12 to 16) in physical education classes
of German secondary schools. Students took part in two running tasks (suicide
runs) – first alone, then with a peer – and filled out a survey in between that
elicited preferences for peers, personal characteristics and the social network
within each class. Our treatments exogenously varied the peer assignment in
the second run using three different matching rules. We implemented a random
matching of pairs (Random) as well as two matching rules that use the elicited
preferences to implement self-selected peers. The specific setup of our experi-
ment allows for two notions of self-selection, based on either social identity or
(e.g., peer pressure, learning, complementarities). Nonetheless, all of these have in common that
the behavior or action of peers imposes an externality on the action or behavior of others. Most of
the research on peer effects takes the peer group or a single peer as given or randomly assigned.
2 Festinger (1954) already conjectured that people tend to compare their own performance
on average with slightly better performing individuals. Similarly, performance leaderboards for
sales representatives are widespread for motivational reasons. They allow employees to compare
their performance with others despite not knowing them personally.
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the relative performance of one’s classmates. First, the classroom environment
enabled students to state preferences for known peers (name-based preferences).
Second, using a running task yields direct measures of performance and thus
could be used to select peers based on their relative performance in the first
run (performance-based preferences). Utilizing these two sets of preferences, we
implemented two treatments with self-selection. The treatments matched stu-
dents based on name-based preferences (Name) or preferences over relative
performance (Performance), which we elicited in the survey.
We find that both peer-assignment mechanisms with self-selected peers im-
prove average performance by .14–.15SD relative to randomly assigned peers.
Self-selection changes the peer composition, e.g., students interact predomi-
nantly with friends in Name, while they choose students with a similar past
performance in Performance. However, this indirect effect due to changes in
the peer composition cannot explain performance improvements in treatments
with self-selected peers. More specifically, the indirect effect of the changed
peer composition is insignificant in Name and even negative in Performance.
Our estimates show that there is a direct effect of self-selection on performance.
Therefore, this process of self-selection seems to provide an additional motiva-
tion to students. In order to investigate the sources of the direct effect, we show
that students in Performance experience more peer pressure. Furthermore, we
find that only slower students within a pair improve their performance in Name,
while both the slower and faster student improve similarly in Performance
compared to students in randomly formed pairs. Both observations suggest that
the within-pair interaction has changed across treatments. Finally, we examine
which students in the ability distribution tend to benefit most from our peer as-
signment mechanisms. We find that Name improves students across the ability
distribution, while Performance tends to favor faster students.
While the impact of a peer and the resulting quantitative effect might be
specific to this setting, the underlying motive of the results are of general inter-
est. Students have not only been successfully used to analyze phenomena like
favoritism (Belot and van de Ven, 2011, and references therein), but they are
also a highly relevant subject group, given that social comparisons are impor-
tant drivers of effort and performance in school and consequently may affect
educational attainment. The process of self-selecting peers is potentially equally
important for settings in which peer effects do not arise due to social compar-
isons or peer pressure, but rather where effort, task or skill complementarities
exist (e.g., Mas and Moretti, 2009) or where learning from peers is important
(among others Bursztyn et al., 2014; Kimbrough et al., 2017). In these settings,
peer effects originate from different mechanisms than studied in our setting, al-
though in principle peers can also be self-selected. This may affect interactions
among peers and the motivation of individuals themselves in ways similar to this
study. Our results also complement the findings by Bartling et al. (2014), who
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demonstrate that people value the opportunity to actively select relevant aspects
of life, whereas we highlight the motivational benefits of subjects being able to
self-select their environment (i.e., their peer).3 As our paper shows, the direct
effect of being able to self-select peers might be even more important than those
induced by exogenous group assignment. Hence, studies analyzing interactions
between peers and policies leveraging these insights need to take into account
any selection of peers taking place within groups.
This paper relates to several strands of literature and addresses recent de-
velopments on peer effects. First, most studies have traditionally relied on (con-
ditional) random assignment of peers (for an overview, see Herbst and Mas,
2015; Sacerdote, 2014). In order to study peer effects in performance, these
studies impose – for example – that all other class members (e.g., as in Feld and
Zölitz, 2017) or the entire set of friends (by leveraging social network data as in
Bramoullé et al., 2009) serve as relevant peers. This literature builds on (condi-
tional) random assignment to identify the existence of peer effects and circum-
vent statistical problems as outlined in Manski (1993). As we are interested in
how self-selection actually changes peer group compositions and performance,
we contrast the setting typically used in the literature (i.e., random assignment)
by allowing for self-selection.
The existence of peer effects in educational settings motivated a small
strand of the literature to focus on reassignment policies. Rather than assign-
ing students randomly to classrooms, Carrell et al. (2013) systematically formed
classes comprising only high- and low-ability students to increase the GPA of the
latter. Instead of increasing their GPA as was predicted by estimates in Carrell
et al. (2009), the GPA actually decreased. The authors suggest that subgroups
of either high- or low-ability students emerged, with little interaction between
them. Therefore, the exogenous formation of classrooms changed the class com-
position and thereby the set of potential peers, while within this group students
self-selected their relevant peers. Booij et al. (2017) also present evidence on
exogenous peer group manipulations. They manipulated the group composition
based on their prior ability, which led to a change in the social interaction: low-
ability students were more involved in classes and reported more positive inter-
actions within classrooms. In this paper, rather than reassigning students into
classrooms as in the previous studies, we take the classes as given and focus on
the peer assignment and resulting interactions within classrooms.
Researchers have recently analyzed the potentially differential effects of
friends and non-friends and thus have moved away from the paradigm that all
peers influence an individual’s performance similarly. Lavy and Sand (2015) an-
alyze how reciprocal – in contrast to non-reciprocal – friends affect the test scores
3 Similarly, having the opportunity to decide or vote has been found to positively affect the
quality of leadership (e.g., Brandts et al., 2014) as well as the effectiveness of institutions (e.g.,
Bó et al., 2010) in the presence of social dilemmas.
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of middle-school students. Chan and Lam (2015) further decompose the type
of peers and investigate the varying effect of those types on educational attain-
ment. In particular, they find that the specific type of peer (classmate, seatmate
or friend) as well as their individual personalities matter for understanding peer
effects in educational settings. In a different domain, Aral and Nicolaides (2017)
suggest that only some parts of a person’s social network affect exercising behav-
ior. While Aral and Nicolaides focus on the extensive margin – i.e., the decision
to exercise or not – and study who is influencing whom in a given network,
we study the intensive margin – i.e., how much effort to provide – taking into
account that not all people serve as relevant peers.
The closest paper to ours is Chen and Gong (2018). The authors study self-
sorting of students into teams for a group task with skill complementarities.
Similar to us, they find that peers are selected based on the social network and
that those groups perform better than randomly formed groups. In contrast to
their setting, we focus on pairs with individual production as the unit of analysis
to identify a peer’s effect on individual performance.
Finally, we add to the literature on rank effects in peer interactions. Our
results are in line with research documenting the importance of ranks for subse-
quent outcomes (Elsner and Isphording, 2017; Gill et al., 2017). If individuals
have preferences over ranks, this can give rise to heterogeneous peer effects sim-
ilar to our setting (Tincani, 2017). Relatedly, Cicala et al. (forthcoming) also use
rank-dependent preferences to build a Roy-model of social interactions, where
agents can select into certain groups based on their ability to carry out different
tasks. In our experiment, subjects can indirectly select their rank in the second
run by choosing a specific peer or relative time (e.g., a faster or slower peer).
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The next section
presents our experimental design as well as procedural details. Section 5.3
presents the data and describes our sample of students. We outline our empiri-
cal framework in section 5.4. In section 5.5, we analyze how self-selected peers
affect performance relative to randomly assigned peers and decompose this ef-
fect in direct effects of self-selection and indirect effects of a change in the peer
composition. We then discuss heterogeneous responses and highlight potential
policy implications. Finally, section 5.6 concludes.
5.2 Experimental design
Studying the self-selection of peers and their subsequent impact on performance
requires an environment in which subjects can choose peers themselves and
where exogenous assignment can be implemented. Subjects must be able to
compare their own performance with that of a peer in a task that lends itself to
natural up- and downward comparisons. Additionally, it might be very difficult
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to isolate the person who serves as a point of comparison. This is especially true
if several potential peers are present at all times. Moreover, within a given group
only some peers might serve as relevant comparisons. As subjects might select
those peers for many reasons besides their performance, it is essential not only
to observe additional characteristics of all subjects, but also to use an existing
social group. In these groups, subjects have a clear impression of other group
members and are able to select peers on additional characteristics such as their
social ties.
In this study, we used the controlled environment of a framed field experi-
ment to overcome those challenges. We embedded our experiment in physical
education classes of German secondary schools. Students from grades 7 to 10
participated in a running task, first alone and then simultaneously with a peer.
Running allowed students to compare their performance with either faster or
slower students, while it also excluded complementaries in production between
the students. Moreover, we focused on pairs as the unit of observation. This re-
duced the number of peers in the experimental task to a single individual and
allows us to identify his or her impact. Subjects singled out specific peers by
either naming them directly (in the treatment Name) or selecting performance
intervals (in Performance). The respective treatments used these preferences
to form pairs with self-selected peers or pairs were formed at random. Hence,
we can compare the effect of self-selected peers with exogenously assigned ones,
and can evaluate the effects of each assignment mechanism.
In the following, we present the design of our field experiment in detail and
describe the implemented procedures.
5.2.1 Experimental design
Figure 5.1 illustrates the experimental design. Students participated in a run-
ning task commonly known as “suicide runs”, a series of short sprints to differ-
ent lines of a volleyball court.4,5 The first run – in which students run alone
4 The exact task is to sprint and turn at every line of the volleyball court. Subjects had to line
up at the baseline. From there, they started running to the first attack line of the court (6 meters).
After touching this line, they returned to the baseline again, touching the line on arrival. The next
sprint took the students to the middle of the court (9 meters), the third to the second attack line
(12 meters) and the last to the opposite baseline (18 meters), each time returning back to the
baseline. They finished by returning to the starting point. The total distance of this task was 90
meters.
5 The task was chosen for several reasons: (1) the task is not a typical part of the German
physical education curriculum, yet it is easily understandable for the students; (2) in contrast
to a pure and very familiar sprint exercise as in Gneezy and Rustichini (2004) or Sutter and
Glätzle-Rützler (2015), students should only have a vague idea of their classmates performance
and cannot precisely target specific individuals in Performance; and (3) due to the different
aspects of the task (general speed, quickness in turning as well as some level of endurance or
perseverance), the performance across age groups was not expected to (and did not) change
dramatically.
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– served two purposes: first, recorded times can be used as a measure of abil-
ity and to evaluate the time improvement between the two runs; and second,
we used (relative) times from the first run in combination with students’ pref-
erences to create pairs for the second run in one of the treatments described
below. The second run mirrored the first one aside from the fact that students
did not run alone, but rather in pairs. This means that both students performed
the task simultaneously, while their times were recorded individually. Feedback
about performance in both runs was provided at the end of the experiment only.
First Run
Survey Peer Assignment
Second Run with
assigned Peer
Post-experimental
Questionaire
Feedback
Peer
Preferences
Personality and
Preferences
Social Network
Random Matching
(Random)
Self-selection
on Names
(Name)
Self-selection
on Performance
(Performance)
Figure 5.1. Experimental design
Between the two runs, students filled out a survey comprising three parts,
eliciting preferences for peers, non-cognitive skills, and information about the
social network within each class. We elicited two kinds of preferences: first, we
asked subjects to state the names of those classmates with whom they would
like to perform the second run; and second, we asked them to state the rela-
tive performance level of their most-preferred peers. Note that we elicited all
preferences irrespective of the assigned treatment and used these preferences
to match students for the second run in two of the three treatments.
In addition to these preferences, the survey included sociodemographic ques-
tions and measures of personality and preferences: the Big Five inventory as
used in the youth questionnaire of the German socioeconomic panel (Weinhardt
and Schupp, 2011), a measure of the locus of control (Rotter, 1966), compet-
itiveness6, general risk attitude (Dohmen et al., 2011), and a short version of
the INCOM scale for social comparison (Gibbons and Buunk, 1999; Schneider
and Schupp, 2011). The survey concluded by eliciting the social network within
every class. Subjects were asked to state their six closest friends within the class
and indicate the intensity of their friendship on a seven-point Likert scale.
6We implemented a novel continuous measure of competitiveness using a four-item scale.
For this, we asked subjects about their agreement to the following four statements on a seven-
point Likert scale: (i) “I am a person that likes to compete with others”, (ii) “I am a person that
gets motivated through competition”, (iii) “I am a person who performs better when competing
with somebody”, and (iv) “I am a person that feels uncomfortable in competitive situations” and
extracted a single principal component factor from those four items, of which the fourth item was
scaled reversely.
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Before and after the second run, we asked students a short set of questions
about their peer and their experience during the task. Before the run, we elicited
their belief about the relative performance of their peer in the first run, namely
who they thought was faster. Following the second run, we asked them whether
they would rather run alone or in pairs the next time, how much fun they had as
well as how pressured they felt in the second run due to their peer on a five-point
Likert scale.
5.2.2 Preference elicitation
We elicited two sets of peer preferences, independent of the treatment to which
a subject is assigned. The first set elicited those for situations in which social
information is available (name-based preferences). Accordingly, we asked each
student to state his or her six most-preferred peers from the same gender within
their class, i.e., those people with whom they would like to be paired in the
second run. They could select any person of the same gender, irrespective of
this person’s actual participation in the study or their attendance in class.7 These
classmates had to be ranked, creating a partial ranking of their potential peers.
Second, we elicited preferences solely based on the relative performance
in the first run, ignoring the identities of the potential running partners
(performance-based preferences). For this purpose, we presented subjects ten cat-
egories consisting of one-second intervals starting from (4,5] seconds slower
than their own performance in the first run, to (0,1] seconds slower and (0,1]
seconds faster up to (4,5] seconds faster. They had to indicate from which time
interval they would prefer a peer for the second run, irrespective of the poten-
tial peer’s identity. Similar to the name-based preferences, we elicited a partial
ranking for those performance-based preferences. Accordingly, subjects had to
indicate their most-preferred relative time interval, second most-preferred rela-
tive time interval and so on.8
5.2.3 Treatments
We exogenously varied how pairs in the second run are formed by implementing
one of three matching rules at the class level, where pairs are only formed within
genders. The first rule matched students randomly, i.e., we employed a random
matching (Random). This condition serves as a natural baseline treatment.
7 All subjects were informed that peers in the second run would always have the same gender
as themselves and would also need to participate in the study.
8Naturally, each time interval could only be chosen once in the preference elicitation, but
each interval could potentially include several peers if several subjects had similar times and thus
belonged to the same interval. Similarly, some intervals may not contain any peers if no subject
in the class had a corresponding time.
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The second matching rule used the elicited name-based preferences (Name)
and the third rule formed pairs based on the elicited performance-based prefer-
ences (Performance). Note that the problem of matching pairs constitutes a
typical roommate problem. We thus implemented the “stable roommate” algo-
rithm proposed by Irving (1985) to form stable pairs using the elicited prefer-
ences.9
Subjects did not know the specific matching algorithm, but were only told
that their preferences would be taken into account when forming pairs. We in-
formed subjects about the existence of all three matching rules in the survey to
elicit both sets of preferences irrespective of the implemented treatment. Just be-
fore the second run took place, they were informed about the specific matching
rule employed in their class and the resulting pairs.
In addition, we conducted an additional control treatment (NoPeer) in
which students ran alone twice and which featured a shortened survey but was
otherwise identical to the other treatments.10 As this only serves the purpose of
excluding learning as a source of time improvements between the two runs, we
exclude it from the main analysis and focus only on the evaluation of different
peer assignment rules.
5.2.4 Procedures
We conducted the experiment in physical education lessons at three secondary
schools in Germany.11 All students from grades 7 to 10 (corresponding to age
12 to 16) of those schools were invited to participate in the experiment.
Approximately two weeks prior to the experiment, teachers distributed
parental consent forms. These forms contained a brief, very general description
of the experiment. Only those students who handed in the parental consent
before the study took place participated in the study.
9Given the mechanism proposed by Irving (1985), it is a (weakly) dominant strategy for all
participants to reveal their true preferences. The matching algorithm requires a full ranking of all
potential peers to implement a matching. Since we only elicited a partial ranking, we randomly
filled the preferences for each student to generate a full ranking. However, in most cases subjects
were assigned a peer according to one of their first three preferences. Nonetheless, if groups were
small, it could be the case that subjects were not assigned one of their most-preferred peers. This
is especially the case for performance-based preferences. See also the discussion in section 5.3.1
below.
10 The survey asked students for their preferences for peers, socio-demographics, and their
social network. Moreover, in order to avoid deception, we told students in advance that they
would run alone both times.
11 Physical education lessons in most German secondary school last two regular lessons of 45
minutes each, thus about 90 minutes in total. At the third school, lessons only lasted 60 minutes
for most classes. In order to conduct the experiment in the same manner as at the other schools,
we were allowed to extend the lessons by 10 to 15 minutes. This was sufficient to complete the
experiment.
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The experiment started with a brief explanation of the following lesson and
demonstration of the experimental task. We informed students that their teacher
would receive each student’s times from both runs, but no information about the
pairings during the second run.12 The students themselves did not receive any
information on their performance until the completion of the experiment. We
did not incentivize students with monetary rewards. Instead, we stressed that
the objective was to run as fast as possible in both runs. Moreover, teachers
used the times in their own class evaluation and students themselves were also
interested in their own times.13 The introduction concluded with a short warm-
up period. After this, the subjects were led to a location outside of the gym.
Students entered into the gym individually. Thus, any potential audience
effects from classmates being present were ruled out by design. Students com-
pleted the first suicide run and subsequently were handed a laptop to answer
the survey. Answering the survey took place in a separate room.14 After the
completion of the survey, subjects returned the laptop to the experimenter and
waited with the other students outside the gym. Upon completion of the survey
by all students, they returned to the gym to receive further instructions for the
second run. In particular, we reminded the students of the existence of the three
matching rules, announced which rule was implemented in their class and the
resulting pairs from the matching process. Following these instructions, the en-
tire group waited again outside the gym. Pairs were called into the gym and both
students participated in the second run simultaneously on neighboring tracks.
After all pairs had finished their second suicide run, the experiment con-
cluded with a short statement by the experimenters thanking the students for
their participation. The teacher received a list of students’ times in both runs and
students were informed about their performance. We then asked the teacher to
evaluate the general atmosphere within the class.15
12Of course, some teachers were present in the gym. In principle, they could observe the pair-
ings and therefore reconstruct the resulting pairs. However, none of the teachers made notes
about the pairings or asked for them.
13Note that this resembles many real-life settings with individual tasks, where individuals are
not explicitly incentivized either.
14 At least one experimenter was present at all stages of the experiment to answer questions
and limit communication between subjects to a minimum.
15 Teachers indicated their agreement to three statements on a seven-point Likert scale: (1)
“The class atmosphere is very good”, (2) “Some students get excluded from the group”, (3) “Stu-
dents stick together when it really matters”.
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5.3 Data description and manipulation check
We present summary statistics of the students in our sample in Table 5.1.16 In
total, 627 students participated in the treatments, with 66% being female.17,18
This corresponds to a participation rate of 73%.19
On average, female students took 27.57 seconds (SD of 2.50 seconds) in
the first run. Their performance is quite stable across all grades, with students
from the seventh grade being somewhat slower. Male students’ times decreased
with age: while male students in grade 7 took on average 25.33 seconds in the
first run, their performance improved to 23.27 seconds on average in grade 10.
In the following, we control for these effects by including gender-specific grade
fixed effects in all of our regressions. Independent of their treatment assignment,
males and females improved their performance in the second run by .78 seconds
and .85 seconds on average, respectively.
We randomized classes into treatment and check whether observable char-
acteristics differ between our treatments in Appendix Table 5.A.1. There are
no observable differences across treatments for most variables, except for a dif-
ference in the pre-treatment times in the first run. However, this gap can be
explained entirely by variation in observables. Conditional on gender-specific
grade fixed effects, school fixed effects and age, these differences are no longer
significant.
5.3.1 Preferences for peers and manipulation check
Before turning to the results of the experiment, we briefly present the prefer-
ences for peers as elicited in the survey. Furthermore, we show that our peer
assignment based on those preferences indeed changed the actual match qual-
ity, which we define as the rank of the assigned peer in the elicited preference
16We focus on the students in the three main treatments, namely Random, Name and Per-
formance and do not include the students from the NoPeer treatment.
17We have more females in our sample since one school in our sample – the smallest one – was
a female-only school.
18 In classes with an odd number of students within a matching group, we dropped one par-
ticipant randomly to match students accordingly. Therefore, some students participated in the
experiment but were only recorded once and are dropped for estimating the treatment effects in
the next section.
19We aimed at recruiting all students of a class. However, due to numerous reasons this was
not possible in every class. Normally some students are missing on a given day due to sickness
or other reasons, are injured and cannot participate in the lesson, are not allowed to take part
in the study by their parents or do not want to participate. Additionally, some students simply
forgot to hand in the parental consent. We do not have concerns of non-random selection into the
study since students did not know in advance the exact day when the experiment was scheduled
and most reasons for non-participation were rather exogenous (like injuries or sickness). More-
over, treatment randomization was at the class level within schools and therefore selection into
treatments is not possible.
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Table 5.1. Summary statistics
7th grade 8th grade 9th grade 10th grade Total
Socio-Demographic Variables
Age 12.77 13.80 14.77 15.83 14.52
(0.48) (0.45) (0.39) (0.53) (1.22)
Female 0.60 0.60 0.66 0.72 0.66
(0.49) (0.49) (0.48) (0.45) (0.48)
Times (in sec)
Time 1 (Females) 28.03 27.06 27.31 27.83 27.57
(2.75) (2.06) (2.28) (2.71) (2.50)
Time 2 (Females) 26.98 26.46 26.47 26.94 26.72
(1.97) (1.74) (2.43) (2.37) (2.23)
Time 1 (Males) 25.33 24.23 23.71 23.27 24.09
(1.93) (1.99) (2.03) (2.18) (2.16)
Time 2 (Males) 24.62 23.58 22.85 22.35 23.31
(2.01) (1.99) (1.70) (1.50) (1.98)
Class-level Variables
# Students in class 25.54 26.00 26.25 25.03 25.68
(2.71) (1.96) (2.56) (3.17) (2.74)
Share of participating students 0.75 0.69 0.77 0.71 0.73
(0.11) (0.14) (0.16) (0.13) (0.14)
Share of Students in Treatments
Random 0.32 0.46 0.34 0.32 0.35
(0.47) (0.50) (0.47) (0.47) (0.48)
Name 0.37 0.25 0.37 0.35 0.34
(0.48) (0.43) (0.49) (0.48) (0.47)
Performance 0.32 0.29 0.29 0.33 0.31
(0.47) (0.46) (0.46) (0.47) (0.46)
Observations 123 124 182 198 627
Notes: Standard deviations are presented in parentheses. Note that some students only partici-
pated in the survey in cases in which they were allowed to participate in the study but were unable
to take part in the regular physical education lesson, while some others only took part in the first
run if there was an odd number of students in the matching group. See the text for details.
rankings. This means that students in the self-selected treatments have a higher
probability of being matched with someone who they prefer more, i.e., who
ranks higher in their name- or performance-based preferences. Hence, our ex-
perimental variation of taking the preferences into account should have an effect
on the rank of the assigned peers within a subject’s preferences (i.e., the quality
of that match) in the respective treatment with self-selection.
Table 5.2. Share of name-based preferences being friends
Name-based Preference 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th overall
Share of peers being friends 0.89 0.79 0.73 0.60 0.49 0.41 0.65
Notes: This table presents the share of friends for each name-based preference (most-preferred
peer to sixth most-preferred peer as well as pooled over all six preferences) as elicited in the
survey.
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Figure 5.2. Most-preferred performance-based peer
Notes: The figure presents a histogram of the peer preferences over relative performance as
elicited in the survey. Vertical lines indicate own time (black line; equals zero by definition) and
the mean preference of all individuals (red line; 0.56 sec faster on average, where we used the
midpoint of each interval to calculate the mean).
We summarize the preferences for peers according to name- and
performance-based preferences in Table 5.2 and Figure 5.2, respectively. Two
findings emerge: first, most students nominate friends as their most-preferred
peer; and second, while students prefer to run on average with a slightly faster
peer, there is strong heterogeneity in this preference. We analyze the determi-
nants of these preferences as well as how these two preference measures relate
to each other in more detail in Kiessling et al. (2018).20
Figure 5.3 shows the realized match quality for all three treatments with
respect to the ranking of peers in the two sets of elicited preferences. The upper
panel shows the realized match quality according to name-based preferences.
We observe that some people are randomly matched to someone they would
like to be paired with in Random and Performance. As expected, this share is
rather low. While the median peer in Name corresponds to the most-preferred
peer according to the elicited name-based preferences, the median peer is not
part of the elicited preferences (i.e., not among the six most-preferred peers)
for Random and Performance. A similar, albeit less pronounced picture arises
when analyzing the match quality according to the preferences over relative
performance as presented in the lower panel of Figure 5.3. We observe that
students in Performance are paired with more preferred peers according to
their preferences relative to the other two treatments. However, note that sub-
jects may prefer other students or relative times that are not available to them,
20 In Appendix 5.B, we also show that the rankings of preferred name- and performance-based
peers measure two distinct sets of preferences mitigating concerns that the two peer measures
correspond to the same underlying preference.
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Figure 5.3. Match quality across treatments
Notes: The figure presents a histogram of match qualities for each treatment measured by the rank
of the realized peer in an individual’s name- (upper panel) or performance-based preferences
(lower panels). Vertical red lines denote median ranks.
which mechanically affects the match quality. Moreover, to match students in
Performance, the preferences need to exhibit sufficient heterogeneity. We dis-
cuss these issues in more detail in Appendices 5.B and 5.C and show that suffi-
cient heterogeneity in preferences exists to match students successfully.
5.4 Empirical Strategy
This section outlines our empirical framework. For this purpose, we first analyze
the effect of being assigned to a particular peer assignment mechanism. In a
second step, we decompose this change in performance into two effects – an
indirect effect stemming from a change in the peer composition and a direct
effect due to self-selection – before we show how to allow for heterogeneities
in the direct effect depending on the rank within a pair. In Appendix 5.D, we
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show how to derive these estimation equations from an economic model similar
to the mediation analysis as described in Heckman and Pinto (2015).
The random assignment of classes into treatments allows us to estimate the
average effect of peer selection on performance. Let Dd = 1 with d ∈ {N , P}
denote treatment assignment to Name and Performance, respectively, and
zero otherwise. Our baseline specification for an outcome yi gs of individual i
in gender-specific grade g of school s is therefore given by:
yi gs = τ + τ
NDNi + τ
PDPi + γX i + ρs + λg + ui gs (5.1)
The main parameters of interest are τN and τP , the effect of being assigned to
one of our treatments relative to Random. School fixed effects, ρs, and gender-
specific grade fixed effects, λg , control for variation due to different schools (i.e.,
due to different locations and timing of the experiment) and variation specific
to gender and grades.21 Finally, X i is a vector of predetermined characteristics
such as age as well as personality characteristics and in some specifications class-
level control variables, and ui gs is a mean zero error term clustered at the class
level.
Any change in outcomes can be attributed to one of two main sources: first,
different peer-assignmentmechanismsmay affect peer interactions directly; and
second, self-selection may change the peers and therefore the difference be-
tween the student’s and his or her peer’s characteristics. We therefore decom-
pose the average treatment effect into a direct effect of self-selection as well as
a pure peer composition effect.22 This takes into account the change in relative
peer characteristics across treatments. We implement this decomposition using
the following specification:
yi gs = τ¯ + τ¯
NDNi + τ¯
PDPi + βθi + γX i + ρs + λg + ui gs (5.2)
We are interested in τ¯N and τ¯P , the direct effects of our treatments relative to
Random. Changes in peer characteristics are captured by θi . In particular, we al-
low our effects to be mediated by the quality of the match measured by the rank
of the peer in an individual’s preferences, ability differences and ranks withing
pairs, friendship ties and a set of personality and preference measures (i.e., Big
Five, locus of control, competitiveness, risk attitudes, social comparison).
21 See the section 5.3 for a discussion concerning why we include gender-specific grade fixed
effects rather than gender and grade fixed effects separately.
22 The direct effect mainly captures changes in motivation due to being able to self-select a
peer, but also inputs that (i) differ across treatments, and (ii) are not measured in our rich set
of potential mediators (match quality, friendship ties, ability differences, ranks and personality
differences).
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Finally, we analyze the heterogeneous direct effects of ranks within pairs to
analyze whether only certain individuals are reacting to our treatments using
yi gs = τ¯ + τ¯
N
h 1{ai≥a j}D
N
i + τ¯
N
l 1{ai<a j}D
N
i (5.3)
+ τ¯Ph1{ai≥a j}D
P
i + τ¯
P
l 1{ai<a j}D
P
i + βθi + γX i + ρs + λg + ui gs
The indicator 1{ai≥a j} denotes whether subject i was of higher ability (e.g., faster
in the first run) than her or his peer j, and 1{ai<a j} equals one if i was of lower
ability. We interact this rank indicator with the treatment indicators Ddi (d ∈
{N , P}) to analyze whether the direct effect depends on the rank within a pair.
5.5 Results
Our experimental design allows us to study the causal effect of different peer
assignment mechanisms on individual performance. Two of these assignment
rules use the preferences for peers elicited in the survey to form pairs and there-
fore allow for the self-selection of peers. More specifically, the three treatments
correspond to random matching (Random), matching based on self-selected
peers using name-based peer preferences (Name) and using preferences over
relative performance (Performance). As outlined in section 5.2, the random
assignment of peers constitutes a natural starting point for at least two reasons:
first, the pure presence of any peer might already improve performance; and
second, randomly assigned peers are used to document peer effects in a wide
range of settings (e.g., Falk and Ichino, 2006; Guryan et al., 2009). We contrast
this baseline condition with two treatments that assign peers based on elicited
preferences, i.e., in which subjects endogenously choose their peer.
5.5.1 Average eect of self-selection on performance
We analyze how average performance improvements differ between treatments.
We use percentage points improvements as outcomes and therefore base our
comparisons on the baseline performance in the first run. This specification takes
into account the notion that slower students (i.e., those with a higher time in
the first run) can improve more easily by the same absolute value compared to
faster students, as it is physically easier for the former.
Figure 5.4 presents our main result. Subjects in Random improve on aver-
age by 1.93 percentage points during their second run. However, performance
improves even more in Name and Performance by 3.22 and 3.58 percent-
age points, respectively. We present the corresponding estimates in Table 5.3.
Columns (1)-(3) present the estimated percentage point improvements in time
according to equation 5.1. Columns (3)-(7) express the results additionally in
terms of (standardized) times in the second run controlling for times in the first
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Figure 5.4. Average performance improvements
Notes: The figure presents percentage point improvements from the first to the second run with
corresponding standard errors for the three treatments Random, Name, and Performance cor-
responding to column (1) in Table 5.3. We control for gender, grade and school fixed effects as
well as age and cluster standard errors at the class level.
Table 5.3. Average treatment eects
(a) Percentage Point Imprv. (b) Time (Second Run)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Name 1.26*** 1.37*** 1.84*** -0.38*** -0.38*** -0.48*** -0.14***
(0.43) (0.50) (0.46) (0.11) (0.12) (0.12) (0.04)
Performance 1.67** 1.69** 1.28** -0.41*** -0.38*** -0.31** -0.15***
(0.62) (0.65) (0.60) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.05)
Time (First run) 0.69*** 0.67*** 0.71*** 0.74***
(0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04)
Class-level Controls No No Yes No No Yes No
Own Characteristics No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No
Gender-Grade/School FEs, Age Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 588 585 515 588 585 515 588
R2 .056 .08 .096 .8 .81 .83 .8
p-value: Name vs. Performance .51 .62 .38 .8 .98 .28 .8
Notes: This table presents least squares regressions according to equation 5.1 using percentage
point improvements (panel (a)) and times of the second run controlling for times in the first
run (panel (b)) as the dependent variable. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1
percent level. Standard errors in parentheses and clustered at the class level. Own characteristics
include the Big 5, locus of control, social comparison, competitiveness and risk attitudes. Class-
level control variables in columns (3) and (6) include the share of participating students, three
variables to capture the atmosphere within a class (missing for four classes), and indicators for
the size of the matching group. Column (7) uses standardized times.
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run to confirm these effects in times rather than percentage point improvements.
Assigning peers based on name-based preferences results in an additional 1.26
percentage point improvement in performance relative to the random assign-
ment of peers. The coefficient for performance-based matching is 1.67 percent-
age points and thus somewhat larger, but it does not differ significantly from
Name. These effects persist when controlling for students’ own personal charac-
teristics (column (2)) as well as if we additionally control for class-level variables
capturing the atmosphere within a class (column (3)). Our baseline effects cor-
respond to additional time improvements of .38 to .41 seconds and account for
14% of a standard deviation in Name and 15% in Performance (cf. columns
(4)-(7)).23
In Appendix 5.E, we show that the observed performance improvements are
due to the presence of peers and not due to learning. We present the results
of an additional control treatment (NoPeer) and its implementation details. In
the control treatment, subjects run twice without any peer and we find that they
do not improve their time from the first to the second run; in fact, individual
performance decreases. The improvements that we observe here can therefore
be attributed to the presence of peers rather than learning or familiarity with
the task.
5.5.2 Changes in the peer composition and the direct eect of
self-selection
As outlined in section 5.4, the estimated average treatment effects consist of
a direct effect due to self-selection and an indirect effect. The latter captures
changes in the relative characteristics of the peer (e.g., the time differences be-
tween the student and peer in the first run) due to the altered peer composition
induced by our treatments.24 In the following, we first document how Name
and Performance change the peer composition relative to Random, before an-
alyzing the extent to which this change in the peer composition can explain the
average treatment effect.
It is important to check for a change in the composition and the resulting
indirect effect as potentially not all peers are equally important. Suppose that
only interacting and comparing yourself with a friend leads to a change in perfor-
mance (e.g., Bandiera et al., 2009) and at the same time subjects only select their
friends in Name. Alternatively, suppose that peers only matter if they have a sim-
23 Appendix 5.F presents additional robustness checks using biased linear reduction standard
errors, controlling for outliers, and presents the average treatment effects for different subgroups.
Our results are robust to all of these checks.
24Note that only the relative characteristics within a pair can matter for a change in the perfor-
mance, given that we randomize subjects into treatments. Therefore, the overall distribution of
peer characteristics across treatments is similar and constant. Our treatments only change with
whom each student interacts.
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(b) Absolute Differences in Ability
Figure 5.5. Changes in peer composition
Notes: Figure 5.5a presents the share of all students who nominated their assigned peer as a
friend for each of the three treatments including standard errors. Figure 5.5b shows the average
absolute within-pair difference in ability (measured in times from the first run) and including
standard errors for each treatment. We control for gender, grade and school fixed effects as well
as age and cluster standard errors at the class level. We present the corresponding regressions
and highlight additional compositional differences of the treatments in Appendix Table 5.C.1.
ilar performance and at the same time subjects more commonly select someone
with a similar performance in Performance. Potentially, our treatments would
simply change the likelihood of interacting with such a person (i.e., change the
peer composition between treatments) and these changes would explain the
average treatment effect.
Figure 5.5 shows that our treatments indeed changed the peer composi-
tion with respect to two prime examples of relative peer characteristics, namely
friendship ties and ability differences within pairs. Even though students could
mainly target peers along these two dimensions, we present how our treatments
affect the peer composition along various other characteristics in Appendix Ta-
ble 5.C.1. More specifically, Figure 5.5a shows that students are predominantly
paired with friends in Name (76% of all peers are friends), whereas the share of
peers being friends in Random and Performance is 49% and 37%, respectively.
As matching based on preferences over relative performance (Performance)
allows for targeting other students with a similar or slightly higher ability, the
students’ absolute time differences in the first run might change. Panel B of Fig-
ure 5.5b confirms this by showing that the average absolute difference in times
from the first run is 1.53 seconds in Performance, while it is greater than two
seconds in the other two treatments (2.24 and 2.16 seconds in Random and
Name).
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While the existing literature to date has mainly concentrated on the influ-
ence of peers with respect to ability and friendship ties on performance, our
data allows us to go beyond this.25 In particular, we allow for a large set of
different personal characteristics (competitiveness, Big Five, Locus of control,
social comparison, and risk attitudes) to influence the performance.
Moreover, by having access to preferences over peers, we are able to include
the match quality of a peer as a potential mediator. For this purpose, we define
two indicators to measure whether the assigned peer is nominated among the
first three peers for name-based preferences or falls into the three highest ranked
categories for performance-based preferences.26
The results of the decomposition based on equation 5.2 are presented in
Table 5.4. Column (1) replicates the baseline estimates from column (2) of Ta-
ble 5.3 for means of comparison. In columns (2)-(5), we include different sets
of characteristics, before we allow all of them to mediate the direct effects in
column (6).
Only controlling for name-based and performance-based match quality or
friendship ties (column (2) and (3)) has little to no effect as the variables them-
selves have only small and insignificant effects on performance improvement.
Hence, the estimated direct effects closely resemble the average treatment ef-
fects. In column (4), we focus on ability differences and ranks within a pair.
Since faster and slower students within a pair might be affected differentially,
we allow the effect of ability differences, |∆Time1|, to differ by the rank within
a pair. We find that ability differences have a significant effect on both faster and
slower students within a pair. On the one hand, slower students within a pair
benefit strongly from running with a faster student, whereby a one-second differ-
ence in ability leads to a 1.03 percentage point improvement in the second run.
On the other hand, the performance of the relatively faster student suffers from
ability differences and their performance declines by .39 percentage points per
second. In sum, the average performance of a pair thus improves with increased
ability differences. However, the impact of ability differences does not mediate
the direct treatment effects. The estimated coefficient for Name remains stable,
and the effect for Performance even increases, implying that the indirect ef-
fect for Performance is negative. This is partially a consequence of the smaller
ability differences in Performance relative to Random as shown in Figure 5.5b
and the overall positive impact of ability differences.
In column (5), we analyze the direct effects if we include the similarity in
several personal characteristics of the two students of a pair. In contrast to abil-
ity differences and friendship ties, personality characteristics could not be tar-
25 Two notable exceptions include Chan and Lam (2015) and Golsteyn et al. (2017), who study
how peer personality traits affect one’s own performance.
26 Appendix Table 5.G.3 also controls for match quality in a flexible way. The results remain
qualitatively and quantitatively similar.
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Table 5.4. Decomposition of treatment eects
Percentage Point Improvements
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Baseline Match Qual. Friend Time Diff. Personality All
Direct Effects
Name 1.37*** 1.36** 1.48*** 1.35*** 1.36*** 1.26**
(0.50) (0.54) (0.52) (0.46) (0.44) (0.47)
Performance 1.69** 1.74** 1.66** 1.84*** 2.03*** 2.18***
(0.65) (0.69) (0.66) (0.61) (0.69) (0.68)
Peer Characteristics
High Match Qual. (name-based) 0.04 0.56
(0.45) (0.42)
High Match Qual. (perf.-based) -0.19 -0.07
(0.48) (0.45)
Peer is friend -0.38 -0.61
(0.40) (0.46)
Faster Student × |∆Time 1| -0.39*** -0.35**
(0.14) (0.14)
Slower Student × |∆Time 1| 1.03*** 1.07***
(0.21) (0.19)
Slower Student in Pair -0.17 -0.14
(0.45) (0.46)
Abs. Diff. in Personality No No No No Yes Yes
Own Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Gender-Grade/School FEs, Age Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 585 585 585 585 582 582
R2 .08 .081 .082 .24 .11 .27
p-value: Name vs. Performance .62 .58 .8 .43 .32 .19
Indirect Effect (Name) .1
Indirect Effect (Performance) -.49
Notes: This table presents least squares regressions according to equation 5.2 using percentage
point improvements as the dependent variable. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and
1 percent level. Standard errors in parentheses and clustered at the class level. High match quality
is an indicator equaling one if the partner was ranked within the first three preferences according
to his or her name- or performance-based preferences. Own characteristics include the Big Five,
locus of control, social comparison, competitiveness and risk attitudes. Absolute differences in
personality include the difference in those. The last two rows quantify the indirect effect forName
and Performance given by the combining the change in peer composition across treatments (cf.
Appendix Table 5.C.1) with the corresponding compositional effects of these characteristics in
column (6). Further robustness checks are relegated to the Appendix.
geted easily in the preference elicitation. Nonetheless, subjects could have cho-
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sen peers with certain personality characteristics indirectly in both treatments.
However, the treatment effects remain stable if we control for those characteris-
tics.
Finally, we control for all of these mediators simultaneously in column (6).
The effects of the peer characteristics are in line with what we have discussed
above. In the last two rows of the table, we quantify the indirect effect as the
change in the coefficient of Name and Performance when controlling for the
peer composition (column (1) vs (6)). This corresponds to multiplying the coef-
ficients from column (6) with the change in the peer composition across treat-
ments. We describe these changes in Appendix Table 5.C.1.
In Name, we estimate a positive indirect effect of .10 percentage point im-
provements. This means that the altered peer characteristics have only a slightly
positive effect on the students’ performance. The direct effect is 1.26 percentage
points and therefore somewhat smaller than the average effect, but not signifi-
cantly different (Wald test, p-value = 0.66). For Performance, we observe an
indirect effect of -.49 percentage points. Therefore, the change in the peer com-
position suppresses improvements in Performance. The direct effect is 2.18
percentage points and it significantly differs from the average effect (Wald test,
p-value = 0.029). The magnitude of the direct effects is more than five times
that of the indirect effects.27
Our analysis suggests that self-selection improves individual performance di-
rectly and not due to a change in the peer composition. This means that subjects
react to observationally similar peers differently once they have chosen them
actively. The direct effect could stem from an additional motivational value of
self-selection, as the comparison and interaction with self-selected peers might
become more important. In principle, a compositional change in unobserved
characteristics – that is not measured by those included in our analysis and dif-
fers across treatments – could still account for the direct effects. However, the
effect would have to be at least five times the size of the measured indirect effect.
Hence, implementing self-selection of peers has likely changed the social in-
teraction in both treatments, either directly or by changing the influence of peer
characteristics. In the next section, we present evidence that students perceive
the peer interactions across treatments differently to bolster this interpretation.
27We present additional robustness checks in Appendix 5.G. In Table 5.G.1, we show that
match quality itself has no influence in Random. Being paired randomly with a preferred peer
does not increase performance. Furthermore, Table 5.G.2 presents the robustness of the direct
effects to using only those subjects in Random who are matched in line with their preferences.
These matches occurred by pure chance and not due to self-selection. Finally, we document in
Table 5.G.3 that the piecewise-linear specification of ability differences and the definition of the
high matching quality indicator are not restrictive by including interval fixed effects for each one-
second interval of ability differences and fixed effects for each rank of the name- and performance-
based preference ranking, respectively. Additionally, this table also shows that conditioning on
class-level variables does not alter our results.
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5.5.3 Markers for changed social interactions
In this section, we study the effects of our treatments on students’ experience
during the tasks. Our experiment features a small post-experimental question-
naire, in which we elicited how much peer pressure students experienced and
how much fun they had during the second run.28 In order to analyze the effects
of the treatments on these two variables, Table 5.5 presents estimates for the
direct effects of our treatments based on equation 5.2 using standardized mea-
sures of pressure and fun as outcome variables. Here, we control for times in
the second rather than the first run for two reasons: first, these measures are
elicited after the second run; and second, a tight race could increase pressure
across all treatments.
Students in Performance experience significantly more pressure from their
peer in the second run than students in Random and Name. Therefore, select-
ing peers based on preferences over relative performance seems to change the
experience of social interactions. Note the differential effects of absolute time dif-
ference for slower and faster students within a pair on pressure: whereas slower
students are always pressured to a similar degree, the pressure experienced by
faster students in a pair decreases with the margin of winning.
Focusing on fun in the second run, we do not find any significant direct
effects (see panel (b) of Table 5.5). However, we observe a significant nega-
tive effect on time differences in the second run for the slower student. Fun
decreases for the slower peer with increasing distance to the peer. Combined
with the zero effect of finishing second, we conclude that it is not losing per se
that affects fun, but rather the margin of losing. Furthermore, the absence of di-
rect effects alleviates a potential concern that knowledge of all three treatments
leads to disappointment when students are assigned to Random, namely when
they are unable to select their peer themselves.29 If those students were more
disappointed, this might lead to smaller improvements by students in Random
compared to the two other treatments. If disappointment had driven the results,
we would have expected students in Random to have significantly less fun.30
28We elicited the peer pressure measure only at one of the three schools. Therefore, we have
fewer observations for this variable.
29One might also argue that this also describes a feature of real-world settings. Imagine that
you are randomly assigned a partner from a group of available people. Even if you have not
explicitly been asked with whom you would have liked to interact, you still have preferences
about interacting with certain people. Therefore, disappointment could also play a role in these
settings. This might be true for all settings that feature exogenous assignment and overrule the
underlying preferences of the people involved.
30 A similar argument could be that our treatment effects are due to reciprocity or some kind
of Hawthorne or John Henry effect, i.e., students perceive being in one or the other treatment
as positive or negative. See Aldashev et al. (2017) for a discussion how this can bias treatment
effects. If subjects perceive treatment assignment as being kind or unkind, we should observe
some kind of reaction in the fun variable. As this is not the case, it is unlikely that the effects are
due to this reason.
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Table 5.5. Post-experimental questions
(a) Pressure (std.). (b) Fun (std.)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Direct Effects
Name 0.24 0.10 0.14* -0.01
(0.20) (0.18) (0.08) (0.10)
Performance 0.32 0.46** -0.10 -0.10
(0.20) (0.15) (0.07) (0.08)
Faster Student (2nd Run) × Match Quality (name-based) 0.28 0.30**
(0.35) (0.14)
Slower Student (2nd Run) × Match Quality (name-based) 0.33 0.07
(0.28) (0.17)
Faster Student (2nd Run) × Match Quality (perf.-based) 0.01 0.07
(0.33) (0.11)
Slower Student (2nd Run) × Match Quality (perf.-based) -0.16 0.22*
(0.27) (0.12)
Faster Student (2nd Run) × Peer is friend -0.14 0.12
(0.44) (0.13)
Slower Student (2nd Run) × Peer is friend -0.03 0.15
(0.35) (0.15)
Faster Student (2nd Run) × |∆Time 2| -0.25** -0.01
(0.08) (0.04)
Slower Student (2nd Run) × |∆Time 2| 0.10 -0.14***
(0.09) (0.04)
Slower Student in Pair (2nd Run) -0.25 0.04
(0.26) (0.18)
Gender/Grade/School FEs, Age Yes Yes Yes Yes
Own and Peer Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes
Abs. Diff. in Personality No Yes No Yes
N 161 161 582 582
R2 .2 .32 .28 .34
p-value (Name vs. Performance) .72 .17 .03 .46
Notes: This table presents least squares regressions according to equation 5.2 using the standard-
ized survey measure of pressure (Panel (a)) or fun (Panel (b)) as the dependent variable. *, **,
and *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level. Standard errors in parentheses
and clustered at the class level. Own characteristics include the Big Five, locus of control, social
comparison, competitiveness and risk attitudes. Absolute differences in personality include the
difference in those. Match quality equals one if a student’s peer is among his three most-preferred
peers according to his name- or performance-based preferences. Note that the faster/slower stu-
dent is defined according to relative times in the second run.
Hence, while we find increased pressure for subjects in Performance, we
do not find any differences in fun students report across treatments. This sup-
ports the notion that the social interaction has changed at least in the pressure
domain.
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5.5.4 Do treatments change the within-pair interaction?
In order to deepen our understanding of differences across the two treatments
allowing for self-selection, we estimate heterogeneous direct treatment effects
with respect to the individual rank within a pair. In the previous sections, we
have already shown that students with different ranks within a pair (i.e., being
the faster or the slower student) react differentially in terms of both performance
and how they perceive the running task. To better understand the influence of
ranks and the difference of our treatments, we first focus on the heterogeneity
of the direct effect with respect to the ability rank within a pair. We then proceed
to look at absolute differences in times of the second run.
Column (1) of Table 5.6 replicates specification (6) of Table 5.4. In column
(2), we allow the direct effect of our treatments to differ by rank according to
equation 5.3. Self-selection yields a positive direct effect for all students inde-
pendent of their rank in Performance. In Name, only slower students within
a pair exhibit significant direct effects compared to Random. Faster students
within a pair are unaffected in Name. This shows that selection on names moti-
vates slower students to catch up with their faster peers. By contrast, selection
on relative performance causes both students to improve their performance.
The observed within-pair interaction has direct consequences for the differ-
ence in performance levels across treatments. As the slower student within a
pair drives the direct effect in Name, we expect a decrease in the within-pair
difference in levels in Name. In Table 5.7, we analyze the absolute within-pair
time difference in the second run. In column (1), we calculate the average treat-
ment effect for these differences and show that they are significantly smaller for
both treatments allowing for self-selection. In column (2), we decompose this
effect again in a direct and indirect one using pair-level mediators, i.e., absolute
time difference in the first run, friendship indicators and absolute differences
in personality characteristics. We find that lower absolute differences in Per-
formance are an artifact of the changed peer composition and therefore due to
the selection mechanism (i.e., lower absolute differences in ability), while we
observe a direct convergence effect for Name.
Although the direct effect of self-selection in both treatments is similar in
sign and magnitude, the two treatments induce distinct interaction patterns
within pairs. While in Name only the slower student within a pair drives the
direct effect, all students improve due to self-selection in Performance. We
also observe a similar convergence in performance levels across both treatments
with self-selection. However, this result is due to the selection mechanism in Per-
formance and due to the interaction in Name. In combination with the results
in section 5.5.3, these heterogeneous effects show that our treatments work
through different channels and thereby affect the subjects differently.
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Table 5.6. Rank heterogeneity within pairs
Percentage point imprv.
(1) (2)
Direct Effects
Name 1.24** 0.58
(0.49) (0.61)
Performance 2.22*** 2.15***
(0.68) (0.69)
Name × Slower Student in Pair 1.35*
(0.70)
Performance × Slower Student in Pair 0.15
(0.65)
Faster Student × Match Quality (name-based) 0.53 0.82
(0.43) (0.49)
Slower Student × Match Quality (name-based) 0.49 0.16
(0.66) (0.65)
Faster Student × Match Quality (perf.-based) 0.49 0.51
(0.52) (0.52)
Slower Student × Match Quality (perf.-based) -0.65 -0.62
(0.65) (0.63)
Faster Student × Peer is friend -1.18** -1.13**
(0.49) (0.48)
Slower Student × Peer is friend 0.11 0.06
(0.66) (0.67)
Faster Student × |∆Time 1| -0.32** -0.31*
(0.15) (0.15)
Slower Student × |∆Time 1| 1.02*** 1.01***
(0.20) (0.20)
Slower Student in Pair -0.21 -0.34
(0.70) (0.77)
Abs. Diff. in Personality Yes Yes
Own Characteristics Yes Yes
Gender-Grade/School FEs, Age Yes Yes
N 582 582
R2 .28 .28
p-value (Name vs. Performance) .16 .028
Notes: This table presents least squares regressions according to equation 5.3 using percentage
point improvements as the dependent variable. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and
1 percent level. Standard errors in parentheses and clustered at the class level. Own characteris-
tics include the Big Five, locus of control, social comparison, competitiveness and risk attitudes.
Absolute differences in personality include the difference in those. Match quality equals one if a
student’s peer is among his three most-preferred peers according to his name- or performance-
based preferences.
5.5.5 Implications for targeting individuals
Our results show that the process of self-selection has a heterogeneous impact
on the subjects depending on the rank within a pair. However, a policy maker
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Table 5.7. Convergence of performance within pairs
|∆Time2|
(1) (2)
Name -0.48*** -0.37***
(0.16) (0.13)
Performance -0.36* -0.20
(0.20) (0.21)
|∆Time 1| 0.49***
(0.07)
Friendship Indicator -0.44***
(0.13)
Abs. Diff. in Personality No Yes
Gender/Grade/School FEs Yes Yes
N 294 291
R2 .07 .52
p-value: Name vs. Performance .52 .41
Mean in Random 1.7 1.7
Notes: This table presents least squares regressions using absolute differences of times in the
second run as the dependent variable. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1
percent level. Standard errors in parentheses and clustered at the class level. Additional peer
composition controls include absolute differences of personality characteristics of subjects and
their peers (Big Five, locus of control, social comparison, competitiveness, risk attitudes).
might not only be interested in the changed interaction within pairs, but rather
they might target specific groups of individuals to improve their performance,
irrespective of direct or indirect effects driving these improvements. For this
purpose, we look at the heterogeneity in average treatment effects conditional
on ability and simulate the effects of other rules employing exogenous peer
assignment.
Figure 5.6 presents percentage point improvements of low-, medium- and
high-ability subjects across the three assignment rules.31 Across all treatments,
the performance improvements decrease when ability increases but remain pos-
itive even for high-ability students. This mainly stems from the positive effect of
ability differences for slower students within a pair and negative effect for faster
ones.32
Although this decreasing pattern holds for all three treatments, there are
some differences. Low-ability students in Random show large improvements of
31 The corresponding regressions as well as alternative specifications are presented in Appendix
Table 5.H.1. Low, medium and high ability are defined according to terciles of times in the first
run within each school, grade and gender.
32 Table 5.6 shows that a one-second ability difference improves performance by 1.06 percent-
age points for slower students within a pair and reduces the faster students’ performance by .34
percentage points.
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Figure 5.6. Heterogeneity by own ability
Notes: The figure presents percentage point improvements and standard errors for the three treat-
ments Random (dark gray), Name (gray), and Performance (light gray) by ability terciles. We
control for gender, grade and school fixed effects as well as for age and cluster standard errors
at the class level. The corresponding regressions are presented in Appendix Table 5.H.1.
4.77 percentage points (p-value < 0.01), while medium- and high-ability stu-
dents do not improve significantly (.96 and .36 percentage points with p-values
of .30 and .31, respectively). All students across the ability distribution improve
more in Name than in Random by 1.02 (p-value = 0.28), 2.00 (p-value = 0.05)
and 1.01 percentage points (p-value = 0.04) for low-, medium- and high-ability
students. By contrast, Performance does not help low-ability students relative
to Random (.20 percentage points decrease, p-value = 0.86) but benefits stu-
dents from the upper two terciles of the ability distribution by 2.57 (p-value =
0.02) and 2.16 (p-value < 0.01) percentage points. Overall, the performance
improvements are more equally distributed across different levels of ability.
The treatments therefore target different groups of individuals. Low-ability
students benefit most from name-based matching, whereas students with higher
ability show the largest improvements when matched using preference over rel-
ative performance. Policy makers can therefore use different peer assignment
rules to benefit specific groups of individuals.
The previous sections and the patterns in Figure 5.6 imply that individual
improvements are largely determined by the interplay of the peer – especially
his or her relative ability – and the treatment. Table 5.6 shows that mainly the
slower students within a pair improve in Name, while both improve similarly in
Performance compared to the random assignment of peers. Low-ability stu-
dents benefit most from this as they are more likely to be paired with faster
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Figure 5.7. Simulation of other peer assignment rules
Notes: The figure presents predicted percentage point improvements for the three treat-
ments (Name, Performance and Random) as well as three simulated peer-assignment rules
(Equidistance, High-to-Low and Tracking). We fix the personal characteristics and other co-
variates not at the pair level to 0, whereby effect sizes are therefore not directly comparable to
treatment effects above. More details are provided in the text and Appendix 5.I.
students. This effect is amplified compared to Performance as this treatment
results in pairs with smaller ability differences relative to the other two treat-
ments.33 Note that this only results in a positive effect for low-ability students
in Name if these students choose faster students and are subsequently matched
with them, a condition that is satisfied in our setting (see Appendix Table 5.H.2).
This implies that the choice of a peer by an individual carries greater weight
for individual improvements in treatment Name than in Performance, as the
former only benefits slower students in a pair whereas the latter benefits both
students. This might also help to understand the absence of improvements for
low-ability students in Carrell et al. (2013) as students in their setting might not
have chosen high-ability students as relevant peers.
While we have shown that self-selected peers improve aggregate perfor-
mance compared to randomly assigned ones, in many situations peers are not
assigned at random but rather in line with a specific matching rule. Schools
employ tracking (e.g., Duflo et al., 2011) or pair high-ability students with low-
ability ones (e.g., Carrell et al., 2013). We can use our estimates to simulate the
33 Figure 5.6b shows that the ability differences are indeed lower in Performance. These
lower ability differences translate into smaller indirect effects for the pair and especially for the
slower peer. This is due to smaller ability differences reducing improvements for slower students
in a pair, which are not compensated by the effects on faster students. See the coefficients on
ability differences interacted with rank of a student in Table 5.6.
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effect of such peer-assignment rules and compare their effect to the outcomes
under self-selection. From our estimates obtained in section 5.5.2, we know that
pairs with a higher difference in ability will improve their performance. If this
is the only characteristic of a peer that affects performance, aggregate perfor-
mance would be maximized as long as the sum of ability differences within a
pair is maximized.34 In order to compare the results of self-selection against
exogenous assignment rules that promise the largest aggregate improvements,
we consider two matching rules that maximize ability differences within pairs
(Equidistance and High-to-Low). Additionally, we look at the effect of track-
ing (i.e., pairing the best student with the second best, third with the fourth, etc.;
Tracking). We compare the predicted performance improvements for those
rules with our estimated performance improvements for the three assignment
rules used in the experiment.35
Figure 5.7 presents the simulated average performance improvements of
each assignment rule. The results show that no other peer-assignment rule is
able to reach similar performance improvements as those featuring self-selection.
In fact, they are close to the results from our random matching, since these stu-
dents under those peer assignment rules do not benefit from the additional mo-
tivational value of self-selection. More surprisingly, the reassignment rules that
maximize ability differences in pairs – Equidistance and High-to-Low – do
not improve average performance compared to the random assignment of peers.
Although both rules increase the average ability difference in pairs by construc-
tion and affect performance through this channel, those rules also change other
characteristics of the peer. The lack of any additional improvement implies that
these other changes in peer characteristics offset the positive effect of increased
ability differences.
In general, depending on the objectives such as targeting specific groups of
individuals, a policy maker such as a teacher might want to implement different
peer assignment mechanisms. While our treatments allowing for self-selected
peers seem to induce similar performance improvements on average, they affect
different individuals. Compared to Random, we observe performance improve-
ments across the entire ability distribution in Name, but only for higher-ability
students in Performance. Nonetheless, such peer assignments may come at
a cost, such as increased pressure in Performance (as documented in sec-
tion 5.5.3) or a large perturbation of individual ranks inName.36 Hence, a policy
maker might not only look at the resulting outcomes but also how different as-
signment rules affect the individuals’ overall well-being.
34 This holds true for all peer-assignment rules that match each student from the bottom half
of the ability distribution with a student from the top half.
35We provide details on the prediction of performance improvements and the peer assignment
rules in Appendix 5.I.
36We document this perturbation of ranks in the Appendix Table 5.H.3.
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5.6 Conclusion
Peer effects are an ever-present phenomenon discussed in a wide range of set-
tings across the social sciences. For many situations, identifying the effect of an
actively self-chosen peer is important beyond estimating peer effects in general.
Our framed field experiment introduces a novel way to study the self-selection of
peers in a controlled manner and is able to separate the impact of a specific peer
on a subject’s performance from the overall effect of self-selection. The results
of our experiment provide evidence that self-selecting peers yields performance
improvements of .14-.15 SD. These cannot be explained by indirect effects of a
differing peer composition; rather, they stem from a direct effect, correspond-
ing to a changed social interaction since students are able to select their partner
themselves. This implies that self-selected peers can serve as a substantial moti-
vator to improve performance.
Teachers or supervisors might be interested to leverage this direct effect of
self-selection. They may allow students to choose their study group themselves
or introduce flexible seating patterns in offices such that employees can self-
select their seat mates, office partners or colleagues. Since our results suggest
that self-selecting peers improves outcomes, the effectiveness of social compari-
son interventions (as, e.g., in Allcott and Kessler, 2015) more generally may be
improved if individuals are given the opportunity to select their relevant com-
parison themselves rather than being assigned an unspecific one.
The results reported in this paper are also in line with earlier studies, which
indicate that being paired with high-ability peers leads on average to higher per-
formance (e.g., Carrell et al., 2009). Combined with the process of self-selecting
high- or low-ability peers, this can set ex-ante similar individuals on divergent
trajectories in classrooms and organizations. Repeatedly choosing higher-ability
peers can lead to continuous improvements, whereas selecting lower-ability
peers may stall individual development.
In general, our findings give rise to a trade-off between the additional mo-
tivation due to self-selection and the exogenous assignment of performance-
maximizing peers. On the one hand, giving subjects discretion over the peer
choice enhances motivation and thereby increases performance. On the other
hand, the resulting pairs are not necessarily performance-maximizing or opti-
mal, as also described in Carrell et al. (2013). It is therefore interesting to ask
whether it is possible to overcome this trade-off: How do subjects’ choices and
subsequent performance change once they are informed how different peers af-
fect their performance or are nudged to select stronger peers? However, some
students may prefer slower peers; for example, to avoid pressure or due to status
concerns. Hence, faster peers might not be a superior choice for all individuals.
Our experimental design can easily be transferred to situations in which
other production functions are used or where peer effects arise via other chan-
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nels, e.g., implementing team production by reporting a function of both stu-
dents’ times to the teacher, or varying the task to allow for learning or skill
complementaries as sources of peer effects. Self-selection of peers can often be
observed in those settings. For example, study groups at universities often form
endogenously (Chen and Gong, 2018), researchers select their co-authors and
workers in firms increasingly form self-managed work teams (Lazear and Shaw,
2007).
In this paper, we highlight that self-selecting peers can serve as a comple-
ment to other established methods such as incentives and exogenous peer as-
signment policies aimed at increasing individual performance. However, further
research on the interplay between endogenous group formation, social interac-
tions and production environments remains imperative to understand how peer
effects work.
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Appendix 5.A Randomization check
Table 5.A.1. Randomization check
Random Name Diff. Performance Diff.
Socio-Demographics
Age 14.43 14.55 0.13 14.58 0.15
(1.18) (1.24) (0.12) (1.24) (0.12)
Female 0.73 0.62 -0.11* 0.61 -0.12*
(0.45) (0.49) (0.04) (0.49) (0.05)
Doing sports regularly 0.82 0.82 0.00 0.90 0.08
(0.39) (0.38) (0.04) (0.31) (0.04)
Times (in sec)
Time (First Run) 26.81 26.08 -0.73* 26.19 -0.62*
(2.96) (2.93) (0.28) (2.78) (0.28)
Residual of Time (First Run) 0.25 -0.00 -0.25 -0.00 -0.25
(2.96) (2.93) (0.28) (2.78) (0.28)
Class-level Variables
# Students in class 26.01 25.39 -0.62* 25.61 -0.41
(2.95) (2.02) (0.24) (3.11) (0.30)
Share of participating students 0.72 0.74 0.02 0.73 0.01
(0.16) (0.13) (0.01) (0.12) (0.01)
Grade 8.68 8.76 0.08 8.75 0.07
(1.07) (1.12) (0.11) (1.13) (0.11)
Observations 221 213 434 193 414
Notes: *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level. Standard deviations in
parentheses in columns 1, 2 and 4; standard errors in column 3 and 5. Residuals of Time (First
Run) are calculated as follows: We first regress all times on school, grade and gender fixed effects
as well as an indicator for the first or second run. We then use the residuals from this regression.
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Appendix 5.B Description and comparison of peer
preferences
In this section, we briefly describe the preferences elicited in the survey and
then compare preference over relative performance and based on names. Sup-
pose that all subjects want to be paired with a faster peer. Subsequently, we may
not be able to match this most-preferred peer to half of the sample. This implies
that we need a sufficient amount of heterogeneity in performance-based prefer-
ences to match pairs optimally given their preferences. Figure 5.B.1a presents a
histogram of the most-preferred relative performance of a peer. It shows that –
although subjects prefer a similar or slightly faster peer on average – preferences
are still heterogeneous mitigating the concern that we are unable to provide sub-
jects with peers according to their preferences. Moreover, Appendix 5.C presents
a manipulation check of our treatments and shows that we are indeed able to
form pairs based on these elicited preferences.
In Figure 5.B.1b, we present the corresponding histogram using the relative
times of the most-preferred name-based peers. On average, students choose sim-
ilar peers of similar ability, but the dispersion of preferences is much larger than
for performance-based preferences. Moreover, the most-preferred name-based
peer is a friend in 89% of all cases (see Table 5.2).
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Figure 5.B.1. Heterogeneity in preferences
Notes: The figures present histograms of the most-preferred relative performances of the students
in Performance (Panel (a), same as in Figure 5.2) and the relative time of the most-preferred
name-based peers (Panel (b)). The intervals used here and in the survey are one-second intervals
of relative times in the first run. Vertical lines indicate own time (black; equals zero by definition)
and mean preference (red; 0.56 sec faster for performance-based preferences where we used the
mean of each interval to calculate the mean, and 0.05 sec slower for name-based preferences).
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In order to show the difference between name- and performance-based pref-
erences, we make use of the elicited beliefs over the relative performance of
peers nominated in the name-based preferences. As the elicitation procedure of
those beliefs is identical to that of the preferences over relative performance, we
can therefore check if subjects want to choose the same kind of peer in terms of
relative performance. If only relative performance matters as a criterion for the
selection process, subjects should choose a peer, which they believe has the same
relative performance as they choose in the performance-based selection process.
At least, this difference should be very small.1 Since subjects beliefs might be
noisy, we can repeat this exercise with the actual performance differences in the
first run. Figure 5.B.2 shows that although on average subjects choose somebody
with a similar performance (based on their belief or actual times), there is a lot
of variation in those preferences.2 Therefore, we can conclude that the two sets
of preferences are distinct preferences and that not only relative performance
matters for the name-based selection process.3
1 This holds as long as subjects believe that there exists at least one class member with their
most-preferred time. Across all three treatments, 67% of all students nominate someone in their
name-based preferences whom they belief has the same relative time as their most-preferred
performance-based peer. Note that this constitutes a lower bound as we can only check this for
the sixmost-preferred name-based peers (for whichwe have the beliefs over relative performance)
and not for the remaining class members.
2 The correlation between beliefs over the peer’s performance and his or her actual perfor-
mance is .55, indicating that subjects’ beliefs are relatively accurate. The share of subjects with
absolute differences less or equal than one second is 65% and 42%, and the mean differences are
-.13 and .57 seconds for beliefs and actual times, respectively.
3Note that even if the differences were zero, the name-based preferences would be informa-
tive as there may be several class members with relative times similar to the performance-based
preferences.
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Figure 5.B.2. Dissimilarity of preferences
Notes: We plot the difference between the first preference for relative performance and the rel-
ative performance of the first preference for name-based preferences. Vertical red lines indicate
the mean differences. In panel (a) we use subjects’ beliefs over relative performance, while panel
(b) uses actual relative times. If subjects choose someone in the same category for name- and
performance-based preferences, this difference is zero.
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Appendix 5.C Manipulation checks
In section 5.3.1, we presented the resulting match qualities using the prefer-
ences as elicited in the survey. However, some subjects may prefer relative times,
which are not available to them. For example, the fastest subject in the class
might want to run with someone who is even faster, or a student wants to run
with somebody else who is 1-2 seconds faster but by chance there is no one in
the class with such a time. Similarly, subjects in Name may rank other students
which were not present during the experiment or did not participate. We there-
fore present an alternative approach to evaluate the match quality by taking the
availability of peers into account. This implies that the quality of a match does
not correspond directly to the elicited preferences; rather, based on these pref-
erences all available subjects (i.e., the students participating in the study) are
ranked. The quality of the match is then calculated based on this new ranking
and results in a realized feasible match quality.
Consequently, we determine the feasible match quality by calculating how
high a classmate is ranked in a list of available classmates.1 In Name, this can
only increase the match quality. If someone nominates another student who is
not available as her most-preferred peer and she received her second highest
ranked choice, this means that she is matched with her most-preferred feasible
peer. Similar arguments can increase the match quality for preferences over
relative performance. However, the match quality in performance can also be
lower. Suppose that a student ranks the category “1-2 seconds faster” highest
and there are three students in that category. However, she is only matched
with her second highest ranked category. There would have been three subjects
whom she would have preferred more, generating a feasible match quality of
4. We present the corresponding histograms in Figure 5.C.1 and observe that
the median of the feasible match quality is actually higher for both treatments
relatively to the match qualities depicted in Figure 5.3.
As our treatments change the peer composition, they also change the relative
characteristics of peers. In order to understand which characteristics change,
we analyze how our treatments affect the peer composition in other dimensions
apart from the match quality in Table 5.C.1.
1We code peers who are not ranked among the first six preferences with a match quality of
7.
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Figure 5.C.1. Feasible match quality across treatments
Notes: The figure presents a histogram of match qualities for each treatment evaluated according
to either the students’ name-based preferences (upper panel) or performance-based preferences
(lower panel). Vertical lines denote median match qualities.
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Table 5.C.1. Eects of treatments on peer composition
Match Qual. (name) Match Qual. (time) Friendship Ties Time 1
Name 0.49*** 0.07 0.27*** -0.08
(0.06) (0.04) (0.06) (0.19)
Performance -0.06 0.24*** -0.12* -0.70***
(0.06) (0.04) (0.07) (0.21)
N 588 588 294 294
R2 .34 .083 .19 .09
p-value: Name vs. Performance 1.0e-11 .0002 3.4e-07 .0037
Mean in Random .23 .3 .43 2.4
Extraversion Agreeableness Conscientiousness Neuroticism Openness
Name -0.14 0.09 -0.15 0.11 -0.15
(0.14) (0.09) (0.11) (0.13) (0.10)
Performance 0.01 0.14 -0.20 0.28** 0.12
(0.17) (0.09) (0.12) (0.13) (0.11)
N 292 292 292 292 292
R2 .05 .058 .047 .039 .03
p-value: Name vs. Performance .19 .53 .63 .19 .031
Mean in Random 1.2 1 1.1 .98 1.1
Locus of Control Social Comparison Competitiveness Risk
Name 0.12 0.00 0.03 0.07
(0.11) (0.10) (0.13) (0.11)
Performance 0.46*** -0.19** 0.12 0.05
(0.12) (0.09) (0.11) (0.11)
N 292 293 291 292
R2 .065 .033 .03 .019
p-value: Name vs. Performance .003 .079 .37 .76
Mean in Random .98 1.1 1.1 1.1
Notes: This table presents least squares regressions using absolute differences in pairs’ character-
istics except for match quality and friendship as the dependent variable. *, **, and *** denote
significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level. Standard errors in parentheses and clustered at
the class level. All regressions control for gender, grade and school fixed effects as well as age in
regressions with individual outcomes.
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Appendix 5.D Econometric Framework
In this appendix, we outline how to interpret our estimates in light of a medi-
ation analysis similar to Heckman and Pinto (2015). A key difference between
their framework and ours is that we are interested in the direct effect of our treat-
ments as well as indirect effects of a change in the production inputs, rather than
only the latter.
In general, any observed change in outcomes of our experiment can be at-
tributed to one of two main sources: first, different peer-assignment mecha-
nisms may affect peer interactions directly; and second, self-selection changes
the peers and therefore the difference between the student’s and his or her peer’s
characteristics. We therefore decompose the average treatment effect into a di-
rect effect of self-selection as well as a pure peer composition effect. This takes
into account the change in relative peer characteristics across treatments.1
Consider the following potential outcomes framework. Let Y P and Y N and
Y R denote the counterfactual outcomes in the three treatments. Naturally, we
only observe the outcome in one of the treatments:
Y = DNY N + DPY P + (1 − DP)(1 − DN )Y R (5.D.1)
Let θd be a vector characterizing a peer’s relative characteristics in treatment
d ∈ {R,N , P}.2 Similar to the potential outcomes above, we can only observe the
peer composition vector θ in one of the treatments and thus θ = DPθP + DNθN +
(1− DP)(1− DN )θR and define an intercept α analogously. The outcome in each
of the treatments is therefore given by
Yd = αd + βdθ + γX + εd (5.D.2)
where we implicitly assume that we have a linear production function, which
can be interpreted as a first-order approximation of a more complex non-linear
function. The outcome depends on own characteristics X as well as treatment-
specific effects of relative characteristics of the peer θ and a zero-mean error
term εd , independent of X and θ .
1Our treatments do not change the distribution of characteristics or skills within the class or
of a particular subject; rather, the treatments change with whom from the distribution a subject
interacts. Due to the random assignment, we assume independence of own characteristics and
the treatment.
2 In our estimations, we include the following characteristics in θd : indicators whether the
peer ranked high in the individual preference rankings, effects of absolute time differences for
slower and faster students within pairs, the rank and presence of friendship ties within pairs, and
absolute differences in personal characteristics (Big 5, locus of control, competitiveness, social
comparison and risk attitudes).
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Potentially, there are unobserved factors in θ . We therefore split θ in a vector
with the observed inputs (θ¯) and unobserved inputs (θ˜)3 with corresponding
effects β¯d and β˜d and can rewrite equation 5.D.2 as follows:
Yd = αd + β¯d θ¯ + β˜d θ˜ + γX + εd (5.D.3)
= τd + β¯d θ¯ + γX + ε˜d (5.D.4)
where τd = αd + β˜dE[θ˜] and ε˜d = εd + β˜d(θ˜ −E[θ˜]). We assume ε˜d d= ε ,i.e.,
are equal in their distribution with a zero-mean. We can express the effect of
θ¯ in Name and Performance relative to the effect in Random by rewriting
βd = β +∆R,d . Accordingly, we rewrite the coefficients β¯d of θi as the sum of
the coefficients in Random denoted by β and the distance of the coefficients
between treatment d and Random (denoted by ∆R,d).
Yd = τd + β¯ θ¯ + ∆¯R,d θ¯ + γX + ε˜d (5.D.5)
= τˆd + β¯ θ¯ + γX + ε˜d (5.D.6)
In what follows, we are interested in τ¯d =E[τˆd − τˆR] (d ∈ {N , P}; τˆd = τd +
∆¯R,d θ¯), i.e., the direct treatment effect of Name and Performance conditional
on indirect effects from changes in the peer composition captured in θ¯ . This
direct effect subsumes the effect of the treatment itself (αd −αR), the changed
impact of the same peer’s observables (∆¯R,d θ¯), and changes in unmeasured
inputs as well as their effect ((β˜ + ∆˜R,d)θ˜). We interpret this direct effect as
an additional motivation due to being able to self-select a peer. This focus on
the direct effect is a key difference compared with Heckman and Pinto (2015),
who are mainly interested in the indirect effects of the mediating variables. The
empirical specification of 5.D.6 is given by
yi gs = τ¯ + τ¯
NDNi + τ¯
PDPi + βθi + γX i + ρs + λg + ui gs (5.D.7)
where we are interested in τ¯N and τ¯P , the direct effects of our treatments rela-
tive to Random. Indirect effects are captured by βθi , the effect of changed peer
characteristics on the outcome yi gs.
Finally, we analyze heterogeneous direct effects of ranks within pairs using
equation 5.D.8:
yi gs = τ¯ + τ¯
N
h 1{ai≥a j}D
N
i + τ¯
N
l 1{ai<a j}D
N
i (5.D.8)
+ τ¯Ph1{ai≥a j}D
P
i + τ¯
P
l 1{ai<a j}D
P
i + βθi + γX i + ρs + λg + ui gs
3 Furthermore, we assume that unobserved and observed inputs are independent conditional
on X and D.
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The indicator 1{ai≥a j} denotes if subject i was of higher ability (e.g., faster in the
first run) than her or his peer j, and 1{ai<a j} equals one if i was of lower ability.
We interact this rank indicator with the treatment indicators Ddi (d ∈ {N , P}) to
analyze whether the direct effect depends on the rank within a pair.
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Appendix 5.E Control treatment to disentangle peer eects
from learning
Table 5.E.1 and Figure 5.E.1 present the estimated average treatment effects
and the margins including an additional control treatment. The NoPeer treat-
ment featured the same design as all other treatments. The only difference was
that students participated in the running task twice without a peer. Moreover,
we shortened the survey for this treatment by removing the questionnaires on
personal characteristics. The control treatment was conducted to show that the
observed performance improvements are not due to learning. If learning drives
our effects, we should observe performance improvements in NoPeer, which is
not the case. Even if this control treatment had yielded performance improve-
ments, this would not affect any of our results. To see this, note that we are
interested in a between treatment comparison of performance improvements.
Learning effects between the runs should therefore be constant across treat-
ments.
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Figure 5.E.1. Average treatment eects
Notes: The figure presents percentage point improvements from the first to the second run with
corresponding standard errors for the three treatments Random, Name, and Performance and
an additional control treatment, where students run two times without a peer (NoPeer). See
column (1) in Table 5.E.1 for the corresponding regression. We control for gender, grade and
school fixed effects as well as age and cluster standard errors at the class level.
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Table 5.E.1. Robustness checks
(a) PP. Imprv. (b) Time (Second Run)
(1) (2) (3)
Name 1.29*** -0.37*** -0.14***
(0.42) (0.11) (0.04)
Performance 1.65** -0.40*** -0.15***
(0.62) (0.14) (0.05)
NoPeer -2.84*** 0.82*** 0.31***
(0.61) (0.16) (0.06)
Controlling for Time (First Run) No Yes Yes
Gender-Grade/School FEs, Age Yes Yes Yes
N 715 715 715
R2 .14 .81 .81
Notes: This table presents least squares regressions using percentage point improvements (Panel
(a)) or times from the second run (Panel (b)) as the dependent variables. *, **, and *** denote
significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level. Standard errors in parentheses and clustered at the
class level.
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Appendix 5.F Robustness checks for average treatment
eects
In Table 5.F.1, we compare the clustered standard errors with clustered standard
errors using a biased-reduced linearization to account for the limited number of
clusters. Comparing the first two columns, we observe that the results are robust
to this alternative specification of the standard errors. In column (3), we addi-
tionally check whether looking at matching group-specific group means – i.e.,
the average percentage point improvement for males and females in each class
– affects the estimates. While the power is reduced due to the small number of
observations, the treatment effects persist and the coefficients on the treatment
effects are not significantly affected. Columns (4) and (5) analyze the sensitivity
of our estimates with respect to outliers. We use two different strategies. First,
we apply a 90%winsorization, which replaces all observations with either a time
or a percentage point improvement below or above the threshold with the value
at the threshold. We replace a time of improvement below the 5th percentile
with the corresponding value of the 5th percentile and all observations above
the 95th percentile with the 95th percentile. Second, we truncate the data and
keep only those pairs where no time or no improvement falls into the bottom
5% or top 5%. Neither winsorization nor truncation significantly changes the
estimated treatment effects.
Table 5.F.1. Robustness checks
Percentage Point Improvements
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Baseline BRL Group means Win. Trunc.
Name 1.26*** 1.26** 1.15* 1.05*** 0.95***
(0.43) (0.50) (0.58) (0.37) (0.35)
Performance 1.67** 1.67** 2.12*** 1.51*** 1.43***
(0.62) (0.72) (0.60) (0.51) (0.43)
Gender-Grade/School FEs, Age Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 588 588 70 588 496
R2 .056 .056 .33 .072 .087
p-value: Name vs. Performance .51 .55 .088 .37 .27
Notes: This table presents least squares regressions using times (Panel (a)) or percentage point
improvements (Panel (b)) as the dependent variable. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10,
5, and 1 percent level. Standard errors in parentheses and clustered at the class level. Column
(1) presents the baseline specifications as used in Table 5.3. Columns (2) uses biased-reduced
linearization to account for the limited number of clusters. Column (3) uses matching group-
specific means as the unit of observation. Finally, columns (4) and (5) apply a 90% winsorization
and truncation, respectively.
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We further analyze the robustness of our results by looking at different sub-
samples. We therefore split our sample first by grades in the upper panel of
Table 5.F.2 and by schools as well as gender in the lower panel and estimate the
treatment effects separately for those samples. The table shows the robustness
of the estimated treatment effects as these effects persists for all subsamples
with similar magnitude.
Table 5.F.2. Robustness checks – Subsample analyses
Percentage Point Improvements
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Baseline 7th grade 8th grade 9th grade 10th grade
Name 1.26*** 1.95*** 2.60*** 1.53** 1.08*
(0.43) (0.08) (0.35) (0.59) (0.61)
Performance 1.67** 2.78*** 2.51*** 2.53*** 1.32
(0.62) (0.63) (0.15) (0.62) (0.88)
Gender-Grade/School FEs, Age Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 588 116 116 174 182
R2 .056 .073 .064 .16 .039
p-value: Name vs. Performance .51 .21 .82 .19 .82
(6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Female Male School 1 School 2 School 3
Name 1.26* 1.21*** 1.36*** 1.44** 2.09***
(0.65) (0.44) (0.11) (0.65) (0.37)
Performance 1.68** 1.63* 1.53*** 2.29*** 2.22*
(0.77) (0.85) (0.05) (0.55) (1.12)
Gender-Grade/School FEs, Age Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 390 198 148 274 166
R2 .057 .065 .065 .1 .12
p-value: Name vs. Performance .53 .62 .3 .14 .88
Notes: This table presents least squares regressions using percentage point improvements as the
dependent variable. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level. Standard
errors in parentheses and clustered at the class level. Column (1) presents the estimates using
the whole sample as in Table 5.3. Columns (2)-(5) restrict the sample to one grade, columns (6)
and (7) to each gender and columns (8)-(10) to one school.
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Appendix 5.G Peer composition robustness checks
We run three robustness checks for the results presented in Table 5.4. First,
to provide further evidence that it is not the quality of the match itself that
drives our results, we estimate the effect of match quality within Random (cf.
Table 5.G.1). As subjects in Random are matched with someone they prefer by
pure chance, this allows us to estimate the impact of match quality itself. The
estimates show that match quality itself has no significant effect on the perfor-
mance in Random. Second, in Table 5.G.2 we restrict our estimation sample
to subjects with a high match quality only to show that the treatment effects
persist for these subjects and the coefficients on peer compositional effects do
not substantially change. Third, we control for differences in ability and match-
ing quality in a more flexible way in Table 5.G.3 by including interval fixed
effects for ability differences and fixed effects for every rank of the preferences.
More specifically, we include an indicator for each one-second interval of ability
differences between subjects within a pair. Similarly, we include indicators for
each rank in the two sets of preferences to check whether the high match qual-
ity indicators are restrictive. This allows for a potential non-linear influence of
ability differences and match quality on our estimates. Comparing the estimates
shows that neither the piecewise-linear functional form of ability differences nor
using high match quality indicators is restrictive. Finally, this table shows that
the decomposition presented in Table 5.4 is robust to the inclusion of additional
class-level controls.
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Table 5.G.1. Eect of match quality within Random
Percentage Point Improvements
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Only Name MQ. Only Perf. MQ. with Controls Baseline
Direct Effects
Name 1.24**
(0.50)
Performance 2.21***
(0.68)
Peer Characteristics
Faster Student × High match quality (Name) 1.00 0.89 0.52
(0.85) (0.95) (0.43)
Slower Student × High match quality (Name) -0.39 0.15 0.46
(1.53) (1.10) (0.66)
Faster Student × High match quality (Perf.) 1.02 0.06 0.43
(1.08) (1.08) (0.53)
Slower Student × High match quality (Perf.) -1.87 -0.51 -0.71
(1.42) (1.22) (0.66)
Faster Student × Peer is friend 0.10 -1.15**
(0.74) (0.53)
Slower Student × Peer is friend 0.01 0.13
(1.15) (0.67)
Faster Student × |∆Time 1| -0.54** -0.35**
(0.25) (0.16)
Slower Student × |∆Time 1| 0.73** 1.04***
(0.32) (0.20)
Slower Student in Pair 3.14*** 3.72*** 0.43 -0.15
(0.43) (0.74) (1.15) (0.68)
Abs. Diff. in Personality No No Yes Yes
Peer Characteristics No No Yes Yes
Own Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes
Gender-Grade/School FEs, Age Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 205 205 204 582
R2 .12 .13 .28 .29
Notes: This table presents least squares regressions using percentage point improvements as the
dependent variable. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level. Standard
errors in parentheses and clustered at the class level. Own characteristics include the Big Five,
locus of control, social comparison, competitiveness and risk attitudes. Absolute differences in
personality include the difference in those.We use only observations withinRandom. If we restrict
the sample to students in Random, the explanatory power of the match quality (MQ) is not
significant.
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Table 5.G.2. Only high match quality sample as comparison group
Percentage Point Improvements
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
All Random&Name with Controls Random&Perf. with Controls
Direct Effects
Name 1.24** 1.83*** 1.93***
(0.50) (0.55) (0.47)
Performance 2.21*** 2.38*** 1.75**
(0.68) (0.71) (0.64)
Peer Characteristics
Faster Student × High match quality (Name) 0.52 -0.47
(0.43) (1.28)
Slower Student × High match quality (Name) 0.46 -0.56
(0.66) (1.15)
Faster Student × High match quality (Perf.) 0.43 -0.51
(0.53) (0.65)
Slower Student × High match quality (Perf.) -0.71 -1.21
(0.66) (0.86)
Faster Student × Peer is friend -1.15** -1.53 -0.98
(0.53) (1.05) (1.87)
Slower Student × Peer is friend 0.13 -1.18 -1.38
(0.67) (1.06) (1.13)
Faster Student × |∆Time 1| -0.35** -0.72** -0.07
(0.16) (0.29) (0.51)
Slower Student × |∆Time 1| 1.04*** 1.25*** 1.08**
(0.20) (0.38) (0.47)
Slower Student in Pair -0.15 -0.44 -0.97
(0.68) (1.70) (1.47)
Abs. Diff. in Personality Yes No Yes No Yes
Peer Characteristics Yes No Yes No Yes
Own Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Gender-Grade/School FEs, Age Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 582 208 207 162 160
R2 .29 .16 .52 .16 .37
Notes: This table presents least squares regressions using percentage point improvements as the
dependent variable. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level. Standard
errors in parentheses and clustered at the class level. Own characteristics include the Big Five,
locus of control, social comparison, competitiveness and risk attitudes. Absolute differences in
personality include the difference in those. Column (1) presents the last specification of Table 5.4
for reference. Columns (2) to (5) show that even if we restrict the comparison group to the
sample of individuals in random that received a peer with high match quality according to name-
(columns (3) and (4)) or performance-based preferences (columns (5) and (6)), respectively, our
treatment effects persist and the coefficients on peer compositional effects do not change much.
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Table 5.G.3. Robustness Check
Percentage Point Improvements
(1) (2) (3)
Linear Time Int. FE Class Controls
Direct Effects
Name 1.24** 1.20** 1.46***
(0.50) (0.52) (0.46)
Performance 2.21*** 2.25*** 1.73**
(0.68) (0.74) (0.68)
Peer Characteristics
Faster Student × High match quality (Name) 0.52 0.71 0.69
(0.43) (0.44) (0.45)
Slower Student × High match quality (Name) 0.46 0.27 0.62
(0.66) (0.65) (0.74)
Faster Student × High match quality (Perf.) 0.43 0.41 0.12
(0.53) (0.49) (0.59)
Slower Student × High match quality (Perf.) -0.71 -0.72 -1.15
(0.66) (0.58) (0.73)
Faster Student × Peer is friend -1.15** -1.08** -1.03**
(0.53) (0.51) (0.47)
Slower Student × Peer is friend 0.13 0.07 0.45
(0.67) (0.73) (0.79)
Faster Student × |∆Time 1| -0.35** -0.36**
(0.16) (0.16)
Slower Student × |∆Time 1| 1.04*** 0.84***
(0.20) (0.19)
Slower Student in Pair -0.15 0.11
(0.68) (0.76)
Time Diff. FEs No Yes No
Class-level Controls No No Yes
Abs. Diff. in Personality Yes Yes Yes
Peer Characteristics Yes Yes Yes
Own Characteristics Yes Yes Yes
Gender-Grade/School FEs, Age Yes Yes Yes
N 582 582 512
R2 .29 .3 .29
p-value: Name vs. Performance .17 .14 .72
Notes: This table presents least squares regressions using percentage point improvements as the
dependent variable. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level. Standard
errors in parentheses and clustered at the class level. Own characteristics include the Big Five,
locus of control, social comparison, competitiveness and risk attitudes. Absolute differences in
personality include the difference in those. Column (1) presents the last specification of Table 5.4
for reference. Column (2) includes fixed effects for every one-second difference in ability levels of
the two students. Column (3) includes an indicator for each rank within the two sets of preference
rankings. Finally, column (4) includes additional class-level controls.
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Appendix 5.H Additional material for implications
Table 5.H.1 shows the regressions underlying Figure 5.6. In particular, in col-
umn (1) we estimate equation 5.1 but interact treatment indicators with ability
terciles (low, medium, or high). Ability terciles are defined according to tercile
splits of times in the first run within each school, grade and gender. Column (2)
repeats the exercise using quintiles rather than terciles to show that the pattern
holds for finer splits.
As argued in section 5.5.5, low-ability students in Name need to prefer to be
and subsequently are matched with faster students on average. We present the
shares of students in Name who prefer a faster student (based on their name-
based preferences) and who are matched to a faster student for the three ability
terciles defined above in Table 5.H.2. Indeed, low-ability students in Name are
more likely to prefer a faster peer and on average are matched to faster peers
than students of higher ability.
Our treatments also have implications for individual ranks of students within
a class since slower students improve more than faster ones. As ranks are impor-
tant in determining subsequent outcomes (Elsner and Isphording, 2017; Gill et
al., 2017), a policy maker has to take the distributional effects of peer assign-
ment mechanisms into account.1 Since low-ability students improve relatively
more than high-ability students in Name and Random, these treatments yield
potentially large changes of a student’s rank within the class between the two
runs. By contrast, Performance will tend to preserve the ranking of the first
run as improvements are distributed more equally relative to the two other treat-
ments. We confirm this intuition in Table 5.H.3, where we regress the absolute
change in percentile scores from the first to the second run on treatment indica-
tors. The outcome variable measures the average perturbation of ranks within
in a class across the two runs. The results show that Performance shuffles the
ranks of students less in comparison to Random and Name. While in Random
students change their position by about 15 out of 100 ranks, we find significantly
less changes in the percentile score in Performance relative to Random. This
change corresponds to a 27% reduction in reshuffling. However, in Name we do
not find any effect compared to Random.
1 Suppose that a policy maker wants to establish a rank distribution (ranks based on times
in the second run) that mirrors the ability distribution (ranks based on times in the first run)
due to some underlying fairness ideal (e.g., she wants to shift the distribution holding constant
individual ranks). In other words, she might want to implement a peer assignment mechanism
that preserves individual ranks rather than shuffle them.
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Table 5.H.1. Heterogeneous treatment eects by own ability
Percentage Point Improvements
(1) (2)
Ability Terciles Ability Quintiles
Low Ability 3.21*** 4.49***
(1.02) (1.52)
Medium-Low Ability 0.43
(1.31)
Medium Ability -0.59 -0.45
(1.18) (1.41)
Medium-High Ability -0.53
(0.98)
High Ability -1.19 -1.54
(0.88) (1.00)
Name × Low Ability 1.02 1.27
(0.92) (1.53)
Name × Medium-Low Ability 1.47
(1.11)
Name × Medium Ability 2.00* 1.65
(1.00) (1.21)
Name × Medium-High Ability 1.28
(0.77)
Name × High Ability 1.01** 0.90*
(0.48) (0.53)
Performance × Low Ability -0.20 -0.65
(1.18) (1.97)
Performance × Medium-Low Ability 1.77
(1.23)
Performance × Medium Ability 2.57** 1.94
(1.03) (1.25)
Performance × Medium-High Ability 2.25***
(0.67)
Performance × High Ability 2.16*** 2.15***
(0.49) (0.63)
Gender-Grade/School FEs, Age Yes Yes
N 588 588
R2 .39 .41
Notes: This table presents least squares regressions using percentage point improvements as the
dependent variable. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level. Standard
errors in parentheses and clustered at the class level. Column (1) assigns one of three ability
levels – low, medium or high – according to tercile splits of times in the first run within each
school, grade and gender and presents the underlying regression for Figure 5.6. Column (2)
uses quintiles rather than terciles to show that the pattern is robust to other definitions of ability
quantiles.
Table 5.H.2. Share of students preferring and receiving a faster peer in Name
Ability Tercile
Low Medium High
Preferred name-based peer is faster 0.75 0.60 0.25
Realized name-based peer is faster 0.75 0.58 0.21
Notes: This table presents the share of students preferring a faster peer in Name and the realized
share. Ability terciles – low, medium or high – are assigned according to tercile splits of times in
the first run within each school, grade and gender.
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Table 5.H.3. Absolute change in percentile scores
Absolute Change in Percentile Scores
within matching group within treatment
Name -0.01 -0.02
(0.01) (0.01)
Performance -0.04** -0.04***
(0.02) (0.01)
Gender/Grade/School FEs, Age Yes Yes
N 588 588
R2 .056 .051
p-value: Name vs. Performance .018 .085
Mean in Random .15 .14
Notes: This table presents least squares regressions using absolute change in percentile scores
as the dependent variable. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level.
Standard errors in parentheses and clustered at the class level. Absolute changes in percentile
scores within matching groups are calculated based on the change of individual ranks of students
in the their class and gender from the first to the second. Percentile scores within treatment are
calculated for all students within the same treatment and gender (i.e., across classrooms).
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Appendix 5.I Simulation of matching rules
We simulate three matching rules and predict their impact on performance im-
provements using our estimates from Table 5.4. In a first step, we create artificial
pairs, based on the employed matching rules described below. In a second step,
we then calculate the vector θ of differences for the artificial pairs as well as the
matching quality of artificial peers. Finally, we use the estimated coefficients
from the column (6) of Table 5.4 to predict the performance improvements we
would observe for the artificial pairs. As peer-assignment rules only change θ ,
we are interested in the difference in the respective sums of the indirect effect
and direct effect, that is between τ¯+ βθ simi and τ¯+ βθ
obs
i from equation 5.2,
where sim and obs denote simulated and observed pair characteristics, respec-
tively. Furthermore, we assume that the direct effect of the simulated policies
equals the one in Random. We additionally fix the covariates X to 0 and leave
out the fixed effects for the simulations and predictions. This means, we cal-
culate the performance improvements for a particular baseline group for our
treatments as well as the simulations. This enables us to compare our results of
the simulations directly to the peer-assignment rules using self-selection imple-
mented in the experiment, as we compare the performance improvements for
the same group.
We simulate the following three peer assignment rules. First, we implement
an ability tracking assignment rule, Tracking, in the spirit of the matching also
employed in Gneezy and Rustichini (2004). Students are matched in pairs, start-
ing with the two fastest students in a matching group and moving down the
ranking subsequently. This rule minimizes the absolute distance in pairs. Sec-
ond, we employ a peer assignment rule that fixes the distance in ranks for all
pairs (Equidistance). We rank all students in a matching group and match
the first student with the one in the middle and so forth. More specifically, if G
denotes the group size, the distance in ranks is G/2− 1 for all pairs. This rule
is one way to maximize the sum of absolute differences in pairs, but keeps the
distance across pairs similarly. Third, we match the highest ranked student with
the lowest one, the second highest ranked with the second lowest one and so
forth (High-to-Low). This is similar to Carrell et al. (2013), who match low-
ability students with those students from whom they would benefit the most
(i.e., the fastest students). Again, this assignment rule maximizes the sum of
absolute differences in pairs. Table 5.I.1 summarizes the distance in ability of
the experimental treatments as well as the simulated assignment rules.
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Table 5.I.1. Overview of simulated peer assignment rules
Peer Assignment Rule Simulated? Mean Ability DescriptionDistance (in sec)
Name No 2.09 Self-selected peers based on names
Performance No 1.41 Self-selected peers based on relative performance
Random No 2.42 Randomly assigned peers
Equidistance Yes 3.11 Same distance in ranks across pairs
High-to-Low Yes 3.11 First to last, second to second to last etc.
Tracking Yes 0.90 First to second, third to fourth etc.
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To whom you may compare -
Preferences for peers?
6.1 Introduction
In many situations, individuals compare their own performance, status, or out-
come to their peers impacting their behavior. These social comparisons impact
job satisfaction (Card et al., 2012), performance (Ashraf et al., 2014; Cohn et
al., 2014) or consumption (Kuhn et al., 2011), individual happiness as well as
overall well-being (A. Clark and Senik, 2010), and there is evidence that firms
take these tendencies to engage in comparisons into account when designing in-
centive schemes (Frank, 1984; Nickerson and Zenger, 2008). But these people
to whom one compares one’s own performance and income are not randomly
chosen. Rather, people select their peers who in turn serve as their social refer-
ence points. For instance, a student might avoid her very successful classmate,
because seeing her makes her feel bad about herself; nonetheless, she seeks out
for her sporty friend to motivate her for a marathon.
This selection of social reference points can differ across environments, due
to varying available information as well as changing relevant selection criteria
andmotives. In some cases, individuals have lots of information about others and
potentially can select peers based on particularly important personality char-
acteristics. In such situations individuals may be able to select friends or con-
sciously avoid them. In other situations, information might be limited and pref-
erences can only be conditioned on very specific characteristics such as past per-
formance. This latter situation might be important for people preferring work-
places with high ability peers or when selecting into specific schools to be “the
? We thank Lorenz Götte, Sebastian Kube, Pia Pinger for their guidance and support. We also
thank Viola Ackfeld, Philipp Albert, Thomas Dohmen, Ingo Isphording, Ulf Zölitz and audiences at
Bonn, IZA Brown Bag and the CRCTR-224 Workshop for Young Researchers for helpful feedback
and comments. We also thank the schools and students that participated in the experiments.
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big fish in the small pond”.1 This highlights that individuals have preferences for
specific peer environments and even within a given setting or group only some
peers might serve as social reference points. At the same time, there are several
motives that can rationalize different peer preferences: in many environments,
high ability peers have a positive impact on individual performance. However, in-
dividuals may simultaneously suffer from disadvantageous social comparisons.
Lastly, some individuals might receive special pleasure simply from interacting
with peers they know well – their friends. This suggests that peer choice pro-
cesses might be more complex than previously assumed.
In this paper, we study preferences for peers for a strenuous task. We develop
a theoretical framework that combines social reference points and time incon-
sistent preferences to derive predictions for the selection of specific peers. Given
this framework, we describe preference for peers based on two dimensions: First,
based on limited information corresponding to relative past performance, and
second, based on the full set of personal characteristics (e.g., friendship ties, per-
sonality, network characteristics, etc.). After documenting large heterogeneities
in these preferences, we analyze the determinants of those preferences. We
demonstrate how these preferences depend on a person’s personality and that
the students in our sample exhibit homophily in their peer choice, i.e., that in-
dividuals choose others that are similar to them in several dimensions. Lastly,
we explore the relationship between the two different kinds of preferences and
study whether these are two measures of the same underlying preference or
whether preferences for peers are multidimensional in nature.
In order to study the selection of peers and the corresponding preferences,
we utilize the dataset of a framed field experiment with over 600 students (aged
12 to 16) in physical education classes of German secondary schools. Students
took part in two running tasks – first alone, then simultaneously with a peer. In
between the two runs, students filled out a survey that asked them with whom
they would like to run in that second run, i.e., their preferences for peers, and
elicited their personal characteristics as well as the social network within each
class. The elicited preferences were used to form pairs in the second run, where
the peer assignment rule was varied across classes; in some classes, students
were randomly assigned to pairs, in others we allowed for self-selected peers
implementing two notions of self-selection of peers. More specifically, students
could self-select their peer either based on the relative performance or the iden-
tity of their classmates. Using this setup has three crucial features for the ques-
tions at hand: First, using a running task yields direct measures of performance
and thus could be used to select peers based on their relative performance in
the first run (performance-based preferences), where students indicated their pre-
1 This is important in models where individuals have preferences over their ordinal ranks in
their peer group (Cicala et al., forthcoming; Tincani, 2017).
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ferred relative performance in the ±5 seconds range. Second, the classroom en-
vironment enabled students to state preferences for known peers (name-based
preferences). Third, focusing on a single peer in the second run, we circumvent
issues associated with multiple reference points (Kahneman, 1992). We ana-
lyze the effects of these peer assignment mechanisms in depth in Kiessling et al.
(2018).
For performance-based preferences, we find that students prefer on average
slightly faster peers (0.56 sec or 0.20 SD in terms of times in the first run). Yet,
this masks large heterogeneities in these preferences. In fact, half of the students
prefer peers differing by more than one second, both, faster and slower. Analyz-
ing the relationship between students’ personality and their preferences, we
document strong effects of three characteristics: more competitive students and
those with a higher internal locus of control tend to prefer faster peers, while ex-
traversive individuals select relatively slower peers. For name-based preferences,
we show that friendship ties play a crucial role to understand peer preferences
based on names as 80% of the three most preferred name-based peers are also
friends. We document the importance of other characteristics as well: students
prefer peers that are similar in ability, score similar on measures of agreeable-
ness as well as attitudes towards social comparisons, and have a similar influence
in the social network as themselves. Given the finding that students prefer sim-
ilar strong peers in both preference measures begs the question whether these
two are different measures of the same underlying preference. When analyz-
ing the relationship between the preferences, we find that while performance-
based preferences are important to understand name-based preferences, other
homophily dimensions are also important, highlighting the multidimensionality
of preferences for peers.
The results in this paper relate to several recent strands of the literature on
social comparisons and (social) reference points.
In our experiment the students may expect an additional motivation through
a faster peer. This motive has been modeled theoretically through endogenous
reference points or goals as in Koch and Nafziger (2011). They consider goal-
setting as a way for time-inconsistent individuals to commit their future self
to exert higher amounts of effort. In contrast to our framework, they consider
solely an individual’s choice, but no further interaction between peers. In a sim-
ilar spirit, Falk and Knell (2004) build a model of endogenous reference points.
Here an individual can partially determine her reference points. They assume
that higher reference points decrease effort costs, providing an incentive to ac-
tively set high goals. This mechanism likely affects individual performance as in
Allen et al. (2017), who find that marathon-performances tend to bunch around
round times that were likely aimed at previously. In a university setting, D. Clark
et al. (2017) report a positive effect of self-set goals on effort and performance
by mitigating self-control problems. Relatedly, Brookins et al. (2017) add to the
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growing literature on goal setting (e.g., Heath et al., 1999; Locke and Latham,
2002; Wu et al., 2008; Hsiaw, 2013; Goerg, 2015; Corgnet et al., 2015) and
find that self-chosen goals might improve performance even in the presence of
monetary incentives.
More generally, our study adds to the literature on specifying reference
points in models with reference-dependence preferences (e.g., Kőszegi and Ra-
bin, 2006, 2007; Abeler et al., 2011). While the existing literature focuses on
predominantly on static reference points, we introduce peers as social reference
points and study how these reference points are selected. Introducing this so-
cial dimensions into reference points – and thereby specific characteristics of
peers – might have profound consequences on how individuals perceive a sit-
uation. Performing a task jointly and comparing the outcome might induce a
tournament-like feeling amongst peers even when no explicit tournament in-
centives are present. The consequences of these competitive environments for
individual behavior have sparked a broad literature over the last decade. Most
prominently, Niederle and Vesterlund (2007) find that females enter tourna-
ments less frequently than males and others have examined how to overcome
this gender gap (e.g., Healy and Pate, 2011). Additionally, the willingness to
compete in these settings has been identified as a potential key component in
different career choices and life outcomes such as schooling decisions and wages
(Buser et al., 2014; Almås et al., 2015). In contrast to that literature, we high-
light a different aspect of competitiveness. We fix the tournament entry decision
often used as a measure of competitiveness in the experimental design and allow
students to select a peer, which consequently affects the chances of being faster
or slower in the second run. Hence, we allow students to select their competi-
tors and not to decide on their participation in the competition.2 This relates
to Niederle and Yestrumskas (2008), who analyze preferences for challenging
tasks for given ability levels rather than preferences for peers of higher or lower
ability.
Social psychologists and sociologists have studied social comparisons at least
since Festinger (1954). In general, they find that on average, there is a slight
upwards tendency in social comparisons (e.g., Blanton et al., 1999; Huguet et
al., 2001); i.e., individuals tend to prefer somewhat better performing peers.
These findings are in line with our results. However, similar to the economic
literature on goal setting, these studies focus on peer preferences solely based
on relative performance and neglect other potential characteristics of peers. The
direction of social comparisons has been explored predominantly in the income
dimension. A. Clark and Senik (2010) find that employees tend to compare
their income with that of their colleagues and to a lesser degree with that of
2 Although by choosing much faster or much slower peers, subjects could basically remove any
competitive element from the task.
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their friends. Moreover, comparing with a person that has a higher income is
associated with lower levels of satisfaction. Kuegler (2009) complements these
findings using siblings as reference points. In contrast to comparisons in the
income dimension, comparison points in a performance dimension might not
necessarily be selected for the purpose of status creation or self-assurance (for
these motives see, e.g., Wills, 1981; Markman and McMullen, 2003). Due to
the positive effect of the social interactions this could create incentives to spend
additional effort to pursue higher performance levels (Collins, 1996).
Since students in our setting are able to select their peers from their social
network, we also relate to the research on the determinants of link formations in
networks (for a recent overview of the literature on network formation see Jack-
son et al., 2017). Similar to one strand of the literature, we focus on empirical
correlates of link formation and dimensions of homophily (see, e.g., Girard et
al., 2015; Lewis et al., 2012; Marmaros and Sacerdote, 2006; Mayer and Puller,
2008, for the role of personality, homophily in the taste for music and movies,
geographic proximity, and race, respectively, in the formation of friendship ties).
Yet, our study takes the social network as given and analyzes a nomination pro-
cess on this social network. Our results highlight that for a given task individuals
may choose specific persons that are or are not part of their social network as
peers.3 Related to this literature, but more similar to our paper is the study by
Cicala et al. (forthcoming), which presents a Roy model where agents self-select
into different peer groups based on their comparative advantage within a given
environment.
Finally, this paper relates to the extensive literature on peer effects, by ask-
ing the question who the relevant peers actually are. While peer effects in per-
formance have been studied extensively (for an overview see Herbst and Mas,
2015), there is growing evidence that different kind of peers differentially affect
performance. For instance, individuals may change their effort provision once
they are working with friend, even forgoing additional earnings (Bandiera et al.,
2010). This is in line with with our results that many students are preferring
their friends as peers. Likewise peers affect behavior differentially in competi-
tive situations (e.g., Gneezy et al., 2003; Gneezy and Rustichini, 2004). More
importantly, most studies take the reference group or peer group as given, or use
exogenous re-assignment policies to sort subjects into peer groups (e.g., Carrell
et al., 2013). The design of optimal policies though hinges on a good under-
standing of the endogenous group formation process within those social groups.
Our study closes this gap by describing, whom students prefer and therefore
choose as their peer within a group.
3 Thus, one can think of our setting as an additional network formation process on top of an
existing network.
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While the importance of peers for educational attainment, consumption, or
performance on the job is undisputed, evidence on to whom people compare
their performance and how these peers are selected remains scarce. Yet, already
Manski (1993, p. 536) noted that “informed specification of reference groups is a
necessary prelude to [the] analysis of social effects”. Therefore, we take a first step
by describing and analyzing the selection of peers across two distinct dimensions
within one setting. This allows us to provide novel evidence on the determinants
of the underlying preferences. By studying them in a single setting, we can shed
light on their relationship and highlight the multidimensionality of preferences
for peers.
Notably, individual personality has been shown to correlate with labor mar-
ket outcomes (e.g., Groves, 2005; Heckman et al., 2006; Almlund et al., 2011).
Some of the characteristics that were found to be predictive for educational at-
tainment and labor market success (see, e.g., Buser et al., 2014; Piatek and
Pinger, 2016, for evidence on competitiveness and locus on control, respectively)
also correlate with individuals selecting into peer groups of higher ability. As
these environments in turn have positive impacts on individual performance,
the selection of specific peer environments could potentially serve as an impor-
tant link between personality on the one side and schooling decisions as well as
labor market outcomes on the other.
The preferences for peers analyzed in this paper and their link to personal
characteristics might be specific to situations in which only own performance
matters and that have competitive components. Other peers might be selected in
cooperative settings or situations where the positive impact of high ability peer
becomesmore apparent and some other personality traits may be important. Yet,
it is reassuring that we document the importance for the peer selection process
of those personality traits that are also predictive for labor market success in
general. As this paper demonstrates, individuals are highly heterogeneous with
respect to whom they select as social reference points or relevant peers. Policies
trying to leverage the influence of peers to boost educational attainment or job
performance therefore might be well advised to take this heterogeneity into
account.4
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The next section (6.2)
presents a theoretical framework of effort provision and peer choice. We then
present the data and describe our sample in section 6.3. Section 6.4 describes
two kinds of preferences for peers – based on relative performance and based
on names – and analyzes the determinants of these preferences. We analyze the
relationship of these preferences in section 6.5. Finally, section 6.6 concludes.
4 The peer preferences and associated heterogeneities might help to explain why reassigning
students into different classrooms as in Carrell et al. (2013) did not have the intended effects of
increasing the GPA of low ability students.
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6.2 Theoretical Framework
In this section, we present a simple model of peer choice and effort provision
to broadly structure the following analyses. We model an individual’s problem
as a two stage process closely following our experimental design: On the first
stage, an individual decides over her peer choice, while on the second stage the
resulting pairs then perform a strenuous effort task simultaneously and compare
their performances. Thus, the peer’s performance will serve akin to a goal or (so-
cial) reference point. Given this similarity, the theoretical framework presented
here corresponds to the models of Koch and Nafziger (2011) and Falk and Knell
(2004).5 Yet, we extent their reasoning to a setting with interaction between
individuals and their peers.6
We assume that each individual has some intrinsic motivation p to provide
effort ei .7 We allow this motivation to differ for the peer choice (pPC) and the
effort provision (pEP). This is similar to dual-self models of self-control (Fuden-
berg and Levine, 2006; Banerjee and Mullainathan, 2010) or to models where
agents are time inconsistent choices due to different discount rates (Laibson,
1997). If the individual provides effort, she incurs costs c, where we assume for
simplicity that these costs are given by c(ei)= θi e
2
i /2. Here 1/θi denotes the in-
dividual’s ability at the running task; higher ability therefore is associated with
lower marginal costs. Moreover, we assume that peers affect an individual’s util-
ity as follows: whenever an individual runs with another person, she will com-
pare her own performance with her peer’s. Being slower induces a dis-utility,
while being ahead affects utility positively. We allow this part of the utility func-
tion to depend on a peer’s ability to capture the idea that being better than a
high performing peer should matter relatively more than being ahead of a low
performing peer. We introduce these social reference points by including an ad-
ditional utility term αe j
 
ei − e j

, where α denotes the weight of this peer effect.
Additionally, we assume that individuals are loss averse if they fall behind, which
we capture by a loss aversion parameter λ > 1 that multiplies the preceding peer
effect. The individual’s overall utility is then given by
uti (ei , e j|θi) =
(
pt ei − θi e
2
i
2 + αe j
 
ei − e j

if ei ≥ e j
pt ei − θi e
2
i
2 + αλe j
 
ei − e j

if ei < e j
(6.1)
5 Koch and Nafziger (2011) analyze the goal setting behavior of a time-inconsistent agent
with βδ-preferences. The agent might be inclined to set higher goals to motivate her future self.
In our model, individuals choose peers and these individuals interact with each other in the effort
provision stage.
6 Thus, one could think of peers corresponding to reference points that adjust given the effort
individuals provide.
7We implicitly assume that the production function is linear in effort.
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for t = EP, PC . In the following, we first solve for the optimal effort levels when
a peer is present or when running alone. In a second step, we then characterize
the optimal peer choice and highlight comparative statics.
6.2.1 Optimal eort
First, consider the situation where individuals run alone, that is without a peer
being present. Then pEP = c′

e∗i,NoPeer

and thus e∗i,NoPeer = pEP/θi, that is those
individuals with a higher intrinsic motivation pEP or higher ability 1/θi provide
more effort and thus perform better.
Now consider the situation where a peer with ability 1/θ j is doing the task
simultaneously, where – without loss of generality – we assume 1/θ j < 1/θi, i.e.,
j has a lower ability than i. Then, i’s reaction function is given by
ei
 
e j|θi

=
pEP
θi
+
α
θi
e j , (6.2)
while the corresponding function for j is
e j
 
ei|θi

=
pEP
θ j
+
αλ
θ j
ei (6.3)
as long as ei ≥ pEPθ j−αλ . Otherwise the two will select the same effort level. Note
that due to the presence of loss aversion, the peer effect (αλ/θ j) is more pro-
nounced for j, the slower of the two, than for i (α/θi) as long as the ability
level is not too different, i.e., λ > θ j/θi. The optimal effort provision by both
individuals is therefore given by:
e∗i
 
θi ,θ j

= pEP
1 + αθ j
θi − α2θ j
(6.4)
e∗j
 
θ j ,θi

= pEP
1 + αλθi
θ j − (αλ)2θi
(6.5)
Hence, effort increases in both intrinsic motivation (eEP) and own ability (1/θi)
as in the case of no peer being present. Moreover, effort provision with a peer
present increases in the ability of the peer; the higher the ability of a peer, the
more effort an individual provides, and this peer effect is amplified by loss aver-
sion if the peer has a higher ability.8
8 These effort levels hold as long as the ability difference between the two individuals is not
too small, that is θ j − θi ≥ α(λ− 1)+ α2/θ j − α2λ2/θi + α3λ/θiθ j(1−λ). Otherwise they will exert
the same effort: e∗i, j = pEP
 
1+ α/θ j

/
 
θi − α2/θ j

.
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6.2.2 Optimal Peer Choice
We now consider an individual’s optimal peer choice. Given our experimental
design, we model this stage as choosing an effort level in the first run, and
assume that an individual i maximizes her utility function 6.1 given the reaction
function 6.2 over the peer’s effort. This means that the selection ignores the own
effect on the peer’s effort choice and treats it as fixed implying that students
are naive about their own influence on their peer. The optimal peer choice of i
then yields e∗j,PC =
pPC
2θi−α if ei > e
∗
j,PC and e
∗
j,PC =
pPC
2θi−αλ otherwise, or in terms
of ability:
1
θ ∗j,PC
=

pPC / pEP
2θi−α if
1
θi
≥ 1θ ∗i,PC
pPC / pEP
2θi−αλ if
1
θi
< 1θ ∗i,PC
(6.6)
Given this optimal peer choice and the bounds, we can conclude that
1
θ ∗j,PC
=

pPC / pEP
2θi−α if
1
θi
<
2−pPC / pEP
α(1−pPC / pEP)
1
θi
if 2−pPC / pEPα(1−pPC / pEP) ≤ 1θi ≤ 2−pPC / pEPαλ(1−pPC / pEP)
pPC / pEP
2θi−αλ if
2−pPC / pEP
αλ(1−pPC / pEP) <
1
θi
.
(6.7)
The expressions in equations 6.6 and 6.7 show that individuals with a suffi-
cient low ability choose even slower individuals as peers, and high ability indi-
viduals choose peers with an even higher ability. Moreover, between those two
extremes there is a range of individuals who prefer peers that have a similar
ability to them. Additionally, the peer’s preferred ability level depends on the
strength of the comparison parameter α and the ratio pPC / pEP (i.e., the ratio of
motivation during the peer choice and the running task).9 In our empirical anal-
ysis, we therefore investigate how personality characteristics and preferences
affect the peer choice.
The theoretical framework presented here mainly applies to the selection
of peers based on relative performance. If that would be the only motive deter-
mining peer choice, we would observe that the preferences over relative perfor-
mance would also be a main determinant for selection based on names. While
we will show in section 6.5 that this is indeed the case, other factors – most
prominently friendships – play an important role, as well. Nonetheless small ex-
tensions to our framework can rationalize such deviations from the preference
over relative performance. Individuals might receive an additional flat utility
9 This ratio can be interpreted as a proxy for a self-control problem. If individuals are aware
of their self-control problem and thus know that they will exert only low effort during the second
run, they can choose a faster peer knowing that she can serve as a commitment to exert more
effort.
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from running with their friends, leading the long-term self to trade off the de-
sired effort level and utility from interaction with friends.
6.3 Data
In most environments it is difficult to observe to whom people want to compare
their own performance. This is especially difficult when there is not a single
peer available as objective standard but rather several peers are observed at
the same time. Additionally, while most models such as the one presented in
section 6.2 assume peer selection takes only place based on preferences over
relative performance, any observed selection of peers is potentially based on
a much broader set of these peers’ characteristics. Hence, it is even harder to
determine preferences for relative performance comparisons based on selected
peers using observational data.
In this paper, we use the dataset of a framed field experiment presented
in Kiessling et al. (2018) to analyze multiple dimensions of preferences for
peers. The field experiment featured three treatments, which allowed for the
self-selection of peers and studied the impact of self-selection on performance.
As the experiment allowed for (controlled) self-selection of peers, it elicited pref-
erences for peers for a population of over 600 students in Germany. Additionally,
the experiment obtained the social network and several personal characteristics,
which we use in this study to analyze preferences for peers. In the following, we
describe in detail how preferences for peers were elicited. We refer the reader
to Kiessling et al. (2018) for a detailed description of the experiment itself.
6.3.1 Experiment
The experiment was embedded into physical education classes in German sec-
ondary schools. Subjects participated in two suicide runs, each consisting of a
series of short sprints along the lines of a volleyball court10: First, at the begin-
ning of the experiment alone; then at the end of the experiment simultaneously
with a peer, where the treatments implemented different peer-assignment rules
(random assignment, self-selection based on names, or self-selection based on
relative performance). Between the two runs, subjects participated in a survey.
In addition to socio-demographics, the survey asked students to reveal their pref-
erences for peers according to two dimensions and obtained several personal
10 The exact task was to sprint and turn at every line of the volleyball court. Subjects had to
line up at the baseline from where they started running to the first line of the court (6 meters).
After touching this line, they returned to the baseline again, touching the line on arrival. The next
sprint took the students to the middle of the court (9 meters), the third to the second attack line
(12 meters) and the last to the opposite baseline (18 meters), each time returning back to the
baseline. They finished by returning to the starting point. The total distance of this task was 90
meters.
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characteristics as well the social network of the class. In the following, we de-
scribe each of these survey elements in more detail.
6.3.2 Preference elicitation
The core element of this paper is to describe who people select as peers. The
survey elicited peer preferences for two situations, which were used to imple-
ment self-selected peers in the experiment. First, we elicited preferences for
situations solely based on relative performance (performance-based preferences).
Second, we asked for preferences for those settings where social information is
available (name-based preferences). These preferences were elicited independent
of the treatment, as the treatment was only assigned after the survey took place.
Note that these preferences are revealed rather than stated preferences as there
was a positive probability that these preferences were taken into account when
forming pairs due to the random assignment of treatments to classes.
We first discuss the elicitation of preferences for peers based on relative per-
formance. For this purpose, the survey presented subjects ten categories con-
sisting of one-second intervals starting from (4,5] seconds slower than their
own performance in the first run, to (0,1] seconds slower and (0,1] seconds
faster up to (4,5] seconds faster. Subjects indicated from which time interval
they would prefer a peer for the second run, irrespective of the potential peer’s
identity. This means the students could not base their decision on any charac-
teristics besides the relative performance. In the first row of the table, subjects
indicated their most preferred time interval, i.e., the most-preferred peer’s rela-
tive performance. In the second row, they indicated their second most preferred
interval; and so forth. We present a screenshot of the elicitation procedure in
Figure 6.1. We asked students to rank their seven most preferred time intervals
and therefore generated a partial ranking of potential peers for performance-
based preferences. Naturally, each time interval could only be chosen once, but
included potentially several peers. Similarly, some intervals might have been
empty.11
The second preference measure elicited preferences for situations, where
selection can be based on the identity of the peer (name-based preferences), i.e.,
subjects could condition their decision on all known characteristics of their peers.
We asked each student to state his or her six most-preferred peers from the same
gender within their class, i.e., those people with whom they would like to be
paired in the second run.12 They could select any person of the same gender,
irrespective of this person’s actual participation in the study or their attendance
11 Since we elicit preferences over the relative performance of peers and not whether these
preferences can be satisfied, having multiple potential peers is no concern.
12 In the experiment, pairs were only formed within gender. Hence, preferences were also re-
stricted to peers from the same gender.
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Figure 6.1. Screenshot of the survey question on performance-based peer preferences
Notes: The figure presents a screenshot of the survey module eliciting the preferences over relative
performance. In particular, it elicits a partial ranking of ten categories of relative ability ranging
from 4 to 5 seconds faster to 4 to 5 seconds slower.
in class.13 These classmates had to be ranked, creating a partial ranking of their
potential peers.
When subjects nominated a student, they were asked to indicate their belief
about the relative performance of the person. The belief elicitation was similar
to the one of the performance-based preferences described above: subjects could
indicate their beliefs about the performance of the potential peer in the first run
using the same ten categories in the same layout.
6.3.3 Personal characteristics and social network
After the preference elicitation, two further survey elements asked for personal
characteristics and the social network of the class. First, the survey included sev-
eral measures for personality traits and preferences: the Big Five inventory as
used in the youth questionnaire of the German socioeconomic panel (Weinhardt
and Schupp, 2011), a measure of the locus of control (Rotter, 1966), competi-
tiveness14, general risk attitude (Dohmen et al., 2011), and a short version of
the INCOM scale for social comparison (Gibbons and Buunk, 1999; Schneider
and Schupp, 2011). For each of multiple item characteristics, we use a factor
13 All subjects were informed that peers in the second run would always have the same gender
as themselves and would also need to participate in the study.
14 Rather than using tournament entry decisions asmeasures of competitiveness, we introduced
a continuous measure based on a subject’s agreement to four items on a seven-point Likert scale.
The statements were: (i) “I am a person that likes to compete with others”, (ii) “I am a person
that gets motivated through competition”, (iii) “I am a person who performs better when compet-
ing with somebody”, and (iv) “I am a person that feels uncomfortable in competitive situations”
(reversely coded). We then extracted a single principal component factor from those four items.
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analysis to retain one underlying principle components factor with mean zero
and standard deviation of one.
Second, we obtained the social network of the class: we asked every student
to name up to six friends in their class. Since the maximum number of friends
in the survey is six, we focus on undirected links. Therefore, we define that
friendship ties exist between person i and j if j was either nominated by student
i as a friend, or j herself nominated i as a friend. This means that students can
have than more than six friends if they were nominated by participants that they
did not nominate themselves.15
6.3.4 Summary statistics
We present summary statistics of our sample in Table 6.1. Overall, we have pref-
erence measures and the social network for 745 individuals from 48 classes
of grades 7 to 10 (aged 12 to 16) with 65% of students being female.16 This
amounts to 73% of all students in a class participating in the experiment.17 The
average class size is 25.44 and students have 6.81 friends on average with 78%
of those friends being from a student’s own gender. Turning to the performance
of individuals in the first run without a peer being present, we observe that on
average females took about 27.50 seconds to finish the running task, which does
not vary by age. Males, in contrast, improve their performance with age: while
the average performance of males in grade 7 is 25.29 seconds, it improves to
23.07 seconds in grade 10.
6.4 Determinants of preferences for peers
In this section, we analyze subjects’ preferences for peers. These preferences
correspond to two dimensions along which peer selection can occur more gener-
ally. Individuals may have limited information such as the relative performance
about their potential peers. Alternatively, they may know their peer group well
and therefore can condition their peer choice on many characteristics of po-
tential peers. The preferences elicited in our survey correspond to these two
cases: first, we asked subjects what (relative) performance their peer should
have (performance-based preferences), corresponding to the former dimension;
15 About 79% of the participants nominated six friends. Thus, we were worried that a maximum
of six friends might be restrictive and accordingly define friendships as undirected rather than
directed links.
16 These classes are from three Germany secondary schools from the highest track preparing
students for university entry after grade 12 (Gymnasien).
17Only those students who handed in parental consent forms prior to the experiment, who
did not choose to abstain from the study (which nobody did), and who were not absent from
the physical education lesson took part in the study. Since students did not know the exact date
where the study took place, we do not have any concerns about study-related absences from the
classes.
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Table 6.1. Summary statistics
7th grade 8th grade 9th grade 10th grade Total
Socio-Demographic Variables
Age 12.76 13.76 14.77 15.84 14.39
(0.44) (0.45) (0.39) (0.53) (1.24)
Female 0.59 0.63 0.67 0.70 0.65
(0.49) (0.48) (0.47) (0.46) (0.48)
Number of friends 6.90 6.99 6.94 6.49 6.81
(1.34) (1.61) (1.60) (1.67) (1.58)
Share of friends of own gender 0.82 0.73 0.84 0.75 0.78
(0.21) (0.24) (0.20) (0.26) (0.23)
Times (in sec)
Time 1 (Females) 27.71 27.13 27.35 27.78 27.50
(2.65) (1.98) (2.25) (2.72) (2.44)
Time 1 (Males) 25.29 24.54 23.60 23.07 24.15
(2.02) (2.50) (1.79) (2.01) (2.26)
Class-level Variables
# Students in class 25.12 25.64 26.01 25.01 25.44
(2.50) (2.16) (2.76) (3.02) (2.68)
Share of participating students 0.73 0.66 0.76 0.72 0.72
(0.12) (0.13) (0.17) (0.12) (0.14)
Observations 165 177 189 214 745
second, we elicited preferred peers based on names (name-based preferences),
where students in principle could condition their peer choice on all known char-
acteristics.
These two distinct preference measures allow us to describe to whom stu-
dents want to compare themselves and how they choose their social reference
point depending on their own personality. In the following, we begin by describ-
ing the performance-based preferences. In a second step, we use the information
gathered in the survey to analyze their determinants. That is, we ask which of
one’s own personality traits predict the relative ability of the most-preferred
peers. We then turn to name-based preferences. Similar to models in the net-
work formation literature, we lever the peers’ personality and social network to
analyze homophily in these characteristics.
6.4.1 Determinants of peer selection – Performance-based preferences
As described in section 6.3, we generated a partial ranking over ten categories,
each category consisting of a one second time interval. In the following, we first
describe patterns in the preferences. Afterwards, we analyze which personality
traits are associated with the respective peer preferences.
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Figure 6.2. Distribution of performance-based peer preferences
Notes: The figures (a) and (c) through (f) present histograms of students’ preferences over relative
performance. Panel (a) presents the distribution of relative times of most-preferred peers, Panel
(c) and (d) present the second and third performance-based preference, respectively, while Panel
(e) and (f) show the distribution for females and males. The intervals used here and in the survey
are one second intervals of relative times in the first run. Vertical lines indicate own time (black;
equals zero by definition) and mean preference (red; where we used the mean of each interval to
calculate the mean). Panel (b) presents the relationship of the first performance-based preference
and the second/third preference.
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Figure 6.2 presents the preferences for peers over relative performance. First,
turning to the distribution of the most-preferred performance differential (Fig-
ure 6.2a), we find that students prefer peers from the entire possible set. In
other words, students’ first preference ranges from 4 to 5 seconds slower to 4
to 5 seconds faster peers, spanning every one second interval in between. Sec-
ond, around half of the students prefer similarly performing peers, i.e., their
first performance-based preference lies within one second of their own time in
the first run. Finally, students prefer on average slightly faster peers, i.e., they
select peers who were .56 seconds faster in the first run corresponding to .20
SD in terms of times in the first run. As Figures 6.2e and 6.2f show, males pre-
fer slightly faster peers than females.18 This tendency for males to select faster,
potentially more challenging peers is in line with previous findings that men
are more likely to select into competitive environments (for an overview of this
literature see Dariel et al., 2017) or choose harder challenges (Niederle and
Yestrumskas, 2008).19
In Figures 6.2c and 6.2d, we present the distributions of the second and
third highest ranked interval. While the probability mass in these histograms
is shifted towards a relative time of zero, this is just an artifact of the limited
amount of categories as can be seen in Figure 6.2b. The figure shows the rela-
tionship between the first performance-based preference and the second as well
as the third one. We observe that the second and third preference are centered
around the first performance-based preference. Using tobit regressions, we show
in Appendix Table 6.A.1 that the second and third preferences are indeed clus-
tered around the most-preferred relative time.20 In the following analyses, we
therefore focus on the first performance-based preference only as this preference
captures the same information as the lower-ranked ones.
In general, the histograms support the conjecture of Festinger (1954, p. 121)
that people compare themselves to others who are “close to [their] own ability”
and is in line with evidence from other disciplines noting also tendencies to
engage in upward comparisons (e.g., Huguet et al., 2001). Yet, this does not
hold for all of our subjects. In particular, there is a sizable share of subjects who
prefer peers that do not have a similar ability as measured by their time in the
first run.
18 The difference corresponds to .61 seconds. Moreover, in Appendix 6.A, we present additional
splits by age group and do not find any differences across cohorts.
19 Yet, as our analysis below shows, this difference can be explained by gender differences in
personality characteristics.
20 The categories in which subjects preferred a much faster or much slower peer as the first
preference naturally show a different pattern due to censoring. This explains why we do not find
a perfect relationship with a slope of 1. Tobit regressions in Appendix Table 6.A.1 confirm this
intuition: allowing for censoring at the lower and upper limit, the regression coefficient on the
second preferences is .97 and we cannot reject the hypothesis that the coefficient equals one.
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In order to further investigate the choice of a preferred peer and analyze
which characteristics predict the choice, we divide subjects preferences into
three categories – preferring slower peers (i.e., preferring more than one sec-
ond slower peers), similar peers (preferring up to one second slower or faster
peers), and faster peers (preferring peers more than a second faster). These
categories correspond to 15%, 50% and 35% of all preferences, respectively.21
First, we analyze how own ability measured by an individual’s time in the
first run is related to peer choice. In order to do this, we estimate a multinomial
logit model of peer choice categories. To begin with, we explain individual i’s
of class c chosen peer categories k – where k may be slower, similar, or faster –
with time in the first run, gender and class fixed effects:
Pr[PCic = k] =
exp

αk + βkX i + γc + δi
	∑
l exp

αl + βlX i + γc + δi
	 k = slower,similar,faster
(6.8)
Panel (a) of Table 6.2 presents the corresponding marginal effects. We find di-
rectional evidence on the 10% significance level that the slower students are in
the first run, the less likely they are to choose faster peers. Interpreting the time
in the first run as a measure of ability, we find that this is broadly consistent
with the prediction of the model outlined in section 6.2. More specifically, being
one second slower in the first run decreases the probability of choosing a faster
peer by 1.75 percentage points and increases the probability of choosing peers
with a similar ability.
In the following, we analyze how individuals’ personality measured by the
Big 5, locus of control, attitudes towards social comparison, competitiveness and
risk attitudes shape these preferences. In order to do so, we enrich our model
of peer choice by including personality traits and preferences as additional ex-
planatory variables in the vector of covariates X i . Panel (b) of Table 6.2 presents
the corresponding marginal effects. First, note that times in the first run do not
help to explain peer choices conditional on the rich set of personality character-
istics. Rather, we find that three traits are significant related to the peer choice –
extraversion, locus of control and competitiveness, of which competitiveness is
strongly related to performance. In order to capture the magnitude as well as the
overall patterns of these effects more easily, we present the resulting marginal
effects for different levels of these three skills in Figure 6.3.22
21We also estimate specifications, where we split up similar peers into “similar but slower” and
“similar but faster” peers. Effects are in line with the specification using three categories. Since,
we do not find differential effects on those two categories, we focus on the specification with
three categories for the ease of exposition. We report these results in Appendix Table 6.A.2.
22 These figures plot the marginal effects of the three non-cognitive skills using the same model
as in Table 6.2 evaluated at levels of the personality characteristics ranging from -3 SD to +3 SD.
All other variables are hold constant at their mean value.
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Table 6.2. Marginal eects of choosing dierent peers
Peer category
slower similar faster
Panel (a): Only time
Time (First Run) 0.0026 0.0149* -0.0175*
(0.0071) (0.0082) (0.0091)
Female 0.0558 -0.0282 -0.0276
(0.0379) (0.0499) (0.0446)
Panel (b): Including personality
Time (First Run) 0.0110 -0.0056 -0.0054
(0.0074) (0.0095) (0.0105)
Agreeableness 0.0206 -0.0006 -0.0200
(0.0148) (0.0223) (0.0214)
Conscientiousness -0.0187 0.0035 0.0151
(0.0161) (0.0207) (0.0173)
Extraversion 0.0421*** 0.0237 -0.0658***
(0.0119) (0.0188) (0.0155)
Openness to Experience -0.0115 -0.0024 0.0140
(0.0128) (0.0225) (0.0204)
Neuroticism -0.0034 0.0193 -0.0159
(0.0221) (0.0264) (0.0248)
Locus of Control -0.0417** -0.0008 0.0425*
(0.0177) (0.0259) (0.0250)
Social Comparison 0.0031 0.0049 -0.0081
(0.0180) (0.0228) (0.0184)
Competitiveness 0.0231 -0.0720** 0.0489*
(0.0177) (0.0302) (0.0278)
Risk Attitudes 0.0018 0.0050 -0.0069
(0.0161) (0.0229) (0.0207)
Female 0.0254 -0.0272 0.0019
(0.0498) (0.0555) (0.0552)
Observations 623 623 623
Class Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Baseline Probability .15 .5 .35
Notes: This table presents marginal effects from multinomial logistic regressions using indicators
for three categories of performance-based preferences as the dependent variable. *, **, and ***
denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level. Panel (a) uses only time in the first run as
an independent variable, while panel (b) also includes personality measures. Standard errors in
parentheses and clustered on class-level.
Increasing extraversion is related to substituting away from faster peers to-
wards slower peers. A one standard deviation increase in extraversion reduces
the probability to choose a faster peer by 6.58 percentage points and increases
the probability to choose a relatively slower peer by 4.21 percentage points. This
corresponds to a 19% decrease relative to the baseline of choosing a faster peer
and a 28% increase for slower peers. In general, higher levels of extraversion are
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Figure 6.3. Marginal eects of personality characteristics on peer choice
Notes: These figures present marginal effects of the results in Table 6.2 for three personality
characteristics, namely extraversion, locus of control, and competitiveness. Solid green lines with
diamonds () correspond to preferring slower peers, dashed orange lines with circles (•) indicate
peers of similar ability (±1 sec.), and dotted blue lines with triangles (4) correspond to faster
peers.
associated with a lower probability of preferring faster peers but rather favoring
slower ones, while leaving the probability of subjects preferring similar peers
mainly unaffected.
Having a more internal locus of control has the opposite pattern as extraver-
sion. A one standard deviation increase of locus of control increases the proba-
bility of choosing a faster peer by 4.25 percentage point, while it decreases the
probability of choosing slower peers by 4.17 percentage points. As presented in
Figure 6.3b, high levels are associated with subjects switching away from slower
peers to faster peers. Again the share of subjects preferring similar peers is nearly
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unaffected. This behavior matches well with the core concept that people with
a higher internal locus of control have higher aspirations and expectations for
themselves (Phillips and Gully, 1997; Yukl and Latham, 1978; Ng et al., 2006).
Finally, the pattern for competitiveness is quiet different. More competitive
individuals have a 4.89 percentage points higher probability of choosing a faster
peer, while their share of similar peers is reduced by 7.20 percentage points.23 In
general, subjects scoring very low on the competitiveness scale choose predom-
inantly peers that have a similar performance in the first run. This changes as
individuals get more and more competitive; they prefer mainly faster and some
slower peers. Only 20% of the most competitive subjects select similar peers.
This relationship suggests that the influence of competitiveness on behavior is
non-trivial. The previous literature related this trait mainly to tournament en-
try decisions (e.g., Niederle and Vesterlund, 2007). Here, we highlight the dual
nature of competitiveness: More competitive individuals either seem to choose
situations were “winning” their second run is very likely, or they choose espe-
cially challenging situations, i.e., competitiveness seems to indicate a preference
for unambiguous results. Other characteristics do not seem to affect peer pref-
erences over relative performance. Their point estimates are close to zero and
non-significant at any conventional level.
In conclusion, we observe significant relationships between an individual’s
personality and her peer preferences. On the one hand, we find that more ex-
traversive individuals and those scoring low on locus of control (i.e., with a
more external locus) switch from choosing faster peers to choosing slower peers
when increasing the respective characteristics. On the other hand, competitive
individuals avoid similar strong peers, but rather prefer either slower or faster
peers with more preferring the latter. These findings highlight that an individ-
ual’s characteristics are important for the selection of peers or (social) reference
points more generally.
6.4.2 Determinants of peer selection – Name-based preferences
The second set of preferences elicited in the survey allows students to state their
preferences based on the identity of their classmates by selecting peers from
a list of their classmates’ names. In contrast to performance-based preferences,
which stripped away all considerations that pertain to the social dynamics of the
observed group or the specific peer (i.e., individuals could condition their peer
choice only on information about relative past performance), students could in
23Note that these estimates show that it is not appropriate to estimate an alternative model
such as an ordered logit since the estimates show that there is no clear ordering of slower, similar
and faster peers. Intuitively, the same trait can lead to an increase in the likelihood to choose
faster or slower peers as the pursuit of winning will increase the likelihood to choose slower
peers, whereas the motive of competing with the best will increase the likelihood to choose faster
peers. Hence, there is no natural ordering of these categories.
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principle take all known information about their potential peers into account
when selecting their social reference point. In our analysis, we proxy the infor-
mation by a rich set of personality measures and individual specific network
characteristics. In the following, we first present summary statistics of these
preferences before we analyze their determinants.
Table 6.3. Share of name-based preferences being friends
Name-based Preference 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th overall
Share of peers being friends 0.89 0.79 0.73 0.60 0.49 0.41 0.65
Notes: This table presents the share of nominated peers for each of the six name-based preferences
elicited in the survey that are friends.
Table 6.3 presents the share of name-based peers that are friends of an indi-
vidual. While 89% of all individuals choose a friend as their most preferred peer,
this number decreases by about 10 percentage points for each of the following
preferences.24 Thus, this finding shows that friendship ties are a good proxy
for peers in general, which validates their use for other studies on peer effects.
However, note that there are some students who do not solely choose their peers
based on friendships. This suggests that some subjects – potentially strategically
– avoid some of their friends in favor of other class members. Hence, two ques-
tions arise: First, if students do not nominate solely their friends, whom do they
nominate? Second, given they nominate a friend, how do they decide which of
their friends to nominate? We answer these questions using a nomination model
similar to those used in the network formation literature (e.g., Graham, 2015).
In order to analyze the determinants of peer nomination in a structured
way, we assume the following. Let yi j equal one if individual i nominates in-
dividual j and zero otherwise. We allow the nomination to depend on unob-
served heterogeneity captured by individual fixed effects νi and ν j as well as a
measure of similarity between those two individuals in terms of K observables
X i = (x i1, . . . , x iK) and X j = (x j1, . . . , x jK) denoted by δ(·, ·), potential existing
friendship ties Fi j , and an idiosyncratic shock εi j for each nomination clustered
on the class-level. This yields the following linear probability model:
yi j = α + νi + ν j + δ(X i ,X j) + εi j (6.9)
In our application, we measure similarity in terms of the absolute difference
in each observable characteristics defined as δ(x ik, x jk)= βk|x ik − x jk|. Ho-
24 This pattern might be partially driven by the fact that students do not have enough friends of
the same gender in the class, which they can nominate. Yet, our data shows that 78% of friends are
of the same gender and thus there are sufficiently many friends to potentially nominate friends
in one of their first preferences (see Table 6.1).
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mophily – the tendency of individuals to nominate others with similar charac-
teristics (McPherson et al., 2001) – is then defined as βk < 0.25
We consider three sets of observable characteristics in which students po-
tentially exhibiting homophily. First, we allow for homophily in ability. That is,
higher differences in ability measured by times in the first run are likely to de-
crease the nomination probability. As we saw above, students have preferences
to run with peers of similar ability. Therefore, it is likely to play a role also for
name-based preferences. If one of their friends is much faster than they are,
they potentially want to avoid that person. Second, we consider homophily in
several personality characteristics, namely the Big Five, locus of control, compet-
itiveness, attitudes to engage in social comparisons and risk attitudes. Several
of these characteristics may be important, similar to what has been found in the
network formation literature.26 Finally, the position of the peer within the so-
cial network itself may be important. Popular individuals might be more likely
to get nominated if other students would like to interact with a popular student
or if those students are just more visible. We therefore consider the effects of the
presence of friendship ties between i and j as well as other homophily terms in
network characteristics: degree (the number of friends), eigencentrality (influ-
ence in a network), and clustering (embeddedness of an individual in a given
network).27
In our analysis, we define a person to be nominated as a peer if this person
is part of the first three nominated name-based peers, i.e., if she is one of the
three students somebody would be most willing to be paired with in the second
run.28 Peers according to this definition obviously constitute the most important
nominations. Moreover, our matching rule to form pairs – a stable roommate
algorithm – ensures that students are most likely to be paired with one of these
three preferred peers.
Table 6.4 presents the results of the estimation of the linear probability
model (equation 6.9). Column (1) restricts attention to homophily in person-
25 Similarly, heterophily – the tendency to avoid others who are similar – is then defined as
βk > 0.
26 A common finding across these studies is that extraversion and agreeableness are important
for forming a link between two nodes of a social network. Moreover, many studies find homophily
in one or several dimensions, i.e., similar individuals are more likely to be linked to each other
(see, e.g., McPherson et al., 2001; Jackson, 2014; Girard et al., 2015). In our setting we take the
social network as given, yet a similar logic may drive the nomination process.
27 Eigencentrality is a measure of influence of an individual in a given social network. It mea-
sures whether an individual is connected to other influential individuals. Clustering describes the
share of friends that are also friends of each other. In order to facilitate interpretation of these
two measures, we standardize them such that we can interpret differences in units of standard
deviations.
28 That is, we define yi j = 1 if and only if j is nominated in i’s first three name-based prefer-
ences and yi j = 0 otherwise.
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Table 6.4. Linear probability model of nominating a peer
Nominated Peer
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Abs. Diff. in Time of First Run -0.0408*** -0.0292*** -0.0297*** -0.0580***
(0.0066) (0.0058) (0.0058) (0.0156)
Abs. Diff. in Beliefs over Times in First Run -0.0443***
(0.0162)
Homophily in Personality
Abs. Diff. in Agreeableness -0.0380*** -0.0365*** -0.0334*** -0.0347*** -0.0551** -0.0713**
(0.0091) (0.0094) (0.0100) (0.0103) (0.0229) (0.0300)
Abs. Diff. in Conscientiousness -0.0125 -0.0124 -0.0017 -0.0044 0.0013 -0.0120
(0.0124) (0.0114) (0.0093) (0.0096) (0.0209) (0.0247)
Abs. Diff. in Extraversion -0.0265** -0.0297** -0.0146 -0.0155 -0.0111 -0.0332
(0.0126) (0.0129) (0.0112) (0.0105) (0.0248) (0.0323)
Abs. Diff. in Openness -0.0050 -0.0080 -0.0038 -0.0022 0.0052 -0.0243
(0.0128) (0.0131) (0.0112) (0.0114) (0.0253) (0.0326)
Abs. Diff. in Neuroticism -0.0148 -0.0217* -0.0142 -0.0155 -0.0451 -0.0498*
(0.0119) (0.0122) (0.0104) (0.0096) (0.0281) (0.0285)
Abs. Diff. in Locus of Control -0.0108 -0.0101 -0.0035 -0.0012 -0.0203 -0.0154
(0.0116) (0.0123) (0.0097) (0.0104) (0.0283) (0.0269)
Abs. Diff. in Social Comparison -0.0347*** -0.0319** -0.0223*** -0.0246*** -0.0512** -0.0561**
(0.0108) (0.0118) (0.0081) (0.0080) (0.0219) (0.0256)
Abs. Diff. in Competitiveness -0.0374** -0.0253* -0.0179* -0.0174* -0.0355 -0.0385
(0.0144) (0.0129) (0.0102) (0.0102) (0.0307) (0.0275)
Abs. Diff. in Risk Preferences -0.0133 -0.0185 -0.0050 -0.0026 0.0194 -0.0151
(0.0158) (0.0157) (0.0102) (0.0106) (0.0325) (0.0308)
Friendship Ties
Friendship Indicator 0.3935*** 0.3745*** 0.4196***
(0.0189) (0.0185) (0.0384)
Homophily in Network Characteristics
Abs. Diff. in Degree 0.0080 -0.0074 -0.0006
(0.0081) (0.0250) (0.0190)
Abs. Diff. in Eigencentrality (std.) -0.0508*** -0.0410 -0.0800
(0.0182) (0.0457) (0.0570)
Abs. Diff. in Clustering (std.) -0.0178 -0.0110 -0.0957**
(0.0184) (0.0479) (0.0422)
Own Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Peer Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Using Beliefs No No No No Yes No
Using Friends only No No No No No Yes
N 7084 6654 6654 6572 2920 2894
R2 0.20 0.21 0.37 0.37 0.71 0.67
Notes: This table presents the results of the linear probability model according to equation 6.9
using an indicator of being nominated as one of the three most-preferred name-based peers as the
dependent variable. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level. Column
(5) uses beliefs over relative performance rather actual relative performance and thus restricts
the sample to those observations with information over the beliefs. Column (6) restricts the set
of potential peers to friends only. Standard errors in parentheses and clustered on the class-level.
ality measures. Similar to findings from the network formation literature (e.g.,
Selfhout et al., 2010), we find significant homophily in two of the Big Five,
namely agreeableness and extraversion. A one standard deviation difference in
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those characteristics decreases the probability of nominating a particular peer
by 3.80 and 2.65 percentage points for agreeableness and extraversion, respec-
tively. Moreover, differences in the attitudes towards social comparisons and in
competitiveness also decrease the nomination probabilities. More precisely, a
one standard deviation increase in the absolute difference in social comparison
attitudes and competitiveness decreases the probability by 3.47 and 3.74 per-
centage points. One possible interpretation of the latter effects is the following:
individuals who tend to dislike social comparisons or are rather uncompetitive
avoid peers that are eager to compare themselves as these students create a
more competitive atmosphere or enforce social comparisons. Students, however,
that gravitate towards social comparisons might actively seek out these peers to
motivate themselves.
The second column additionally includes absolute differences in ability as
measured by times in the first run. We observe a strong and significant ho-
mophily factor of 4.08 percentage points for these differences. Notably, except
from competitiveness the influence of all the characteristics discussed above re-
mains constant in magnitude and precision when adding absolute differences
in performances to the model. The coefficient for homophily in competitiveness
decreases to 2.53 percentage points since performance in the first run and com-
petitiveness are strongly associated.29
Adding an indicator for friendship ties in column (3) shows that these links
are highly predictive for nominations. Existing friendship ties increase the nom-
ination probability of potential peers by 39.35 percentage. While this effect is
hardly surprising given the share of friends amongst nominated peers (as dis-
played in Table 6.3), other dimensions remain important for the nomination
process even conditional on friendship ties. In particular, we still observe ho-
mophily in ability as measured by times in the first run, agreeableness and atti-
tudes for social comparisons.
We additionally control for the absolute differences in network character-
istics in column (4). This reveals that the position in the social network is im-
portant, as well. Individuals are much more likely to be nominated as peers if
they have a similar eigencentrality, i.e., have a similar influence in the network.
More specifically, a one standard deviation difference in eigencentrality between
two individuals decreases the nomination probability by 5.08 percentage points.
This effect is larger than the remaining homophily terms on ability, agreeable-
ness and social comparison and highlights the importance of having detailed
information on entire social networks for understanding peer preferences.
Summarizing our results so far highlights that information on friendship
ties is by far the most important determinant of peer nominations. However,
29 The correlation between time in the first run and competitiveness is -.46 implying that more
competitive individuals are on average faster (have a lower time) than less competitive ones.
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this information does not reveal which of your friends you nominate. Table 6.4
conveys that differences in ability and two personality measures – agreeableness
and attitudes to engage in social comparisons – as well as the difference in one’s
influence in a social network measured by eigencentrality are all important for
understanding the peer nomination process. If a friend has, for instance, a highly
different ability or does engage in more comparisons with others, the likelihood
of nominating this friend decreases strongly.
For the preceding analysis, we used the time in the first run as a measure of
ability. However, students in the experiment neither did know about their own
performance in the first run nor about that of their peers. For the nomination
process, they have to rely on their beliefs about the relative performance of their
peers. We therefore check our results by including the beliefs over relative per-
formance rather than actual relative performance in column (5).30 The results
– except the effect of homophily in eigencentrality, whose coefficient remains
similar in size but is now insignificant – are robust to using beliefs rather than
actual relative performance. In fact, homophily in these characteristics is even
more pronounced. It amounts to 4.43 percentage points for a one second dif-
ference in believed ability differences, 5.51 and 5.12 percentage points for one
standard deviation differences in agreeableness and social comparison attitudes.
Yet, the analysis using beliefs is based on a much smaller sample than the one
presented here. This is due to the fact that beliefs are only measured for those
individuals which are nominated as one of their first three name-based prefer-
ences.31
Our analysis, so far, has looked at the nomination process across the whole
class of an individual. It is also interesting to analyze whether the observed
patterns hold when looking at nominations solely among friends. Studying this
restricted sample of potential peers is meaningful as friends often share many
similar characteristics due to homophily. Column (6) presents the results and
shows that these are similar with one exception: rather than eigencentrality,
clustering seems to be important for peer choice.32 A clustering coefficient is
high if friends of an individual are also friends with each other – that is, those
individuals likely belong to the same clique given that we have restricted the
30 In Appendix Table 6.C.1, we present additional estimates corresponding to columns (1)
through (3) of Table 6.4.
31 In Appendix 6.B, we show that beliefs and actual relative performance are strongly related
to each other. Moreover, we show the consistency of the beliefs by validating that they are stable.
In particular, we lever a second belief elicitation over the relative performance of the peer in the
first run that was elicited just before the second run took place. This second belief measure and
the one used in the elicitation of name-based preferences are indeed highly correlated indicating
that the beliefs are meaningful.
32 Similarly to the robustness check using beliefs, Appendix Table 6.C.1 presents additional
specifications corresponding to the other columns of Table 6.4 for the restricted sample of friends
only.
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sample to friends only. Thus, when focusing on friends, not the relative influence
of a given person matters, but rather whether she is as embedded as oneself in
the network.
6.5 Relationship between performance- and name-based
preferences
The preceding sections have analyzed both performance- and name-based pref-
erences in isolation. A natural next step is to ask whether and, if yes, to what
extent the two preference dimensions are related. Until now, we have estab-
lished that students, on average, prefer to be paired with somebody slightly
faster than themselves. At the same time, this preference is significantly related
to several personality measures, namely extraversion, locus of control, and com-
petitiveness. Second, we analyzed whom do students choose if they in principle
can condition their peer choice on a larger set of information. We found that
although friendship ties are crucial for understanding peer preferences, there
exist non-negligible homophily in ability, agreeableness and the tendency to en-
gage in social comparisons. We now study the relation of the two preferences
and analyze whether students indeed target peers with ability levels similar to
their own as indicated by the homophily term in Table 6.4, or whether they ac-
tually try to target their preference over relative performance when nominating
peers based on names.
Figure 6.4 and Table 6.5 show the relation of performance- and name-based
preferences. We plot the relative performance level of the most preferred name-
based peer against the most preferred relative performance level. More specifi-
cally, Figure 6.4a and Panel (a) of Table 6.5 use beliefs over the relative perfor-
mance of peers nominated in the name-based preferences. We observe a positive
relationship: If subjects nominate a peer that they belief is one second faster than
themselves, they choose a .44 seconds faster peer in their performance-based
preferences (column (2)). Similarly, we observe a significant positive relation-
ship between binary indicators of believing that the most preferred name-based
peer is faster and choosing a faster peer in the performance-based preference.
However, the relationship between name- and performance-based preferences
is not perfect as it would be the case if students just try to select a name-based
peer corresponding solely to their performance-based preferences. If this would
be the case, we observed regression coefficients of unity. A similar, although
less pronounced pattern holds if we look at actual time differences rather than
beliefs in Panel (b) of Table 6.5.
A possible interpretation to explain this imperfect relation is the fact that
preferences for peers are multidimensional in nature. In this case the coeffi-
cients smaller than one would result from other dimensions being important
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Figure 6.4. Relationship of performance- and name-based preferences for peers
Notes: The figures present the relationship between performance- and name-based preferences
using either beliefs over peer’s performance (Panel (a)) or peer’s actual performance (Panel (b)).
Corresponding regressions are presented in Table 6.5.
and being used when nominating peers based on names.33 In order to show
that preferences for peers are indeed multidimensional and that name-based
preferences in contrast to performance-based preferences allow students to take
other dimensions into account, we enrich the linear probability model from the
previous section, equation 6.9, and additionally include a peer’s absolute devi-
ation from the most-preferred relative performance in the nomination model.
Table 6.6 presents the results of this analysis.
In column (1), our main specification, we observe homophily between the
nominated peers and the most preferred performance of 2.37 percentage points,
similar to the previous effect of homophily in ability as reported in Table 6.4. The
direct homophily in ability is now much smaller and not significant at all con-
ventional levels. Thus, students indeed target individuals that are close to their
most-preferred performance rather than those who are close to their own perfor-
mance. Importantly, the other homophily terms that were found to be important
for the peer choice in the previous analysis of Table 6.4 remain unaffected: both
agreeableness and attitudes to engage in social comparisons exhibit strong ho-
33 A second possible explanation is that the true relation is indeed perfect and measurement
error attenuates this association. We discuss this in Appendix 6.D, where we show that the prefer-
ence measures would need more noise than actual signal components to explain the coefficients
smaller than one. This makes measurement error as sole cause for this imperfect relation rather
unlikely.
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Table 6.5. Relationship between performance- and name-based preferences
(a) Peer’s relative time (b) Peer is faster (binary)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Perf.-based pref. and name-based beliefs
Belief over name-based peer’s performance 0.43*** 0.44***
(0.06) (0.06)
Belief over name-based peer’s performance (0/1) 0.29*** 0.29***
(0.03) (0.04)
Personality No Yes No Yes
Class FEs, Gender, Age Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 781 648 781 648
R2 .23 .28 .17 .2
Panel B: Perf.-based pref. and name-based actual performance
Relative Time of most-preferred name-based peer 0.09*** 0.09***
(0.03) (0.03)
Preferred name-based peer is faster 0.04 0.03
(0.03) (0.04)
Personality No Yes No Yes
Class FEs, Gender, Age Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 662 562 662 562
R2 .11 .13 .095 .12
Notes: This table presents least squares regressions using a peer’s relative time in one second
intervals or an indicator for preferring a faster peer according to the performance-based prefer-
ences as the dependent variable. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent
level. Standard errors in parentheses and clustered on class-level. Figure 6.4 presents the results
graphically.
mophily of 3.50 and 2.35 percentage points, respectively, and clustering has a
coefficient of 5.17 percentage points.
Columns (2) and (3) of Table 6.6 confirm these results using beliefs rather
than actual performance and restricting the sample to friends only. As previously,
the effects are even more pronounced for these subsets.
These results highlight that there exist a non-trivial relation between
performance- and name-based preferences; that is, the most preferred relative
ability and whom individuals choose as peers are indeed strongly related. This
implies that reference points over relative performance matter in natural envi-
ronments, in which these reference points are not induced by experimenters. Yet,
these measures do not coincide completely. Instead, being able to select peers
based on their names enables students to condition on a richer information set
and thus introduces additional dimensions to the peer choice process. Moreover,
while information on existing friendship ties play a crucial role, there exist sig-
nificant and robust homophily in other dimensions such as agreeableness and
attitudes towards social comparisons. These associations remain even if taking
performance-based preferences and social networks into account.
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Table 6.6. Linear probability model of nominating a peer II
Nominated Peer
(1) (2) (3)
Abs. Diff. in Time of First Run -0.0096 -0.0178
(0.0063) (0.0188)
Abs. Diff. from Perf.-based Preference -0.0237*** -0.0465***
(0.0066) (0.0137)
Abs. Diff. in Beliefs over Times in First Run -0.0061
(0.0180)
Abs. Diff. from Perf.-based Preference (using beliefs) -0.0794***
(0.0162)
Homophily in Personality
Abs. Diff. in Agreeableness -0.0350*** -0.0493** -0.0712**
(0.0105) (0.0239) (0.0301)
Abs. Diff. in Conscientiousness -0.0045 0.0042 -0.0131
(0.0094) (0.0219) (0.0240)
Abs. Diff. in Extraversion -0.0159 -0.0130 -0.0329
(0.0105) (0.0238) (0.0317)
Abs. Diff. in Openness -0.0016 0.0065 -0.0216
(0.0114) (0.0284) (0.0327)
Abs. Diff. in Neuroticism -0.0156 -0.0443* -0.0501*
(0.0094) (0.0259) (0.0284)
Abs. Diff. in Locus of Control -0.0012 -0.0211 -0.0152
(0.0104) (0.0284) (0.0271)
Abs. Diff. in Social Comparison -0.0235*** -0.0499** -0.0542**
(0.0078) (0.0216) (0.0253)
Abs. Diff. in Competitiveness -0.0168 -0.0310 -0.0399
(0.0104) (0.0300) (0.0263)
Abs. Diff. in Risk Preferences -0.0032 0.0140 -0.0202
(0.0105) (0.0306) (0.0306)
Friendship Ties
Friendship Indicator 0.3743*** 0.4120***
(0.0183) (0.0374)
Homophily in Network Characteristics
Abs. Diff. in Degree 0.0080 -0.0071 0.0013
(0.0080) (0.0236) (0.0184)
Abs. Diff. in Eigencentrality (std.) -0.0517*** -0.0374 -0.0811
(0.0183) (0.0466) (0.0576)
Abs. Diff. in Clustering (std.) -0.0187 -0.0040 -0.0971**
(0.0181) (0.0449) (0.0418)
Own Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Peer Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes
Using Beliefs No Yes No
Using Friends only No No Yes
N 6572 2920 2894
R2 0.38 0.72 0.67
Notes: This table presents the results of the linear probability model according equation 6.9 using
an indicator of being nominated as one of the three most-preferred name based peers as the
dependent variable. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level. Standard
errors in parentheses and clustered on the class-level.
6.6 Discussion and conclusion
As peers influence behavior in various aspects of our life as consumption, perfor-
mance on the job, or even financial investments, the question how and whom
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individuals select as these peers is crucial for understanding peer effects in gen-
eral and for designing policies aimed at leveraging them specifically. In this pa-
per, we study preferences for peers across two dimensions – either based on
relative performance levels or on the identity of peers – and analyze their re-
lation. We find that many subjects tend to favor comparisons with people who
have a similar or slightly higher ability level, or with their friends. Still, a large
degree of heterogeneity in preferences persists. Individual preferences for peers
are related to individual characteristics, as well as relative characteristics of the
potential peer. This highlights the importance of personality for selecting social
reference points as well as for the selection of more or less challenging environ-
ments more generally. While students target a preferred relative ability, even if
selecting peers based on their social identity, this is only one amongst several fac-
tors determining peer choices. A peer’s personality as well as existing friendship
ties are also crucial to understand who serves as a peer. These findings there-
fore stress the multidimensionality of preferences for peers and validate using
friendship ties as proxies for peers in other peer studies.
Understanding the heterogeneity of preferences for peers might not only be
useful from an academic point of view, but also for many practical settings. Our
results can help teachers or supervisors to figure out how peer groups emerge
endogenously in schools or in the workplace. Even more importantly, we high-
light that an individual’s personality is crucial for the selection of social refer-
ence points. In order to design institutions that lever the positive impact of peers
optimally and foster performance, it is not only necessary to understand how in-
dividuals select into different environments (e.g., Müller and Schwieren, 2012;
Dohmen and Falk, 2011), but also how individuals choose relevant peers within
these environments. This helps to realize the difficulties that lie in designing
optimal re-assignment policies as in Carrell et al. (2013), and complements the
theoretical discussion of Ederer and Patacconi (2010) who emphasize the role
of relevant reference groups in tournaments.
Our descriptive analysis of preferences for peers is in line with the previous
literature (e.g., Blanton et al., 1999; Huguet et al., 2001): students prefer simi-
lar, but slightly more able peers. Combined with our results on the importance of
personality for peer selection, this process can potentially have far reaching ef-
fects. A student’s personality might indirectly impact educational attainment or
performance on the job, for instance, by selecting repeatedly into high perform-
ing environments that accelerate individual growth. Agostinelli (2018) provides
evidence that the peer environment of adolescents indeed affects skill develop-
ment and life outcomes. Our results demonstrate how personality traits help
to understand the formation of peer groups and thus contribute to our knowl-
edge of the link between personality and life outcomes. These potentially long-
lasting effects create a new avenue for interventions: How can individuals of
different personality be encouraged to select themselves into peer groups that
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help them to unfold their full potential? Moreover, students might not be per-
fectly aware how their peers affect their own performance raising the question
whether these preferences would change if they are informed about these effects
or even “nudged” to select specific peers.
Our results can be seen as a first step to document the multidimensionality
of preferences for peers. Nevertheless, further research on the interaction of
personality, selection into specific (peer) environments, and the influence of
peers is needed to improve our understanding of social comparison processes
and the endogenous formation of peer groups as well as their consequences for
important outcomes later in life.
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Appendix 6.A Additional material for performance-based
preferences
Figure 6.A.1 presents histograms similar to Figure 6.2 by cohort. More specifi-
cally, each histogram corresponds to the most-preferred relative times for each
of grades 7 to 10 corresponding to ages 12 to 16. The resulting histograms look
similar across cohorts. In unreported regressions we confirm this and conclude
that there does not exist a gradient in these preference measures by age.
In Table 6.A.1, we analyze the relationship between first- and second-/third
performance-based preference. Using Tobit regressions we allow for censoring
in the dependent variable at relative times of ±5 seconds. In columns (2) and
(4) we additionally control for censoring in the independent variables (the sec-
ond and third performance-based preference, respectively). We observe that we
cannot reject that the coefficient of the second-performance-based preference
equals one indicating that subjects indeed try to mimic their most-preferred rel-
ative time with their second preference. A similar pattern holds for the third
performance-based preference. We observe a significant association between
third- and first preference. However, due to the additional dependence intro-
duced by the second preference, the relationship is weaker.
Finally, we check whether the specification of Table 6.2 is restrictive by split-
ting the similar category in similar/slower and similar/faster corresponding to
the intervals of preferring a peer who is up to one second slower or one second
faster, respectively. Qualitatively, the patterns are similar to the results using
three categories.
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Figure 6.A.1. Distribution of performance-based peer preferences by grade
Notes: The figures present histograms of students’ preferences over relative performance by grade.
The intervals used here and in the survey are one second intervals of relative times in the first
run. Vertical lines indicate own time (black; equals zero by definition) and mean preference (red;
where we used the mean of each interval to calculate the mean).
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Table 6.A.1. Relationship between performance-based preferences
First perf.-based preference
(1) (2) (3) (4)
model
Second Performance-based Preference 0.92*** 0.97***
(0.04) (0.05)
Third Performance-based Preference 0.69*** 0.69***
(0.05) (0.05)
Censoring in independent Variable No Yes Yes Yes
Class FEs, Gender, Age Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 781 781 781 781
Pseudo R2 .21 .22 .11 .11
p-value: Coefficient=1 0.03 0.47 0.00 0.00
Notes: This table presents tobit regressions using the first performance-based preference as the de-
pendent variable with censoring at relative times of±5 seconds. *, **, and *** denote significance
at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level. Standard errors in parentheses and clustered on class-level.
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Table 6.A.2. Marginal eects of choosing dierent peers
Peer category
slower similar/slower similar/faster faster
Panel (a): Only time
Time (First Run) 0.0027 0.0153*** -0.0002 -0.0178*
(0.0072) (0.0058) (0.0073) (0.0093)
Female 0.0561 -0.0098 -0.0173 -0.0290
(0.0385) (0.0320) (0.0473) (0.0454)
Panel (b): Including personality
Time (First Run) 0.0108 0.0074 -0.0125 -0.0057
(0.0074) (0.0068) (0.0089) (0.0107)
Agreeableness 0.0196 0.0208 -0.0193 -0.0210
(0.0151) (0.0187) (0.0215) (0.0214)
Conscientiousness -0.0185 0.0349** -0.0315* 0.0150
(0.0164) (0.0149) (0.0182) (0.0175)
Extraversion 0.0416*** 0.0169 0.0085 -0.0670***
(0.0121) (0.0207) (0.0160) (0.0153)
Openness to Experience -0.0121 0.0056 -0.0056 0.0121
(0.0130) (0.0135) (0.0212) (0.0203)
Neuroticism -0.0039 0.0139 0.0064 -0.0164
(0.0223) (0.0195) (0.0218) (0.0248)
Locus of Control -0.0417** -0.0270 0.0259 0.0428*
(0.0179) (0.0186) (0.0205) (0.0252)
Social Comparison 0.0030 -0.0099 0.0151 -0.0083
(0.0183) (0.0183) (0.0224) (0.0186)
Competitiveness 0.0228 -0.0222 -0.0494** 0.0487*
(0.0179) (0.0213) (0.0244) (0.0280)
Risk Attitudes 0.0015 0.0136 -0.0074 -0.0077
(0.0162) (0.0202) (0.0186) (0.0205)
Female 0.0257 -0.0255 -0.0026 0.0024
(0.0500) (0.0402) (0.0541) (0.0556)
Observations 623 623 623 623
Class Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Baseline Probability .15 .21 .29 .35
Notes: This table presents marginal effects from multinomial logistic regressions using indicators
for four categories of performance-based preferences as the dependent variable. *, **, and ***
denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level. Standard errors in parentheses and clustered
on class-level.
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Appendix 6.B Relationship of actual performance and
beliefs
In this section, we first describe the relationship between beliefs and actual per-
formance. Afterwards, we provide evidence that the beliefs are meaningful, that
is they are consistent over time by leveraging a second measurement of the same
belief.
Beliefs over relative performance and actual relative performance do not
necessarily coincide. We therefore check how these two relate to each other. Fig-
ure 6.B.1a presents a scatter plot of the belief over relative performance of name-
based peers and their actual relative performance. We observe that although the
relationship is not perfect, these two are significantly related as is confirmed by
the corresponding regressions in Table 6.B.1. Figure 6.B.1b displays the absolute
differences between the beliefs and the actual relative performance. On average,
these two have an absolute difference of 1.95 seconds.
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Figure 6.B.1. Relationship of actual performance and beliefs
Notes: Figure (a) presents the relationship beliefs over and actual relative performance of the
name-based peers. The corresponding regression is presented in Table 6.B.1. Figure (b) presents
a histogram of the absolute difference in beliefs and actual performance. The vertical line in (b)
indicates mean absolute difference (red; where we used the mean of each interval to calculate
the mean). Intervals used here and in the survey are one second intervals of relative times in the
first run.
Moreover, we are interested whether the beliefs capture pure noise or
whether they are constant over time. To check for consistency of the beliefs,
we lever a second (binary) belief elicited right before the second run and com-
pare it to the beliefs elicited as part of the name-based preferences. The first two
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Table 6.B.1. Relationship between beliefs over and actual relative performance
(a) Peer’s relative time (b) Peer is faster (binary)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Relative Time of most-preferred name-based peer 0.24*** 0.24***
(0.03) (0.04)
Preferred name-based peer is faster 0.26*** 0.25***
(0.04) (0.05)
Personality No Yes No Yes
Class FEs, Gender, Age Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 662 562 662 562
R2 .21 .23 .16 .17
Notes: This table presents least squares regressions using a peer’s relative time according to the
beliefs of the name-based preferences as the dependent variable. *, **, and *** denote signifi-
cance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level. Standard errors in parentheses and clustered on class-level.
Figure 6.B.1 presents the results graphically.
columns of Table 6.B.2 use the continuous measure of beliefs over relative per-
formance as elicited in the name-based preferences as the dependent variable.
The second set of columns uses a binary version of this indicating whether the
student believed that the peer has been faster or slower. The sample is restricted
to those students with peers that are nominated somewhere in the name-based
preferences (i.e., of whom we have beliefs) and that are matched as a peer in
the second run (i.e., as only for those we have a second belief measure). This
naturally oversampled observations in Name. We thus check whether the pat-
tern differs depending on the treatment. As can be seen, the two measures are
significantly related with a correlation of .58. Moreover, this correlation does
not significantly vary with the assigned treatment.
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Table 6.B.2. Consistency of beliefs
(a) Continuous belief (b) Binary belief
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Believe peer is faster 1.96*** 0.58***
(0.23) (0.05)
Random × Believe peer is faster 2.00*** 0.53***
(0.27) (0.06)
Name × Believe peer is faster 1.92*** 0.59***
(0.23) (0.05)
Performance × Believe peer is faster 2.01*** 0.58***
(0.23) (0.05)
N 345 345 345 345
R2 .26 .27 .3 .31
Notes: This table presents least squares regressions using the beliefs over the peer’s performance
as elicited in the name-based preferences as the dependent variable. *, **, and *** denote signifi-
cance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level. Standard errors in parentheses and clustered on class-level.
The sample is restricted to those subjects with peers that are nominated in the name-based prefer-
ences and are actually matched for the second run, for which we have elicited a second (binary)
belief measure. 89 observations are from students in Random, 180 from Name, and 87 from
Performance.
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Appendix 6.C Additional material for name-based
preferences
This table checks the robustness of the findings from Table 6.4 using absolute
difference of the beliefs over the times in the first run rather than actual absolute
differences. This reduces the number of observations because we need to restrict
our sample to individuals that are nominated in the name-based preferences.
Table 6.C.1. Linear probability model of nominating a peer
Nominated Peer
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Abs. Diff. in Beliefs over Times in First Run -0.0385** -0.0448*** -0.0443*** -0.0061
(0.0165) (0.0153) (0.0162) (0.0180)
Abs. Diff. from Perf.-based Preference (using beliefs) -0.0794***
(0.0162)
Abs. Diff. in Time of First Run -0.0566*** -0.0580*** -0.0178
(0.0148) (0.0156) (0.0188)
Abs. Diff. from Perf.-based Preference -0.0465***
(0.0137)
Homophily in Personality
Abs. Diff. in Agreeableness -0.0380*** -0.0433* -0.0505** -0.0551** -0.0493** -0.0617** -0.0665** -0.0713** -0.0712**
(0.0091) (0.0222) (0.0222) (0.0229) (0.0239) (0.0294) (0.0278) (0.0300) (0.0301)
Abs. Diff. in Conscientiousness -0.0125 -0.0169 0.0046 0.0013 0.0042 -0.0188 -0.0119 -0.0120 -0.0131
(0.0124) (0.0241) (0.0208) (0.0209) (0.0219) (0.0251) (0.0244) (0.0247) (0.0240)
Abs. Diff. in Extraversion -0.0265** -0.0279 -0.0092 -0.0111 -0.0130 -0.0179 -0.0281 -0.0332 -0.0329
(0.0126) (0.0245) (0.0251) (0.0248) (0.0238) (0.0300) (0.0329) (0.0323) (0.0317)
Abs. Diff. in Openness -0.0050 0.0059 0.0064 0.0052 0.0065 -0.0139 -0.0211 -0.0243 -0.0216
(0.0128) (0.0287) (0.0246) (0.0253) (0.0284) (0.0318) (0.0339) (0.0326) (0.0327)
Abs. Diff. in Neuroticism -0.0148 -0.0480 -0.0405 -0.0451 -0.0443* -0.0279 -0.0443 -0.0498* -0.0501*
(0.0119) (0.0299) (0.0290) (0.0281) (0.0259) (0.0279) (0.0289) (0.0285) (0.0284)
Abs. Diff. in Locus of Control -0.0108 -0.0245 -0.0204 -0.0203 -0.0211 -0.0133 -0.0158 -0.0154 -0.0152
(0.0116) (0.0260) (0.0281) (0.0283) (0.0284) (0.0264) (0.0261) (0.0269) (0.0271)
Abs. Diff. in Social Comparison -0.0347*** -0.0688** -0.0488** -0.0512** -0.0499** -0.0561** -0.0525* -0.0561** -0.0542**
(0.0108) (0.0255) (0.0218) (0.0219) (0.0216) (0.0272) (0.0266) (0.0256) (0.0253)
Abs. Diff. in Competitiveness -0.0374** -0.0438 -0.0398 -0.0355 -0.0310 -0.0499 -0.0406 -0.0385 -0.0399
(0.0144) (0.0371) (0.0307) (0.0307) (0.0300) (0.0305) (0.0277) (0.0275) (0.0263)
Abs. Diff. in Risk Preferences -0.0133 0.0122 0.0140 0.0194 0.0140 -0.0084 -0.0232 -0.0151 -0.0202
(0.0158) (0.0296) (0.0307) (0.0325) (0.0306) (0.0293) (0.0289) (0.0308) (0.0306)
Friendship Ties
Friendship Indicator 0.4329*** 0.4196*** 0.4120***
(0.0379) (0.0384) (0.0374)
Homophily in Network Characteristics
Abs. Diff. in Degree -0.0074 -0.0071 -0.0006 0.0013
(0.0250) (0.0236) (0.0190) (0.0184)
Abs. Diff. in Eigencentrality (std.) -0.0410 -0.0374 -0.0800 -0.0811
(0.0457) (0.0466) (0.0570) (0.0576)
Abs. Diff. in Clustering (std.) -0.0110 -0.0040 -0.0957** -0.0971**
(0.0479) (0.0449) (0.0422) (0.0418)
Own Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Peer Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Using Beliefs No Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No No
Using Friends only No No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 7084 2957 2957 2920 2920 3152 2934 2894 2894
R2 0.20 0.68 0.71 0.71 0.72 0.64 0.66 0.67 0.67
Notes: *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level. Standard errors in
parentheses. Linear probability model using being nominated as one of the three most-preferred
name-based peers as an outcome.
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Appendix 6.D Additional material for relationship of
preferences
One potential explanation for the imperfect relationship between performance-
and name-based preferences is measurement error. Here we show that measure-
ment error is unlikely to explain the imperfect association alone. Assume that
we have classical measurement error and the true coefficient corresponds to one
(β = 1), then by the standard attenuation bias formula (Cameron and Trivedi,
2005, p. 903f.), we have that if x∗ = x + v with v being a mean-zero error with
variance σ2v ,
p lim βˆ =
σ2x∗
σ2x∗ + σ2v
β = λβ = λ (6.D.1)
as β = 1 and where λ is the attenuation factor.1 Thus the regression coefficients
in Table 6.D.1 correspond to the attenuation factors that would be needed for a
perfect relationship. For a more intuitive interpretation, we rewrite the factor in
terms of the noise-to-signal ratio s such that λ= 1/(1+ s). The noise-to-signal
ratio tells us how much noise relative to signals the data should have if the true
relationship is given by β = 1. We reproduce Table 6.5 here and additionally
present the corresponding noise-to-signal ratios of each coefficient below the
corresponding regressions. We find that all ratios exceed one, which implies
that the measurements would need to have more noise components than actual
information. We thus conclude that measurement error alone cannot explain
the imperfect relationship.
1 For the multivariate case the formula is slightly different, but the basic idea remains the
same.
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Table 6.D.1. Relationship between performance- and name-based preferences
(a) Peer’s relative time (b) Peer is faster (binary)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Perf.-based pref. and name-based beliefs
Belief over name-based peer’s performance 0.43*** 0.44***
(0.06) (0.06)
Belief over name-based peer’s performance (0/1) 0.29*** 0.29***
(0.03) (0.04)
Personality No Yes No Yes
Class FEs, Gender, Age Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 781 648 781 648
R2 .23 .28 .17 .2
Noise-to-Signal Ratio needed for β = 1 1.3 1.3 2.4 2.5
Panel B: Perf.-based pref. and name-based actual performance
Relative Time of most-preferred name-based peer 0.09*** 0.09***
(0.03) (0.03)
Preferred name-based peer is faster 0.04 0.03
(0.03) (0.04)
Personality No Yes No Yes
Class FEs, Gender, Age Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 662 562 662 562
R2 .11 .13 .095 .12
Noise-to-Signal Ratio needed for β = 1 9.7 10 25 28
Notes: This table presents least squares regressions using a peer’s relative time in one second inter-
vals or an indicator for preferring a faster peer according to the performance-based preferences
as the dependent variable. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level.
Standard errors in parentheses and clustered on class-level. The reported signal-to-noise ratio
describes the extend of measurement error needed if the true relationship is actually perfect (i.e.,
β = 1) rather than imperfect (β < 1). That is, a noise-to-signal ratio larger than one indicates
more noise than signal, equal to one corresponds to as much signal as noise and less than one
more signal than noise. Figure 6.4 presents the results graphically.
